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 Explicit and Implicit System of Corporate Control –  
A Convergence Theory of Shareholder Rights 
Dirk Zetzsche∗ 
September 23, 2004 
Abstract 
This paper categorizes Anglo-American, French and German systems of shareholder rights 
as either Implicit or Explicit Systems of corporate control. It challenges the orthodox view 
that inadequate protection of minority stockholders historically accounted for under-
developed capital markets by positing that explicit shareholder influence may substitute for 
market control. Different ethical roots prompted legislature to adopt either a friendly or a 
hostile attitude towards market forces. This paper further suggests that corporate laws will 
formally converge through Convergence Cycles towards a middle ground between the 
Implicit, and the Explicit System. Finally, it posits the need for a close interrelation of 
comparative and corporate finance research. The author’s example of the fertility of such a 
cooperation results in a dynamic, rather than static theory of ownership convergence. 
Historical, statutory, and new empirical evidence demonstrates German and American 
shareholders’ different propensity towards shareholder activism, and supports the three 
propositions.
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The capital market frenzy of the late 1990s and the following revelations of corporate 
misconduct have rattled eternal principles of traditional Corporate Governance1 theory for 
public corporations. Continuing a scholastic trend of the early 1990s,2 the tech bubble 
induced academia to rediscover its examination of the activism of shareholders3 who have 
                                            
1
 This paper uses the term Corporate Governance in a relatively narrow meaning, describing legal issues 
related to the problem of how equity investors receive a fair return on their investment in public corporations 
(see Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance“, (1997) J. Fin. 52, 737), and 
dealing with the corporate devices associated with the control of the management (see Joel Seligman, 
Corporations: Cases and Materials (1995), 133 – 230). 
2
 Bernard S. Black, “Shareholder Passivity Reexamined” (1990-1991) Mich. L.R.. 89, 520; Bernard S. 
Black, “Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice” (1991-1992) UCLA L.R. 39, 
811 Bernard S. Black, “The Value of International Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence“ (1991-
1992) UCLA L.R. 39, 895; Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee Jr., “Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor 
Behavior under Limited Regulation “ (1993-1994) Mich. L.R. 92, 1997; C. J. Campbell, Stuart L. Gillan & C. 
M. Niden, “Current Perspectives on Shareholder Proposals: Lessons from the 1997 Proxy Season” (1999) 
Financial Management 28, 89; W.T. Carleton, J.M. Nelson & M.S. Weisbach, “The Influence of Institutions 
on Corporate Governance through private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF,” (1999) J. of Fin. 53, 
1335; John C. Coffee, Jr., “Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor” (1991) 
Colum. L.R. 91, 1277; Lilli A. Gordon & John J. Pound, “Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder 
Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals” (1993) J. of Fin. 48, 697; 
Jonathan M. Karpoff, Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph A. Walkling, “Corporate Governance and Shareholder 
Initiatives: Empirical Evidence” (1996) J. of Fin. Econ. 42, 365; Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “The Role of 
Institutional and Retail Investors in Canadian Capital Markets” (1996) Osgoode Hall L.J. 31, 371; Jeffrey G. 
MacIntosh, “Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in Canada” (1995-96) Can. Bus. L.J. 26, 
145 – 188; Kathryn E. Montgomery “Market Shift – The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate 
Governance” (1995-96) Can. Bus. L.J. 26, 189; John J. Pound, “Proxy Voting and the SEC: Investor 
Protection v. Market Efficiency” (1991) J. Fin. Econ. 29, 241 [Pound, “Proxy Voting”], and “Proxy Contests 
and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight” (1988) J. Fin. Econ. 20, 237 [Pound, “Proxy Contest”]; Edward 
B. Rock, “The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism” (1991) Georgetown 
L.J. 79, 445; Roberta Romano, “Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered” 
(1993) Colum. L.R. 93, 795; Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, “A Survey of Shareholder Activism: 
Motivation and Empirical Evidence” (1998) Contemporary Finance Digest 2, 10; Robert Yalden, 
“Concentrated Control, Institutional Investors and shareholder responsibilities” (1995-96) Can. Bus. L.J. 26, 
86, 92 [Canada]. Even before this trend: Melvin Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal 
Analysis (1976), at 64-65. 
3
 Lucian Arye Bebchuck “Empowering Shareholders” (2003) Working Paper (from SSRN), and “The 
Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballott” (2003) Bus. Lawy. 59, 43 [Bebchuck, “The Case for Shareholder 
Access”]; Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Allen Ferrell “Federal Intervention to enhance shareholer choice” (2001) 
Virg. L.R. 87, 993; Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Oliver Hart “Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for 
Corporate Control”, ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, Working Paper No. 04/2002; Stuart L. Gillan & 
Laura T. Starks, “Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional 
Investors” (2000) J. of Fin. Econ. 57, 275; Michael Klausner, “Institutional Shareholders' Split Personality on 
Corporate Governance: Active in Proxies, Passive in IPOs” (2001) Stanford Law and Economics Olin 
Working Paper No. 225 (from SSRN); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall Thomas, “Aligning Corporate 
Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions” (1998) Mich. L.R. 96, 1018; critical: Roberta Romano, 
“Less is more: Making institutional investor activism a valuable mechanism for Corporate Governance” 
(2001) Y. J. on Reg. 18, 174. 
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traditionally been held to be rationally apathetic and disinterested in the control of their 
investments.4 This analysis intends to further the discussion about the role of shareholders 
in Corporate Governance, by highlighting some differences between present Anglo-
American and German and French Corporate Governance systems that have yet to be 
addressed in academic literature and their impact on the current convergence debate. A 
hypothesis relating to the likely outcome of legal and factual convergence rounds off the 
comparative inquiry into shareholder rights.  
The study is rooted in three key assumptions: First, the assumption that “[s]uccess 
(survival) accompanies relative superiority.” Thus, “[w]henever successful enterprises 
are observed, the elements common to those observed successes will be associated with 
success and copied by others in their pursuit of profits or success.”5 This principle also 
applies to the competition of Corporate Governance systems.6  
Second, if there is an ideal Corporate Governance model, this has yet to be unveiled: 
while, due to apparently strong minority rights, many (primarily American) scholars 
assume that the outcome of convergence would be the American model of “shareholder 
capitalism” in an environment of firms with dispersed ownerships,7 not all agree on the 
                                            
4
 This conception is based on Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933), at 
64-65, and 244 et seq., and has been repeated over and over again, for example by Clark, Corporate Law 
(1986), at 390 et seq.; Earl Latham, “The Commonwealth of the Corporation” (1960) Nw. U.L.R. 55, 25; 
Clark, Corporate Law (1986), at 390; Henry G. Manne, “Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting – An 
Essay in Honour of Adolf A. Berle”, (1964) 64 Colum. L.R. 1427, at 1437, at 1438 [Manne, “Some 
Theoretical Aspects”]; Bayless Manning, “Book Review”, (1958) Yale L.J. 67, 1477, 1485-1496; Siems, 
Convergence (2004), at 100 et seq. 
5
 Armen Albert Alchian, “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory,” J. Pol. Econ. (1950) v.58, p.211-
221, p. 213, 218.  
6
 See, for example, the seminal pieces by Harold Demsetz, “The Structure of Ownership and Theory of the 
Firm” (1983) J.L. & Econ. 26, 375; Robert Clark, Corporate Law (1986), at 801 et seq. (Appendix); Roberta 
S. Karmel, “Is it time for a federal corporation law?” (1991) Brook. L.R. 57, 55, 90, and Easterbrook & 
Fischel, Economic Structure (1991), at 212-218; this view has become almost ubiquitous, see for example 
David Charny, “The politics of corporate convergence”, in Gordon & Roe, Convergence and Persistence 
(2004), at 293, 296. 
7
 For example Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott “Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate 
Governance in the United States and Germany” (2003) ECGI Law Working Paper No. 17/2003 (From 
SSRN), at 3 et seq.; John C. Coffee, Jr. “Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and Its Implications” (1998-1999) 93 Nw. U. L.R. 641 [Coffee, “Future As History”], 
at 649, 698; Jeffrey N. Gordon, “An International Relations Perspective on the Convergence of Corporate 
Governance: German Shareholder Capitalism and the European Union, 1990-2000” (February 2003) 
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Law Working Paper No. 06/2003 [Gordon, “An 
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implicitly stated superiority hypothesis of the American model.8 Empirical data on the 
superiority of Anglo-American Corporate Governance is inconclusive.9 
Finally, Corporate Governance regulation is responsive to crises:10 When recession 
highlights corporate failures, the impact on the economy and public pressure force 
legislatures to deal with capital market crises following a plethora of failures. Whenever a 
crisis occurs, the question of what the right legislative response is to this crisis determines 
the content of legislation until the crisis is settled or forgotten, and investor confidence has 
been regained. Academia’s responsibility, however, is to deal with the general problem of 
how to guarantee proper business conduct without restraining entrepreneurial business 
creativity or otherwise raising social costs. While crises are not necessarily evidence of the 
                                                                                                                                     
International Relations Perspective”], p. 43, although Gordon accounts for the German convergence towards 
the American system with the German commitment to a project of transnational economic and political 
integration (EU integration) rather than with efficiency consideration; Henry Hansman & Reinier Kraakman, 
“The End of History for Corporate Law”, (2001) 89 Georgetown L.J. 439, 443 et seq. [Hansman & 
Kraakman, “The End”]; Roberta Romano, “A cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative 
Corporate Law” (1993) 102 Yale L.J. 2021, 2023 et seq. [Romano, “A cautionary Note”] 
8
 For example Masahiko Aoki, “Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm” (1990) J. Econ. Lit. 
28, 1; Julian Frank & Colin Mayer, ”Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of France, Germany 
and the U.K.” (1990) Econ. Policy 10, 189; Klaus J. Hopt & Patrick C. Leyens, “Board Models in Europe - 
Recent Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, 
and Italy” (2004) ECGI Law Working Paper No. 18/2004 (from SSRN), at 19 et seq. (for Board of Directors). 
The superiority of German and Japanese banking regulation also posits Mark J Roe, “Some Differences in 
Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States” (1992-1993) Yale L.J. 102, 1927, at 1936, and 
“A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance” (1991) Colum. L.R. 91, 10. 
9
 See - on the hand - the data by Mark Roe, “Corporate Law’s Limits”, (2002) 21 J. Legal Studies 233, at 
p. 251 [Roe, “Corporate Law’s Limits”]. These data are consistent with the fact that corporate scandals that 
have shaken the American corporate landscape have not been unveiled to the same extent in Germany. Rather, 
German shareholders merely associate corporate scandals with young Tech-stocks and the Neuer Markt, see 
the list of 45 firms that went either bankrupt or were subject to examinations by the Federal Agency for 
Financial Services, Manager Magazin Online, <www.manager-
magazin.de/geld/artikel/0,2828,186368,00.html>. On the other hand, other studies put forth that the fact that 
capital market pricing positively correlate to a cross-listing in the U.S. should be interpreted as evidence for 
better American minority rights protection, see, for example, Craig Dodge, “U.S. Cross-listings and the 
private benefits of control: evidence from dual-class firms” (2004) J. Fin. Econ. 72, 519, citing older studies. 
10
 Stuart Banner, “What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 years of Evidence”, (1997) Wash. 
U.L.Q. 75, 849, 850; Thomas Clarke, "Cycles of Crisis and Regulation: The Enduring Agency and 
Stewardship Problems of Corporate Governance" (2004) Corporate Governance: An International Review 12, 
153 [Clarke, "Cycles of Crisis and Regulation”]; John C. Coffee, Jr., “The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The 
Role of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control” (2001) Yale L.J. 111, 1 [Coffee, “The 
Rise”], at 66, speaks of “Crash Then Law” Cycles; Frank Partnoy, “Why Markets Crash and What Law Can 
Do About It”, (2000) U. Pitt. L.R. 61, 741, 743, with detailed citations from the various legislative steps in 
note 11. 
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presence of inefficient laws, crises encourage academics to review whether or not the law 
provides incentives for proper business conduct. 
Current comparative Corporate Governance research focuses on the extent of likely 
convergence between the Anglo-American and the Continental European systems of 
Corporate Control. Though various nuances hinder overgeneralization,11 scholastic 
opinions may best be assigned to one of three strains of thought. (1) The formal 
convergenists suggest that efficiency considerations and increasingly dispersed 
shareholdings will eventually overcome forces of divergence through democratic devices. 
These theorists submit that convergence at the level of formal legal rules is ongoing, and 
even already largely complete.12 (2) The divergenists suggest that political barriers, 
institutional complementarities, and path dependence will produce trajectories towards 
convergence. Therefore, at least any short-run tendency towards convergence will be 
unlikely to materialize, and differences will persist.13 (3) The intermediate position puts 
                                            
11
 Siems, Convergence (2004), at 24, counts six subcategories of convergence theory: besides the 
understanding of formal and functional convergence as described in the following, commentators discuss 1) 
contractual convergence (Gilson), referring to similarities resulting from contracting around state-provided 
rules, 2) hybrid convergence (Rose), meaning that, in a divergent legal surrounding, firms achieve 
convergence by changing its state of incorporation to a state with a more convergent regime, 3) normative 
convergence (Milhaupt), holding that convergence can be achieved factually despite divergent legal regimes, 
by changes of ethical and cultural backgrounds of law, and 4) institutional convergence (Charny, Black), 
referring to converging institutions in a still partially diverse legal surrounding.  
12
 Brian R. Cheffins, “Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via 
Toronto” (1999) Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 10, 5, 6, 39 et seq.; Lawrence A. Cunningham “Commonalities 
and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate Governance” (1999) Cornell L.R. 84, 1133, 
at 1145, 1194 [Cunningham, “Commonalities and Prescriptions”]; Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Pathways to Corporate 
Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany” (1999) Colum. J. Eur. L. 5, 
219 [Gordon, “Pathways”], and Gordon, “An International Relations Perspective”, supra note 7; Hansmann & 
Kraakman, “The End”, supra note 7; Edward B. Rock, “America's Shifting Fascination with Comparative 
Corporate Governance” (1996) Wash. U. L. Q. 74, 367; Siems, Convergence (2004), pp. 287 et seq.; Gustavo 
Visentini, “Compatibility and Competition Between European and American Corporate Governance: Which 
Model of Capitalism?” (1997-1998) Brook. J. Int’l L. 23, 833, 846 et seq. 
13
 Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Mark J. Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance” (1999) Stan. L.R. 52, 127, at 132 et seq. [Bebchuck & Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence”]; 
Douglas M. Branson, “The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance” 
(2001) Cornell Int’l L.J. 34, 321, at p. 325 et seq. [Branson, “The Very Uncertain Prospect”]; William W. 
Bratton & Joseph McCahery, “Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case 
against Global Cross-Reference” (1999) Columb. J. Tran’l L. 38, 213; David Charny, “The German Corporate 
Governance System”, (1998) Co. Bu. L.R. 145, and “The politics of corporate convergence”, in Gordon & 
Roe, Convergence and Persistence (2004), at 293, 297 et seq.; Marry E. Kissane, “Global Gadflies: 
Applications and Implications of U.S.-Style Corporate Governance Abroad” (1997) N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 621; Curtis J. Milhaupt, “Property Rights in Firms” in Gordon & Roe, Convergence and 
Persistence (2004), at 210, 243 et seq.; Mark Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners (1994), at 238-39, 280-81, 
- 5 - 
forth that different formal rules could produce similar outcomes with respect to the 
function, rather than the form of the rules [functional convergenists].14  
This analysis focuses particularly on one of the many aspects of the convergence debate, 
which is shareholders rights. Part B. compares the basic concepts of shareholder control in 
Anglo-America and some states of Continental Europe, and, in particular, those of the 
United States and Germany, respectively.15 It shows that three traditional categories of 
Corporate Governance systems – common vs. civil law countries, market- vs. bank-
centered economies, and share- vs. stakeholder models – are inaccurate. It thus introduces a 
new categorization between Implicit and Explicit Systems of corporate control, which are 
centered primarily around the concept of shareholder rights. The first category refers to 
statutes that are enacted and construed with the belief that market forces influence 
managers, assuming that active competition in the product, stock and managerial labor 
market has a significant impact on managerial behavior. Shareholder rights to be exercised 
in direct contact with the corporation are thought to be relatively weak. In contrast, direct 
shareholder influence through voting and (even minority) shareholder monitoring constitute 
the fundaments of the Explicit System. The former concept was established in Anglo-
America, and the latter is reflective of the Continental European states that this study 
regards. There is, however, not a bright-line distinction between these two concepts. No 
                                                                                                                                     
and Political Determinants (2003); Romano, “A cautionary Note”, supra note 7, at 2036; Reinhard H. 
Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, “Path dependence and complementarity in Corporate Governance”, in Gordon & 
Roe, Convergence and Persistence (2004), at 114, 117 et seq. [Schmidt & Schmidt & Spindler, “Path 
dependence and complementarity, “Path dependence and complementarity]. 
14
 Bernard S. Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets” (2000-
2001) 48 UCLA L.R. 781, at p. 846 [Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions”], if the jurisdiction is 
not caught in a “downsizing, self-reinforcing equilibrium” (see 838 et seq.); Coffee, “Future As History”, 
supra note 7, and “The Rise”, supra note 10, at p. 77; Ronald J. Gilson, “Corporate Governance and 
Economic Efficiency: When do Institutions Matter?” (1996) Wash.U.L.Q. 74, 327, 332-33 [Gilson, 
“Economic Efficiency”], and “Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function”, (2001) 
49 Am. J. Comp. Law 329, at p. 333 et seq. [Gilson, “Globalizing”]; Steven N. Kaplan, “Top Executives, 
Turn Over, and Firm Performance in Germany” (1994) J. L. Econ. & Org. 10, 142, 144; Steven N. Kaplan & 
Bernadette A. Minton, Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for 
Managers (1994) J. Fin. Econ. 36, 225, 256-57; Paul Rose, “EU Company Law Convergence Possibilities 
after Centros”, (2001) Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 11, 121. 
15
 The author is aware of the fact that Germany is not a synonym for Continental Europe, and he does not 
allege that the laws of other states are modelled after, or similar to, Germany. The German law (and also the 
French and Swiss law) are two out of more than 40 corporate laws in Continental Europe each of which have 
with different legal roots and traditions. In order to raise linguistic efficiency, the author uses the term 
“Continental Europe” merely as a geographical contrast to the United States and England.  
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jurisdiction has installed a “pure” system that includes implicit or explicit governance tools 
to the exclusion of the other.  
Voting, shareholder monitoring through meetings, shareholder suits revising the decisions 
of shareholder meetings, and minority protection legislation that enables minority 
shareholders to survive in the firm, as provided by German Konzernrecht, establish the 
Explicit System of shareholder control. The Implicit System includes public monitoring, 
takeover bids, the appraisal remedy, as well as protective measures for minorities and 
shareholder suits aimed at financial compensation. Per se, shareholder influence mediated 
through the board constitutes neither implicit nor explicit influence within the meaning of 
the above categories. 
Historical, statutory and empirical evidence accounts for this differentiation: The historical 
analysis reveals the support of market forces that is present in the Calvinistic-Puritan 
Christian belief that constitutes the ethical basis of the Anglo-American legal system – but 
also that of Switzerland and the Netherlands. The Catholic and Lutheran-Protestant belief 
that was predominant in the other states of western Europe favors policies that further the 
responsibility of those entrusted by God to the economically stronger parts of society for 
the benefit of overall society, and the balancing of the impact of market power in general. 
This belief facilitates the emergence of strong states that could hamper market forces where 
they conflict with the cultural obligation to care for one’s dependents.  
This philosophy is consistent with historically weak capital markets: if owners can neither 
sell their stake in the firm nor easily dismiss employees, they are likely to be interested in a 
long-term healthy business, and a relatively low stress relationship with their employees. 
Under these conditions, an Anglo-American style of implicit shareholder control through 
market forces was untenable. Since the need for controlling managers nevertheless existed, 
Germany and France developed explicit structures of shareholder control. This paper 
provides statutory evidence from some Continental jurisdictions, esp. Germany, showing 
that procedural rights preceding shareholder meetings, information rights, and shareholder 
remedies were enacted as direct and individual measures to control managers explicitly, 
resulting in a system with significantly less directorial deference than is the norm in the 
United States. 
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Empirical figures demonstrate the practical relevance of shareholder control. This paper 
presents formerly unpublished data showing that German shareholder meetings are huge 
events with thousands of shareholders present, while those in Anglo-America used to be 
non-events, relatively speaking. While extraordinary factors render the attendance as 
measured in votes incomparable, “soft data”, such as the website structure of American and 
German corporations add to the persuasiveness of my theory. It concludes that in Germany, 
shareholder meetings are part of Corporate Governance, while the Anglo-American 
corporate world traditionally understood this term to include only inter-board relationships. 
Part C. analyses the questions of whether, how and why Corporate Governance systems 
converge. Based on an analysis of major changes in shareholder rights since the early 
1990s, this study suggests that Corporate Governance systems are likely to develop in 
Convergence Cycles. This means that in a closely interrelated world Corporate 
Governance reform draws on foreign experiences with specific Corporate Governance 
devices. If a legal regime provides a particularly efficient solution to a specific problem, 
this solution will eventually be adopted by other Corporate Governance systems with an 
inferior system in respect of such problem. Since no system of shareholder rights is 
flawless, Convergence Cycles will eventually result in formal convergence on a middle 
ground between the Explicit and the Implicit System of corporate control. Given the 
current cataclysms in world’s economic structure, - negatively speaking – the legislatures’ 
“plagiarism,” which is initiated and particularly furthered by comparative academic studies, 
will finally overcome the three core forces against formal convergence, which are political 
barriers, complementarities, and path dependence. The proposition of Convergence Cycles 
draws on historical, as well as new statutory and empirical evidence, collected by the 
author. 
Part D., finally, analyses the likely impact of convergence on ownership structures. 
Based on the hypothesis that the legal environments of Corporate Governance in Anglo-
America, France and Germany will converge, it posits that the current discussion has asked 
the overly simplistic question of whether dispersed or concentrated ownership constitutes 
the best solution to the problem of how to effectively monitor managers. Instead, this 
section suggests that asking the more complicated question of which ownership structure is 
efficient for which type of firm is more likely to yield accurate results. Part D. demonstrates 
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the fertility of combining comparative and corporate finance research by applying a 
simplified model of Jensen’s free cash flow theory to the debate about ownership structure 
convergence: Based on this example, it is likely that the answer to the question of which 
ownership structure is efficient depends on the stage of the business cycle that the firm is at. 
The specific stage of the firm can be determined by factors such as the firm’s growth rate, 
size, and internal cash flow. Competition will press firms to adopt efficient ownership 
structures. Thus, firms within the same stage are likely to become more and more similar 
with respect to their ownership structures, until they reach an equilibrium that is set at a 
specific point for a particular group of firms. Thus, applying corporate finance insights to 
comparative Corporate Governance adds a dynamic perspective to the static views that 
presently prevail in the debate upon the convergence of ownership structures.  
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B. The Implicit and Explicit System of Corporate Control 
Convergence theory is unlikely to achieve accurate results with respect to the future without 
understanding the status quo. Consequently, a proper categorization of present Corporate 
Governance systems has constituted a primary concern for convergence scholarship.  
I. Traditional Categories 
Two types of works utilize the concept of Corporate Governance categories. Some studies 
focus on systemic issues, examining forces that generally influence tendencies towards 
convergence and persistence. Another part of comparative literature examines specific 
elements of Corporate Governance, such as the presence of different types of shareholders, 
the degree of capital market development, and the degree of minority shareholder 
protection in order to account for differences between American and European Corporate 
Governance systems. I admit that every categorization requires a minimum degree of 
flexibility in order to stay adaptable to different circumstances, e.g. to more than a limited 
number of countries, or to transition periods. However, most of the categorizations current 
scholarship provides can be criticized from a methodological perspective for exhibiting 
deficiencies with respect to their doctrinal and statutory basis. 
Due to the inflation in comparative Corporate Governance literature in recent years, this 
paper cannot analyse all categorizations that commentators have used. It merely endeavours 
to elucidate some of the most glaring, though most prominently argued, misconceptions in 
drawing wedges between closely interrelated (both culturally and economically) 
economies. In the belief that, as Hayek suggested in another context, grave consequences 
have followed from these “seemingly simple but false” categories,16 the adjustment of three 
biases is particularly essential for the purposes of further discussion. These are the 
distinction between common and civil law jurisdictions,17 the distinction between market 
                                            
16
 Friedrich Hayek, “The Pretense of Knowledge”, in Nishijama & Leube, The Essence of Hayek (1984), 
266, at 272. 
17
 Primarily established by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate 
Ownership around the World” (1999) J. Fin. 54, 471, at 473 [La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, 
“Corporate Ownership“], and together with Robert Vishny: “Legal Determinants of External Finance“, (1997) 
J. Fin. 52, 1131; “Law and Finance “ (1998) J. Pol. Econ. 106, 1113, at 1116; “Investor Protection and 
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and bank-driven economies,18 and Hansmann & Kraakman’s bold assertion that only the 
present American corporate world would be shareholder driven, while in France the state 
would regularly intervene in corporate matters, and in Germany labor interests would 
influence corporate decision making (at least) as much as would shareholder interests. 
1. Common and Civil Law jurisdictions 
Relying on a distinction between civil and common law countries raises three serious 
concerns. First, in many cases it is unclear what qualifies which each country for 
membership in a specific category. For example, Japan is usually considered to be a civil 
law country. While the roots of the Japanese legal system are German, and thus based in 
civil law, the categorization neglects that Japanese law after the second world war has been 
fundamentally reformed under strong influence from the American state law of Illinois.19 
Second, a bright-line distinction between European common and civil law countries is not 
consistent with traditional cultural ties, or antagonism, which can be assumed to impact law 
development as well. For example, traditionally strong ties existed between the 
Netherlands, a civil law country, and England, a common law country.20 Third, common 
law traditionally describes a specific kind of law exercised and developed by courts in 
medieval England.21 Despite the fact that some legal traditions might be traced back to 
these times,22 the Stuart Kings removed parts of the traditional law when it conflicted with 
                                                                                                                                     
Corporate Governance“ (2000) J. Fin. Econ. 58, 3; reconsidered, e.g., by Coffee, “The Rise”, supra note 10, at 
45 and 60 et seq. 
18
 For example, Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions”, supra note 14, at 842 et seq.; 
Visentini, “Compatibility and Competition”, supra note 12; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, “Corporate 
Ownership“, id., at 508. 
19
 For Japan’s hybrid law background see Curtis Milhaupt, “Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of 
Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance” (2001) U. Pa. L.R. 149, 2083, 2123 Fn. 131; Siems, 
Convergence, at 8, 21. 
20
 After the ousting of the last Stuarts, the Dutch king (Wilhelm of Oranje) became English king, which 
was due to the strong religious, cultural, and commercial ties between both nations, see Bowl, The Unity of 
European History (1970), at 229-231. 
21
 See on early corporate law Paul G. Mahoney, “Contract or Concession” (2000) Ga. L.R. 34, 873, at 878. 
22
 For example, the emphasis on precedent over codification in common law countries.  
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the King’s power to charter corporations.23 Commentators need to pay more attention to 
these little, but significant details when categorizing corporate law, as they have done. 
2. Market- and Bank-centered Economies 
Another distinction refers to different legal regimes governing financial institutions. Until 
1999,24 the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited American credit banks from engaging in 
investment banking and the mutual funds industry, and from making equity investments in 
nonfinancial firms for their own account, while German and Japanese institutions were not 
restricted in the same way.25 A categorization of Corporate Governance systems relying on 
this bank-influence is, however, not convincing. 
Despite the fact that until 199826 German banks influenced their clients through the triad of 
memberships in supervisory boards, proxy voting and creditor rights, a bank could not 
effectively exercise this power without risking a backlash by its own supervisory board and 
shareholder body, since German corporations were traditionally organized in interlocking 
shareholdings and directorates.27 In addition, banks’ influence was weakened because 
relatively low dividend pressure resulting from underdeveloped capital markets enabled 
firms to use extensive internal financing, and forego external finance through credit and 
share issues. In addition, share ownership of banks was not extraordinary high, as one 
would suggest in a bank-centered economy. Share ownerships held by German retail 
                                            
23
 Paul G. Mahoney, “Contract or Concession” (2000) Ga. L.R. 34, 873, at 881-886: common law would 
have enabled free incorporation through contracts, while the king’s prime source of income in times of 
colonization was fees for chartering corporations; Detlef Vagts, “Comparative Company Law – The New 
Wave” (2002) Festschrift Druey, 598.  
24
 Through Gramm-Leach-Biley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, see Art Alcausin Hall, 
“International Banking Regulation into the 21st Century: Flirting With Revolution” (2001) N.Y.L.Sch. J. Int’l 
& Comp. L. 21 (2001) 41; Aigbe Akhigbe & Ann Marie Whyte, "The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999: Risk 
Implications for the Financial Services Industry" (2004), Journal of Financial Research, forthcoming (from 
SSRN). 
25
 Mark Roe, “Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States” (1992-
1993) Yale L.J. 102, 1927, at 1948-49 (with details); a comparative overview over banking regulation 
provides Siems, Convergence (2004), at 318 et seq. 
26
 In 1998, the legislature enacted the KonTraG-Reform (Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im 
Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG) v. 27.4.1998, BGBl. I (1998), S. 786), which reduced bank-influence by 
imposing stricter formal conditions on banks organizing proxy voting, as well as by stricter limits and higher 
transparency of supervisory board memberships and meetings. 
27
 Which caused the legislature to enact in 1965 s. 19 Aktiengesetz (transl.: German Stock Corporation 
Act) [GSCA], according to which ownership rights in cross-ownerhips exceeding 25% must not be exercised. 
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investors usually exceeded bank shareholdings, while non-financial corporations held the 
bulk of the shares in public corporations.28 This data is consistent with concentrated 
ownership, but not with the theory of a bank-centered economy. Banks were part of what 
has been called “Germany Inc.” – a company network that closely tied its members to 
national economic development, and mitigated competition among themselves.29 In this 
network, banks were important and influential, but were neither the center30 nor the 
controlling part.31 The same aspect – that banks are involved, but do not control the 
economy – is true with respect to Japan, where banks belong to, rather than control 
keiretsu-conglomerates.32 Finally, there is some evidence that American banks control 
important voting stakes of nonfinancial firms through their trust business, and that 
American bankers are more likely to join the board of nonfinancial firms of which their 
bank controls a large voting stake through its trust business.33 These characteristics used to 
be associated with bank-centered economies.  
                                            
28
 Appendix A provides a table of share ownership in German corporations. The data is taken with kind 
permission from DAI, Factbook (2003). 
29
 Martin Hoepner & Lothar Krempel, “The Politics of the German Company Network” (Nov 2003), 
MPIfG Working Paper No. 2003-9 (from SSRN), at 3 [Hoepner & Krempel, “The Politics”]. 
30
 Rather, insurance companies (Allianz AG, Munich Re), which neither provided credit nor exercised 
voting rights, and industrial conglomerates (Daimler Benz AG, Veba/Viag, RWE/VEW) also held also wide-
spread shareholdings. The fourth element of the Germany Corp. were the estates of the founder families 
(Thyssen, Krupp, Bosch, Siemens, Quandt, etc.). In this structure, bank-plans could indeed falter, for example 
the plan of forming a car-conglomerate of Daimler Benz AG and BMW AG in 1966. Though the legal details 
lack precision, see for an instructive overview Hoepner & Krempel, “The Politics”, id.; John W. Cioffi, 
“Restructuring “Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Company and Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the 
European Union,” (2002) Institute of European Studies, University of Berkeley, California, online: 
<repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=ies> [Cioffi, “Restructuring “Germany 
Inc.”]. 
31
 Ralf Elsas & Jan Pieter Krahnen, “Universal Banks and Relationships with Firms” (February 2004) 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4224 (from SSRN) show that with respect to the role of banks as monitoring 
investors, the evidence does not unanimously support a special role of banks for large firms. This is consistent 
with Mark Roe, “Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States” (1992-
1993) Yale L.J. 102, 1927, at 1945. Recently, similar structures were shown for the U.S., see Joao A.C. 
Santos & Adrienne S. Rumble, ”The American Keiretsu and Universal Banks: Investing, Voting and Sitting 
on Nonfinancials' Corporate Boards” (2003) Working Paper (from SSRN) [Santos & Rumble, “The American 
Keiretsu”]. 
32
 Id.; specifically on the role of keiretsu-banks J. Mark Ramseyer, “Cross-shareholding in the Japanese 
keiretsu”, in Gordon & Roe, Convergence and Persistence (2004), at 348; Siems, Convergence (2004), at 
324, 327. 
33
 Santos & Rumble, “The American Keiretsu”, supra note 31, at 11 et seq. show that, in 2000, American 
banks control on average 10% of the votinmg rights of S&P 500 nonfinancial firms, including several firms in 
which banks exercise 20% to 60% of the voting rights through their trust business. This evidence is consistent 
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3. Hansmann & Kraakman’s Shareholder Primacy 
Hansmann & Kraakman predicate categories of Corporate Governance models on conflicts 
between stakeholder interests. Economic studies have shown that the interests of different 
stakeholder groups conflict in particular circumstances.34 These studies demand that the law 
determines whose interest management should primarily pursue. Probably due to the 
legislatures’ reluctance to articulate clear statements on this politically explosive issue,35 
and the paucity of case law,36 the legal literature responded in a fragmented way to the 
economists’ demand.37 Hansmann & Kraakman nevertheless confined their categories by 
                                                                                                                                     
with that provided by R.M. Soldofsky “Institutional Holdings of Common Stock, 1990-2000: History, 
Projection, and Interpretation,” (1991) Bureau of Business Research, Graduate School of business 
Administration of the University of Michigan. It counters Mark J. Roe, “Political and Legal Restraints on 
Ownership and Control of Public Companies,” (1990) J. of Fin. Econ. 27, 7, who posited that banks could not 
have significant equity stakes in firms through their trust department. S.D. Prowse, “Institutional Investment 
Patterns and Corporate Financial Behavior in the United States and Japan,” (1990) J. of Fin. Econ. 27, 43, 
argues that American banks would be required by law to vote in the interest of the beneficial owners. This, 
however, is also the position under German law. 
34
 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure” (1976) J. Fin. Econ. 3, 305, at 310 et seq. [Jensen & Meckling, “Theory of the 
Firm”]; Alfred Rappaport, Creating shareholder value: the new standard for business performance (Free 
Press, New York: 1986). These conflicts include 1. insolvency: shareholders – creditors; 2. reduction of 
production: shareholders – workers; 3. geographical investment strategy: shareholders – state; 4. 
environmental aspects of production: shareholders – public; etc.  
35
 The German legislature in its “official interpretation” of the German Stock Act Reform of 1965 
mentioned that corporations should not oppose interests of overall economy and the interests of society, while 
they should, among other interests, also regard interests of employees, see Bruno Kropff, Aktiengesetz (1965), 
at 97-98. However, this statement needs to be considered in the light of the “social welfare” clause of s. 70 of 
the German Stock Act of 1937, which bound corporations to merely pursue social welfare projects. The 
German majority opinion holds that corporations may and shall pursue shareholder interests, as long as 
management balances these interests with diverse interests of other stakeholders, see Mülbert, “Shareholder 
value from a legal perspective”, ZGR 1997, 129, 156 ff. 
36
 For the United States, see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 (1919), implicating shareholder 
primacy. The German Federal Supreme Court in BGHZ 64, 325, 329 has used the expression “interests of the 
enterprise,” which commentators have interpreted as abbreviation for a behavior whose guidelines are the 
existence and long-term rentability of the firm, see Hüffer, AktG, § 76 Rn. 13, also Higher Regional Court of 
Hamm, DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 1995, 512, 514 – Harpener/Omni -.  
37
 The vast majority of American scholarship posits shareholder primacy models, purporting that the 
primary goal of the public corporation ought to be maximizing shareholders’ wealth, and that the reduction of 
agency costs as central economic problem should be addressed by imposing duties of loyalty and care owed 
by directors and managers to shareholders, see, for example Lucian Arye Bebchuck, “Federalism and the 
Corporation” (1992) Harv L.R. 105, 1435, at 1451 (implicitly); Bernard S. Black, “Shareholder Passivity 
Reexamined” (1990) Mich. L.R. 89, 520; Victor Brudney, “Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the 
Rhetoric of Contract” (1985) Colum. L.R. 85, 1403; Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure (1991), at 
35; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, “Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional 
Investors” (1991) Stan. L.R. 43, 863, 879 et seq.; Henry G. Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control” (1965) J. Pol. Econ. 73, 110. In contrast, stakeholder models assume management should take into 
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contrasting American shareholder primacy with what they perceive to be the leading 
principle of other Corporate Governance models. These apparent leading principles include 
the strong influence or primacy of managers (historically in the United States), workers 
(Germany), or the state (France and Japan) in the firm. Hansmann & Kraakman’s category 
achieves dubious results, as a closer look at France and Germany illustrates.38  
The authors categorize the French economy as state driven due to the French state’s 
involvement in corporate affairs, and the replacement of shareholder suits with criminal 
sanctions for directors’ malfeasance.39 While the creation of “national champions” by the 
French Government indeed happens,40 Hansmann & Kraakman focus exclusively on a tiny 
excerpt from French Corporate Governance. The distinction becomes even more hapless 
when one considers that the French state only interferes with strategic decisions of national 
impact, rather than with day-to-day business. Consequently, it is very likely that a 
mechanism for day-to-day control of the firm exists which Hansmann & Kraakman do not 
examine. Eventually, in the aftermath of the bubble, the American public could hardly miss 
the pictures of American corporate managers having been jailed for (apparent) corporate 
misconduct. Thus, criminal sanctions are not exclusively a French characteristic. 
                                                                                                                                     
account interests of various stakeholder groups, see for example Blair & Stout, “ A Team Production Theory 
of Corporate Law” (1999) Va. L.R. 85, 247; Marleen A. O’Connor, “Organized Labor as Shareholder 
Activist: Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism” (1997) U. Rich. L.R. 31, 1345, and “The 
Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation” (1993) 
Cornell L.R. 78, 899; Duncan McLaren, "Global Stakeholders: Corporate Accountability and Investor 
Engagement" (2004) Corporate Governance: An International Review 12, 191; Kent Greenfield, “The Place 
of Workers in Corporate Law” (1998) B.C. L.R. 39, 283; David Millon, “Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, 
and Corporate Law Reform: Employment at Will versus Job Security” (1998) U. Pa. L.R. 146, 975, and “New 
directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law” (1993) Wash. 
& Lee L.R. 50, 1373, and “Theories of the Corporation” (1990) Duke L.J. 201, and the essays in Lawrence E. 
Mitchell (ed.), Progressive Corporate Law (1995). This discussion goes back to the 1930ies, see E.M. Dodd, 
“For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 Harv. L.R. 1145; A. Berle, “For Whom Corporate 
Managers are Trustees: A Note”, (1932) 45 Harv. L.R. 1365.  
38
 Hansman & Kraakman, “The End”, supra note 7, at 449 et seq.; the authors borrow heavily from 
Cunningham, “Commonalities and Prescriptions”, supra note 12, at 1136 et seq. 
39
 Hansmann & Kraakman, “The End”, supra note 7, at 446-447. 
40
 And has recently happened again with the merger of Sanofi-Synthelabo and Aventis (see online: 
<www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/newcoatwork.nsf/docid/225FBBBA606F152185256E9400738D9E>; French 
policy understands its measures as anti-takeover regulation by creating size against imperialistic American 
firms, most of which have strong anti-takeover devices which cannot be exercised in mandatory Continental 
European corporate law. 
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With respect to Germany, Hansmann & Kraakman consider worker co-determination to be 
the prime characteristic. Their emphasis on German worker co-determination, however, is 
methodologically flawed. If co-determination is the central criterion of a categorization of 
Germany as labor-oriented, it will require a thorough analysis of the mechanisms of co-
determination: what influence do the workers have, in law and in practice? German 
corporate law provides for three relevant types of co-determination regimes. Pursuant to the 
most relevant co-determination regime for large public corporations,41 shareholders and 
workers elect an equal number of supervisory board members. Since under German 
constitutional law the final decision of the supervisory board must eventually lay in the 
hands of shareholders as property owners (or their representatives),42 if there is a tie in the 
first vote on a proposal, the chairman of the board (who is a shareholder representative) will 
have two votes in a second vote, thereby tipping the balance in favor of the owners. 
Furthermore, one of the worker representatives is an officer of the firm, and will typically 
represent management’s interests in practice. Since worker representatives are aware of this 
mechanism, they tend to avoid contentious votes. Rather, workers try to gain influence 
through (sometimes tainted) information about the workers’ views and discussions in the 
board committees. Given these implications, co-determination does not necessarily result in 
pro-labor decisions of the board. This does not mean that German co-determination will 
always result in an owner-favored decision.43 It does, however, suggest that despite the 
                                            
41
 The oldest and most extensive, though the least relevant today (with approximately 20 firms, including 
ThyssenKrupp AG) is the co-determination pursuant to Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1951 (and 
Mitbestimmungsergänzungsgesetz of 1956) merely regards corporations in mining industries and steal 
production. Supervisory Boards under this regime have 11, 15, or 21 members, of which shareholders and 
workers elect both the same number. One member of the employees’ bench is an officer of the corporation. 
The eleventh, fifteenth, or twenty-first member will be elected by shareholders on a proposal by the whole 
supervisory board (in which shareholder and workers are equally represented), for details see s. 8 
MonMitbestG.  
Furthermore, under the Co-determination pursuant to Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1976 for corporate groups 
with more than 2000 workers, workers elect the half of 12, 16, or 20 supervisory board members. See, in 
particular, ss. 27, 29 (2) MitbestG 1976.  
Finally, the Co-determination pursuant to Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz of 2004, the successor of the former 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 1952, regards corporate groups with more than 500 and up to 2000 workers. 
Under this regime, a third of the supervisory members will be elected by workers. 
42
 BVerfG of 01.03.1979 – 1 BvR 532, 533/77, BVerfGE 50, 290, 337 et seq. – Mitbestimmung -. 
43
 Nor does it mean that the German supervisory board system is without weaknesses. For example, 
German supervisory boards are too large (24 members) and thus inefficient. Labor Unions lobby against a 
reduction of board sizes since they receive some of the worker members’ compensations. 
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proportional worker representation on supervisory boards, shareholder interests will often 
be paramount, a suggestion which is disregarded by Hansmann & Kraakman’s lopsided 
analysis.44 
This does not ignore the fact that the collective bargaining processes mitigating the impact 
of market forces are deeply rooted in German culture or economy, as Hansmann & 
Kraakman point out. But terming the German economy a “labor-oriented model” is apt to 
miss other important aspects of Corporate Governance. Some of these aspects are the 
important questions which ask why shareholders invest in structures with concentrated 
ownership, and why dispersed shareholders, holding 45% of all shares by then, did not 
resist structures of worker co-determination by democratic devices when they were first 
enacted.45 
Remarkably, Hansmann & Kraakman state that the present American model would be the 
most efficient “standard model”.46 This bold assertion gives us a riddle: why should the 
present American model be the most efficient – the “End of History”-, while its 
predecessors have not been? Since legislatures strive for “local optima” through the 
development of complementarities,47 and the legislatures of advanced countries also have 
the intellectual and academic capacities to achieve it, why should the present American 
system be the most efficient for the whole world? References to relatively short periods of 
economic superiority48 are not persuasive: the fact that the German system was successful 
in the 1970s, the Japanese in the 1980s, the American in the 1990s, and probably the 
                                            
44
 Siemens’ and DaimlerChrysler’s recent agreement with worker representatives on increasing weekly 
average labor hours from 35 to 40 per week (which was sacrosanct for many years) as a precondition for 
building new factories in Germany shows that management can pursue shareholder interests, The Economist 
Online 29 July 2004 (online: <www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2967451>). 
45
 Co-determination was enacted in 1950 –52. Appendix A, relying on data taken from DAI, Factbook, 
supra note 28, shows that in these years German households held approximately 45% of all shares in public 
corporations. This figure has never been reached since. Data of 2001: 14,8% German households, and 13,2% 
investment funds (which can be considered to reflect household investments, too). This is also true with 
respect to actions: these were merely filed against the extension of codetermination in the 1970s. 
46
 Hansman & Kraakman, “The End”, supra note 7, at 440-443. 
47
 Bebchuck & Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence”, supra note 13, at 139 et seq., referring to Mark Roe, 
“Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics” (1996) Harv. L.R. 109, 641-643; Schmidt & Spindler, “Path 
dependence and complementarity, supra note 13, at 114, 117 et seq. 
48
 Hansman & Kraakman, “The End”, supra note 7, at 449 et seq.; also, for example, though much more 
cautious, Romano, “A cautionary Note”, supra note 7, 2023 et seq., and The Genius (1993), at 128 et seq. 
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Chinese system will be successful in the 2000s, does not establish bullet-proof evidence for 
the efficiency of Corporate Governance systems, but for the periodical supremacy of 
overall economic conditions. To the same extent that current Chinese enticement of 
international investment (which is probably due to advantageous labor prices and a state-
directed monetary policy) does not necessarily prove that American-style Corporate 
Governance is inherently flawed, American-style Corporate Governance was not 
necessarily superior to Japanese and German-style Corporate Governance in the 1990s, and 
so on.49 
Given that the ability of convergence analysis in predicting future development is 
conditioned upon a felicitous categorization of present Corporate Governance systems, one 
can reasonably assume that the above shortcomings in categorizing Corporate Governance 
models have impacted the quality of predictions based on traditional categorizations. 
Though, as indicated above, some leeway is inherent in every categorization, a more 
accurate distinguishing criterion regarding shareholder rights is likely to result in a more 
sound and stable premise from which to predict future events.  
II. Thesis 
1. Proposition 
A new categorization does not need to reinvent the wheel. Rather, it may draw on three key 
findings of comparative Corporate Governance analysis in asserting itself.  
First, concentrated ownership has traditionally been higher in Germany than in the United 
States. These large shareholders are presumed to control management, which might result 
in greater management efficiency, but which also increases the danger of minority 
                                            
49
 In particular, in the case of Germany, three other reasons than Corporate Governance resulted in a 
weaker overall position: first, the high government debt load caused by the re-unification of Germany, 
reducing Government’s freedom in entering into a tax-competition; second, insufficient reforms of the labor 
laws, the pension system, and the health care system in the eighties, which under German Law increases the 
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shareholder exploitation.50 From an American perspective, this division of functions 
provokes an inquiry into why a controlling shareholder would ever refrain from taking over 
all shares, and why minority shareholders would invest in firms, knowing that they might 
be deceived by the controlling owner. The logical explanation may be derived from the 
legislatures’ aforementioned tendency to strive for local optima through 
complementarities:51 in advanced corporate laws, the consequence of higher concentrated 
ownership will not be higher exploitation of minorities by majorities, but some kind of 
minority protection legislation. If protective legislation (or complementarities) guarantees 
minority shareholders a comfortable existence in a majority controlled firm, minority 
shareholders will appreciate that they can free-ride on the majority’s monitoring expenses.52 
Second, there is evidence for (formerly) underdeveloped external capital market laws 
and institutions in Germany and France, as compared to the United States and the United 
Kingdom.53 Consequently, the market prices in Germany are less likely to reflect 
management’s achievements, and are thus less likely to be effective control devices. 
Additionally, the network structure between companies presumes that there is a relatively 
lower level of competitive pressure from the product markets.  
Third, although they do not constitute the majority of firms, competitors with dispersed 
shareholders have also existed in countries associated with less well-developed capital 
markets.54 Given that managers are subject to a permanent conflict of interest,55 if market 
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 Bebchuck & Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence”, supra note 13, at 133-134; Roe, “Corporate Law’s 
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 Supra, B.I.3. 
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at III. (distinguishing between efficient and inefficient controlling shareholders); the American position 
analyse Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Controlling Controlling Shareholders” (2003) U. Penn. L. 
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 E.g. Coffee, “The Rise”, supra note 10, at 45 et seq.; Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners (2004), at 
147 et seq. 
54
 For example, the German Continental AG. 
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forces fail to provide control, how could systems with less well-developed market 
institutions exist, and – in the case of Germany – become a symbol of economic success in 
the 1970s? Furthermore, since the number of voting shareholders is particularly high in 
widely held firms, governments can hardly afford scandals in these companies. It is thus 
logical to suggest that complementarities to market control exist. 
In light of these three considerations, this paper puts forth that, while the foundation of the 
French and German system is an Explicit System of corporate control, an Implicit 
System of corporate control prevails in the Anglo-American countries. The Explicit 
System of corporate control is based on direct influence of present shareholders - majority 
shareholders through board control, and minority shareholders by providing monitoring 
functions through shareholder meetings. In contrast, the Implicit System of corporate 
control is predicated on the efficiency of the capital, product and labor markets.  
Three characteristics mark this Implicit System:  
(1) Implicit corporate control requires action beyond the circumscribed enclave of 
present shareholders and proxies immediately instructed by them. For example, 
capital market pricing requires activity of present and future shareholders. If there 
were either no present shareholders selling, or no future shareholders buying, a 
price could not be set.56 Thus, the exit right of shareholders over capital markets is 
an implicit device.  
(2) The Implicit System does not require direct contact between shareholders and 
the company. Rather, if shareholders influence managers, they will do it indirectly, 
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 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations [1776], Cannon Edition (New York: Modern Library, 1937), p. 
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(1983) J.L. & Econ. 26, 301. 
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without contacting the firm, talking to management, or otherwise trying to 
influence its behavior. Voice is an explicit, rather than an implicit, device. 
(3) In the Implicit System, shares are commercialized, and can be wholly replaced by 
monetary compensation. In contrast, an Explicit System relies on the assumption 
that shares represent not only monetary value, but also – positively speaking – 
possibilities, or – negatively speaking – a responsibility to influence managers. 
Thus, while both control systems are based on shareholder decisions and shareholder 
primacy, the degree of directorial deference that corporate law provides varies significantly. 
Corporate law in Explicit Systems presumes that directors and shareholders share the power 
in the corporation. In contrast, corporate law in Implicit Systems allots ultimate power to 
directors, while explicit shareholder rights are considered to be a side issue. This is due to 
the presumption that direct shareholder influence is merely part of a “rich array of 
constraints on directors that also includes markets, private ordering and norms.”57  
The above proposition challenges the orthodox American explanation for why Continental 
Europe lacks developed capital markets, which is that Continental jurisdictions have failed 
in providing adequate protection to minority stockholders from expropriation either by 
management or by majority owners and, thus, strong securities markets could not develop.58 
My theory assumes that commentators have overlooked the key complementarity to 
implicit shareholder control through security markets, which is the explicit influence 
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exerted by minority shareholders. This study holds that this is at least true with respect to 
Continental Europe’s largest economies, namely France and Germany.  
If there is significant evidence to support this proposition, its scope might exceed the 
countries on which the study focuses. It might provide some interesting insights into the 
functionality of systems in which companies with concentrated ownership and dispersed 
minority shareholding coexist without significant minority expropriation.59  
2. Elements of Implicit and Explicit Systems 
How could corporate law protect minority shareholders from expropriation? One would 
assume that minority shareholders can hardly influence managers through voice: either, a 
controlling shareholder decrees which decision should result from voting; or, in the absence 
of a controlling owner, adverse economic incentives would prevent minority shareholders 
from co-ordinating and exercising voice.60 According to this logic, the only efficient 
minority right is the right to sell, which implicates an implicit, rather than an explicit 
influence on managers.  
From today’s point of view, however, this logic is contestable, even beyond the point 
achieved by American corporate lawyers in their encouragement of institutional investor 
activism.61 In line with Hirschmann’s attack on economic strongholds regarding the 
incapability of voice,62 the challenge is twofold. The first strain of argument questions the 
efficiency of implicit control. Both the Tech Bubble of the years 1998-2000, and the bust 
period following, have shown that market prices can dissolve from the fundamental data of 
the underlying business. If market prices do not reflect the business fundamentals, market 
control becomes partially inefficient.63 Direct shareholder influence may then substitute for 
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capital market efficiency.64 Additionally, shareholders might have invested when stock 
prices were high. While low stock prices include the “option value” of high stock prices, 
selling at low prices would also amount to a sale of this option: staying in the firm might be 
profitable in the long run. Explicit shareholder influence might contribute to this profit. The 
market cannot evaluate the turn-around influence of shareholders, since the “option value” 
of minority shareholder action, as long as it is not imminent, is beyond the scope of market 
information and market scrutiny. Finally, medium to large shareholders, on the one hand, 
do not fully control the investment. On the other hand, sales of medium to large stakes 
(>0.5%) are rarely possible in the capital markets without price discounts.65 From the 
specific perspective of medium to large shareholders, capital markets are inefficient. 
Explicit shareholder influence might provide a partial solution to this dilemma.  
The second strain of arguments focuses on the ongoing improvement and refinement of 
corporate law by the legislatures. Since Hirschmann’s analysis, legal systems have 
developed a plethora of different mechanisms of exit and voice as archetypes of shareholder 
rights. A theory holding that explicit shareholder influence may substitute for indirect 
influence through market pressures thus requires an allocation of shareholder rights to 
either the Explicit or the Implicit System of corporate control. 
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Eight mechanisms66 operate to induce corporate managers to fulfil their duties: (1) voting, 
(2) public monitoring, (3) takeover bids, (4) the appraisal remedy, (5) shareholder suits, (6) 
shareholder monitoring through shareholder meetings, (7) minority shareholder protection 
from abuse of majority shareholders, (8) finally the ongoing supervision of the managers by 
the supervisory board or the board of directors. 
The fundamental elements of explicit shareholder influence are voting and shareholder 
monitoring through shareholder meetings – for example, by initiating meetings, co-
ordinating behavior, and exercising information rights both prior to and during meetings. In 
the traditional understanding of American corporate law, monitoring by private or public 
watchdogs aims to ensure a steady flow of topical, correct and material information, which 
will be evaluated by market institutions. It is not primarily designed to initiate direct 
shareholder action. Instead, shareholders should be protected by guaranteeing that stock 
prices accurately reflect the value of the firm at all times.67 Thus, public monitoring 
facilitates implicit shareholder influence.  
Assigning takeover bids, the appraisal remedy, shareholder suits, minority shareholder 
protection, and management control through a board to a particular category requires more 
consideration.  
Takeover bids are the hinge between the Implicit and the Explicit System, since they 
transform market driven control in widely held companies into shareholder driven, direct 
control of majority stockholders. While the current shareholder’s exit-decision after a 
takeover bid is a reaction to market forces, the bidder’s intent to own a majority stake in a 
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business is driven by the fact that a majority stake carries direct control rights. Hence, 
depending on which perspective one takes, the takeover bid could either belong to the 
Explicit or the Implicit System. Given the definition of explicit and implicit from the 
perspective of the present rather than the to-be shareholder,68 takeover bids are regarded as 
part of the Implicit System. The following consideration supports this supposition. The 
market evaluates shares as combinations of expected future cash flow and control.69 Since a 
takeover bid does not change the cash flow prospects of the firm, as it actually exists, the 
rise in stock-prices, which occurs whenever there is a takeover bid, is likely to reflect the 
price for control.70 If a potential controlling shareholder separately evaluates control over 
that specific firm and announces her intent to the public, a market for control begins to 
develop. Takeover bids are thus part of a market-driven, i.e. Implicit System.71  
The appraisal remedy entitles shareholders to have a court determine and award the “fair 
value” of their shares in specific circumstances, esp. when the majority shareholder intends 
to “squeeze out” the minority in the aftermath of a merger or consolidation. While only 
mergers merit appraisal rights in Delaware,72 most American states, the United Kingdom 
and Canada also provide appraisal rights for some asset sales, fundamental changes in the 
business of the corporation, and some charter amendments that materially affect the rights 
of dissenting shareholders, such as altering preferential rights, limiting voting rights, or 
establishing cumulative voting.73 In contrast, German law has traditionally refrained from 
utilizing appraisal rights as protection devices of minorities.74 In France, minority 
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shareholders only have statutory appraisal rights when a majority holds 95% of the shares. 
Whether fundamental changes result in an appraisal right under French law, is unclear.75 
The appraisal remedy constitutes an implicit tool of corporate control, for two reasons: first, 
the appraisal remedy is a consequence of a takeover market, which has been found to 
influence managerial behavior implicitly, and second, the appraisal remedy merely protects 
the minority shareholders’ exit rights, but not their voice rights, once a shareholder has 
assembled controlling influence.  
Minority shareholding may also result from events other than mergers and 
consolidations.76 In this case, devices other than those securing the right to sell at adequate 
terms may provide minority protection. American case law has decided the outcome of 
minority and majority conflicts either by applying principles developed in the context of 
closely held corporations to the few cases regarding public corporations,77 or these cases 
were held to be subject to the business judgement rule.78 Despite the fact that managers are 
influenced by majority shareholders, the business judgment rule protects managers from 
liability unless the manager’s conduct is so blatant a circumvention of appraisal rights that 
courts applied the de facto merger doctrine, which eventually also resulted in appraisal 
rights.79 In short, American law provides either for no specific protection, or for the right to 
sell, which is an implicit mechanism. 
In contrast, German corporate law consists of a complicated system of provisions that are 
designed to protect minorities from expropriation by the majority, while allowing 
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concentrated ownership to remain a viable alternative to dispersed ownership 
[Konzernrecht].80 Controlling shareholders have the choice between formally entering into 
a control agreement with the minority shareholders, or taking control of the firm without an 
agreement. If the majority decides in favor of an agreement, it needs to offer to the minority 
adequate compensation for the loss of economic chances and potential expropriation of the 
firm’s assets by the majority. This offer must induce a dividend guarantee and an offer to 
buy the outstanding shares. In advance of the separate meeting of minority owners who 
must also decide upon the agreement, public accountants will review and report about the 
mandatory compensation, which may also be subject to judicial review ex post.81 After the 
agreement has been entered into, the majority owner is relieved from various burdensome 
formalities in directing the firm, while the control agreement essentially transforms the 
minority’s investment into a debt-like security issued by the majority shareholder, though 
the corporation still needs to hold annual meetings. If the majority owner decides against 
entering into an agreement, it must not influence the dependent firm to its advantage 
without immediate financial compensation to the firm. Some of the specific means of 
protection include mandatory disclosure by the board of management, and a review of the 
management’s conduct regarding corporate opportunities and asset diversion by public 
accountants, as well as liability in cases of misconduct.82  
The difference between German Konzernrecht and American law lies primarily in the 
American emphasis on the exit-right that solves majority-minority conflicts through an 
outright sell-out. If minority shareholders do not sell, American law provides for no other 
protection but shareholder suits based on a breach of fiduciary duties.83 Consequently, in 
order to prevent minorities from suing, American acquirers generally intend to gain total 
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control over the firm, which American corporate law facilitates by devices enabling the 
acquirer to expropriate minorities if they are properly financially compensated.84 Equivalent 
provisions did not exist in Germany until 2002: since German law had originally considered 
control to be an element of property distinct from financial value,85 financial compensation 
was regarded as insufficient for counter-balancing the shareholders’ loss in property. Thus, 
Konzernrecht was developed as a functional substitute for takeover regulation. 
Konzernrecht is, hence, the opposite solution to the same problem addressed by takeover 
regulation. While American law structured and secured the path of Exit, German law 
ensures minority influence through Voice in a situation where Voice has practically become 
irrelevant. Thus, Konzernrecht belongs to the Explicit System. 
The categorization of shareholder suits and day-to-day supervision of management by a 
supervisory board or a board of directors requires differentiation.  
One could suggest that shareholder suits are part of the explicit model since they require 
direct contact between suing shareholders and the company, rather than the use of 
intermediaries, as one would expect in the market model. However, such an argument 
would be flawed: from a rational actor model shareholder suits are unlikely to occur, due to 
collective action problems and free rider phenomena.86 Capital market, corporate, and civil 
laws mitigate these problems by providing for solutions87 that eventually result in lawyer 
activism, rather than shareholder activism.88 If shareholder suits are in fact initiated by the 
entrepreneurial drive of lawyers – hence intermediaries -, rather than the control interests of 
shareholders on behalf of the corporation, one can reasonably regard shareholder suits as 
part of the Implicit System. Such a categorization, however, would neglect the fact that 
                                            
84
 E.g. American law enables freeze-outs through tender offers, and through amalgamation-mergers, see in 
detail for Delaware Corporate Law Gilson & Gordon, “Controlling Controlling Shareholders”, supra note 52.  
85
 For the main part, this was due to constitutional reasons, an emphasize of direct control, and illiquid 
capital markets, see infra B.III.2.a) & C.III.2.a). 
86
 Edward M. Iacobucci & Kevin E. Davis, “Reconciling Derivative Claims and the Oppression Remedy” 
(2000) S.C.L.R. 12 (2d), 87, at 114 et seq. 
87
 By allowing class-actions, advantageous success related contracts with lawyers, etc. For details, see 
citations in next note. 
88
 Roberta Romano, “The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?” (1991) J.L. Econ. & Org. 7, 
55, at 84 (1991) [Romano, “The Shareholder Suit”]; Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, “The New 
Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions”, (2004) Vand. L.R. 57, forthcoming, 
(from SSRN) [Thompson & Thomas, “Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions”]. 
- 28 - 
shareholder suits require a proxy of attorney from a present shareholder, while public 
monitoring and takeover bids require interplay between present and future shareholders. 
In light of these considerations, a differentiation with respect to the intention of the 
shareholder bringing the suit guides the way. Some shareholder suits, esp. securities fraud 
and civil class actions, aim at cash-payments, while other suits are intended to have an 
immediate impact on firm behavior by challenging shareholder meeting decisions, or 
requiring a temporary or permanent revision of specific kinds of conduct.89 While the latter 
constitutes direct shareholder control – an enforced variant of voice -, the former 
establishes a variant of the “appraisal remedy“: the shareholder will receive payment for the 
reduced value of all or a part of her shares as a consequence of directorial misconduct. By 
paying compensation, the firm or a controlling shareholder essentially buys a part of the 
share (value) from the present shareholder. Like a sale, monetary compensation substitutes 
for the share itself. Thus, shareholder suits aiming at judgements directly correcting 
corporate conduct are part of the Explicit System, while suits initiated to result in financial 
compensation are part of the Implicit System. 
The ongoing supervision of management by a supervisory board or the board of 
directors carries, at first glance, characteristics of explicit shareholder influence: assuming 
that the board members should supervise the managers’ day-to-day work on behalf of 
shareholders – metaphorically speaking as proxies of shareholders -, board members would 
explicitly influence managers through direct contact. A second look reveals that board 
members neither economically nor legally depend on shareholders, since they receive their 
payment from the firm (which is represented by directors themselves), rather than directly 
from the shareholders,90 and shareholders cannot generally bind directors through their 
decisions. Consequently, shareholders have, in fact, no direct influence on board members’ 
conduct, which renders a categorization as explicit inaccurate. However, at the level of who 
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pre-selects candidates for election by shareholders, the distinction between Explicit and 
Implicit Systems may be applied.91  
3. Caveats 
The categorization of shareholder rights as either Implicit or Explicit devices of corporate 
control requires two caveats.  
First: the categorization combines factual and legal factors and, as such, transcends a 
merely legal differentiation. Categorization thus also becomes a matter of degree. In 
Continental Europe, as in Anglo-America exist elements of both the Explicit and the 
Implicit System. For example, though voting rights exist, American Corporate Governance 
theory and the legislature have long denied their relevance, preferring corporate control 
through market reactions. The opposite was true in Germany, both due to the under-
development of capital markets and the oligopolistic behavior of the corporate aristocracy, 
which I have referred to as “Germany Inc.”92  
In stating that categorization becomes a matter of degree, one might argue that the author’s 
criteria exhibit equivalent weaknesses to the traditional - and herein criticized - 
categorizations. However, the categorization posited herein regards a narrow scope – 
shareholder rights – and inherently relies on specific corporate law devices, while the other 
categorizations draw on general cultural (civil vs. common law), economical (market vs. 
bank-centered) or political (liberal vs. interventionist policy) factors whose relationship to 
corporate law is not always clear. While generality reduces the risk of rebuttal of the 
categorization, it also reduces precision pertaining to its results. With respect to shareholder 
rights, the categorization presented herein is, despite its flexibility, likely to achieve more 
accurate results than its competitors. 
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suggests for election by shareholders, in Continental Europe concentrated ownership facilitates direct 
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Second: the distinction between implicit and explicit is not doctrinaire selective. Some 
rights can be interpreted as part of the Implicit, as well as the Explicit System of corporate 
control. This is particularly true with respect to information rights and mandatory disclosure 
under securities or corporate law, since information is the pre-condition to both the buy/sell 
decision, and the exercise of voting rights.93 Hence, with respect to the above 
characterization, one can understand the effect of information rights as “hybrid.” This does 
not exclude the possibility that systemic differences exist with respect to the specific 
characteristics of disclosure, which might signal whether information is primarily designed 
for the exercise of voting rights or market control. 
4. Provisional Result 
This section posited a new categorization between Explicit and Implicit Systems of 
corporate control. Both systems rely on shareholder influence, and are thus shareholder 
primacy models. However, the means of shareholder influence differ: voting, shareholder 
monitoring through shareholder meetings, Konzernrecht, and shareholder suits aimed at the 
revision of corporate conduct belong to the Explicit System. In contrast, monitoring by 
private or public watchdogs, takeover regulation, the appraisal remedy, and shareholder 
suits aimed at financial compensation are part of the Implicit System.  
Two caveats frame this categorization. First, “pure” systems do not exist. In some respects, 
the categorization is a matter of degree. Second, information rights can facilitate both 
implicit and explicit shareholder influence, and are to be considered as hybrid, while their 
specific design might hint at either an Implicit or an Explicit System. 
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III. Evidence 
Historical, statutory, and empirical evidence support the categorization, as follows. 
1. An Ethical Theory of Corporate Governance History 
The present Anglo-American system of corporate control is said to be a random result of 
market forces, the strong influence of which resulted from a weak state, and undefined 
principles in the state’s economic policy until the 1930s.94 In contrast, in Continental 
Europe, strong states with a tendency to interfere with market forces were 
established.95 The events resulting in these two divergent systems must be analysed in order 
to understand what predominant factors catalyzed the development of the current Corporate 
Governance structures. Though values other than religious principles are likely to prevail in 
today’s business world, this paper argues that religious foundations provide a sound 
explanation for the developmental path of either the Implicit or the Explicit System of 
corporate control. 
Historians recognize three pillars of Western (European) culture. First: the ideal of free and 
rational thought, a development which is owed to the Ancient Greeks. Second: a neutral 
state administration designed to pursue the goal of its citizens’ “good life,” rather than the 
individual interests of its kings, queens or oligarchs. This ideal was first developed in the 
Roman res publica, and analysed in Ciceros’s de legibus. Third: Christianity.96  
The impact of rational thinking of policy makers and corporate stakeholders on corporate 
law development97 and the impact of an efficient administration on corporate law has been 
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 Coffee, “The Rise”, supra note 10, at 24 et seq. Later, however, the American legislature interfered with 




 Bowle, The Unity of European History (1970), at p. 85. 
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 This is essentially what historical corporate law scholarship is about; see, in particular, Margaret M. 
Blair "Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us" (2003) Georgetown Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 485663 (from SSRN), at 9 et seq. [Blair, “Reforming Corporate 
Governance”]; Margaret M. Blair, "Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century", (2003) UCLA Law Review 51, 387, at 423 et seq.; "Why Markets 
Chose the Corporate Form: Entity Status and the Separation of Asset Ownership from Control" (2003) 
Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 429300 (from SSRN), at 4 et seq.; Coffee, “The Rise”, 
supra note 10; Coffee, “Future As History”, supra note 7. 
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sufficiently considered in the current body of literature.98 Despite Branson’s thoughtful 
comprehension,99 modern corporate law scholarship100 has neglected to recognize 
Christianity as the third cultural root of the Western hemisphere.101 This is particularly 
unfortunate since “broad similarities are obvious in terms of the relative development and 
maturity of legal institutions across Europe and the United States.”102 These institutions 
impact the application or enforcement of, law and thus deserve more attention.  
a) Christian Ethics and Corporate Law 
The Christian belief is rooted in the (Jewish-based) Pauline doctrine, combining the ideas 
of human guilt, asceticism, punishment, election, and – finally – redemption.103 However, 
with respect to their attitude towards economic activity, the major Christian strands of 
belief vary significantly. From an economic point of view, the most important difference 
between Catholicism and Protestantism is Martin Luther’s ethical qualification of a 
believer’s occupation. While from a Catholic’s point of view one’s occupation is ethically 
neutral, Protestants understand the occupation as a “calling”, and associate the highest 
value with the fulfilment of one’s day-to-day duties. Regardless of whether one works as 
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 See, for example, the work by James M. Landis (instructive McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (1984), 
153 et seq.), and Seligman & Loss, Securities Regulation (1992). 
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master or servant, all religiously acceptable jobs have the same positive ethical 
qualification, while being lazy or wasting time, in general, are considered to be sins.104  
While this religious duty might explain greater economic activity in Protestant, as 
compared to Catholic, societies,105 it cannot explain the different economic development 
among Protestant societies, such as between parts of Germany and Scandinavia, on the one 
hand, and parts of Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
on the other hand. A closer look at the strands of Protestantism that prevail in these 
countries reveals that Lutheran-Protestantism prevailed in the former, while Calvinistic-
Puritanism dominated the culture of the latter.106 
While both convictions accept the idea of a calling, they qualify the pursuit of profit 
differently. Being traditionalistic and dogmatically very similar to Catholicism,107 Martin 
Luther holds that, since the pursuit of profit can only be achieved at others’ costs, it is sinful 
and should thus be left to the heathens. A believer should concentrate on her God-given 
occupation, which she must not challenge or change by, for example, improving the tools of 
production, etc.108 Calvinistic-Puritanism, though far from being focused on financial 
affairs, took a much more world-directed stance. Based on the doctrine of predestination, 
the distribution of any characteristic, personal good, or idea, is assumed to be God-given.109 
Consequently, neither wealth, nor its maximization through the pursuit of profit-
maximizing opportunities or inventions, is assumed to be sinful. Though riches for the 
believer’s fleshy ends must not ultimately be intended, profitability of the occupation will 
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 Max Weber, Protestant Ethics (1920), I.3., at [64-71] and [169-175] 
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 The Roman-Catholic belief was predominant throughout the 19th century in all of south, and most of 
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108
 Id., at I.3., at [75-79]. 
109
 Id., at I.3., at [92-93]. 
- 34 - 
accrue to God’s honour110 - unless it results in laziness, since enjoying one’s wealth and 
refraining from work means denying God his dignity and honour, which results in the 
foreclosure of one’s access to paradise.111 The true believer thus worships by pursuing her 
calling. Consequently, in contrast to Lutheran and Catholic societies, wealth maximization 
by trade or industrial activity is a generally accepted goal in Calvinistic societies.112 Thus, 
Calvinistic ethics strongly encouraged the development of market institutions that were not 
interfered with by the state. The different attitude towards the impact of (capital) markets 
on society is consistent with the different religious backgrounds of societies.113  
As a cautionary note, however, one needs to consider that the question of which religion 
was adopted for society in the aftermath of reformation depended on which parts of society 
decided upon the adoption of a belief. In Calvinistic societies, wealthy citizens of a 
merchant background were influential, while in the rest of Europe feudal structures (still) 
prevailed. It is thus possible that the choice of religion is merely a proxy for the ruling class 
itself. Even then, though, the specific religious belief has at least petrified the prevailing 
attitude of the ruling class at a particular point in time. 
b) From Medieval to Modern Times 
These ethical differences can be traced through philosophical and political literature.114 A 
brief look at three events further untangles the ways in which religion has influenced 
corporate law development: the diverse fates of colonial undertakings, the policy regarding 
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speculative bubbles in corporate stocks in the years of 1719/1720, and the regulatory 
approach to freedom of incorporation in the 19th century.  
First: the theory of a pro-business attitude in the Calvinistic belief is consistent with the 
success of colonial undertakings in the Netherlands and England.115 While the Dutch and 
English East-India companies flourished for almost 200 years116 and laid the foundations of 
British and Dutch colonial empires, colonial companies from Catholic and Lutheran 
countries were all but successful. For example, the French East-India company, set up in 
1624 and re-named as such in 1664, quickly faltered because French Kings focused on 
Catholic missionary works, rather than on economic development and trade.117 
Second: in the first quarter of the 18th century, a frenzy in corporate stocks developed. 
Starting in France, the Compagnie des Indes, magnetizing money from all over the 
continent, promised to invest in, and economically exploit, the area of New Orleans, which 
was a French colony in North-America.118 At about the same time, the English South Sea 
Corporation, trying to mimic the amazing success of the Compagnie des Indes, promised to 
exploit territories in the South Sea area. When both bubbles eventually burst, the French 
and English legislatures dealt with the speculation problem in different ways. The French 
tried to stabilize the precipitating stock prices by prohibiting trade in the stocks by various 
means.119 All of these measures were (futile) means of reducing the impact of market forces 
on investors and preventing them from experiencing financial catastrophe. In contrast, in 
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accordance with the idea of predestination, English regulators strictly applied the caveat 
emptor principle, resulting in spectacular scenes in the London financial district, involving 
bankruptcy and the suicides of many investors.120  
Third: Aristocratic state laws had traditionally required an official state act for 
incorporation [concession system]. Given the enormous amounts of capital needed for 
industrialization, state bureaucracies faced the impossible task of estimating whether the 
prospective business was viable, dangerous, or potentially fraudulent, on the basis of papers 
that entrepreneurs presented when applying for concession. The United Kingdom replaced 
the concession system in 1844.121 The early departure from concession to the contractual 
approach has been held to be an expression of the English sense of personal and economic 
liberalism,122 since – despite the prohibition of bearer shares – few restrictions applied. By 
1860, most American states, following England’s liberal approach, had passed general 
incorporation statutes.123 When France (1867) and the Northern German states (1870) 
eventually receded from incorporation control,124 it was soon replaced by a strict mandatory 
scheme, rather than by a reliance on freedom of contract. This is consistent with an ethical 
bias against the impact of market forces. 
c) Continuation in 20th Century Politics 
In the 20th century, the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949, the 
political roots of co-determination after World War II, and the refusal to implement the 
suggestions contained in the Segrè-Report by the French and German governments, are 
milestones in a chain of events that show the significant impact of ethics on corporate law 
development. 
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First: Article 14 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany [Grundgesetz] 
provides constitutional protection for property rights to which the rights of share owners 
belong.125 Articles 14 (1) and (2) hold:  
(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content and limits shall 
be defined by the laws. 
(2) Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good. [emphasis by 
author] 
Furthermore, according to Article 20 (1) of the Grundgesetz, Germany is a democratic and 
social federal republic. Articles 14 and 20 are the result of a consensus of the constitutional 
convent at Herrenchiemsee in 1948. A lay public would assume that this provision is 
derived from socialist ideas. This is not, in fact, the case. After the breakdown of the Third 
Reich, all democratic groups assembled in order to negotiate the provisions of the 
Grundgesetz. The most influential group was the Catholic Christian group126 centered 
around the later chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer’s belief was rooted in the Catholic 
social ethics of the 19th century, developed by Steguweit, Wilhelm Marx, and Windhorst.127 
The main achievement of Catholic social ethics was to develop from the Christian ideal of 
charity [clemencia] an obligation of the state and its members to support the weaker parts of 
society, which - in times of industrialization - meant to protect them from the impact of 
market forces. This approach was consistent with Lutheran beliefs and Germanic 
traditions,128 and also found support in left-wing groups, such as the social democrats. 
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- 38 - 
Thus, Christian roots underpin the ideological fundament of the German “social economy.” 
The Ahlen-Program of the Christian Democratic Union of 1947 reflects this fundament: 
Capitalist striving for profit and power can no longer constitute the essence and objective 
of this social and economic renewal; it will have to be the well-being of our nation. By 
adopting a cooperative economic order, the German people shall obtain an economic and 
social constitution which is commensurate with the rights and dignity of man, serves the 
spiritual and material reconstruction of our nation and secures peace at home and 
abroad.129 
Second: In the years 1951 through 1956, the CDU under Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig 
Erhardt and Alfred Müller-Armack implemented (in coalition with the Liberals) co-
determination regimes.130 While co-determination was partially intended to be a device 
used to control industrialists, who had supported the Third-Reich Nazi-regime,131 it was 
also well aligned with the doctrine of ensuring corporate social responsibility (Property 
entails obligations!). German Social-democrats, who first participated in government in the 
late 1960s, did not create the co-determination regimes in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, but rather expanded them in the 1970s.132 
Finally, 
                                                                                                                                     
were to take on responsibility for those who had sacrificed their life and health to the personal profits of the 
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Christian democratic parties … with powerful Catholic influence behind them, promoted 
[a] closer European Union: the existing social order was to be saved by a reaffirmation of 
Christian values in social welfare and rationalized by cosmopolitan big business.133 
The reaction of European states to the Segrè-report134 in the 1960s, that guided the 
trajectory of Continental European Corporate Governance, is consistent with John Bowle’s 
above statement. The Segrè-report strongly recommended the development of capital 
market law, in order to strengthen economic development and competition in the (then) 
European Economic Community [EEC]. The governments of Continental European 
nations, however, decided to harmonize and strengthen corporate law by strengthening 
explicit shareholder rights, rather than by establishing a uniform capital market law. This 
decision is consistent with the doctrine of the German Stock Corporation Reform Act of 
1965, which enhanced the information that was required to be provided to shareholders 
through a variety of mandatory regulatory devices, and reduced directorial deference, which 
the leadership-oriented Stock Corporation Act of 1937, tainted by Nazi-ideology, had 
embedded within the Act.135 This decision was not revised until the United Kingdom 
entered into the EEC in 1973.136  
d) Intermediate result 
This section has shown that a weak state coupled with strong market forces is consistent 
with Calvinism-Puritanism, which prevailed in Anglo-America, while a strong state that 
aims at balancing and directing the influence of economic power on society is consistent 
with the Roman-Catholic and Lutheran-Protestant belief. It traced the impact of these 
different ethical backgrounds throughout the centuries until the second half of the 20th 
century. The observation that different “market” ethics prevailed in Anglo-America and in 
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France and Germany, is consistent with a Friedrich A. Hayek study, which underscores the 
difference between an understanding of individualism that is bound by the limits that 
society provides, and the “true” individualism.137 While French and German authors have 
typically endorsed the former, Anglo-American authors have generally hailed the latter. It 
is likely that this differential understanding of individualism has impacted modern 
corporate law. Thus, the different ethical backgrounds might explain the differences 
between countries with an Explicit and those with an Implicit System of corporate control. 
2. Statutory Evidence 
If these cultural roots have indeed impacted modern corporate law, one would anticipate 
that the statutes will provide further evidence to support such contention. I have suggested 
that more explicit devices traditionally serve as a substitute for market control in France 
and Germany. Less efficient external institutions have been balanced by more efficient 
internal institutions.138 In light of this proposition, those shareholder rights which enable 
explicit influence on the corporation and its management should be more strongly 
developed in Continental Europe than in Anglo-America. At the same time, a market based 
economy could accommodate more directorial deference, since the proliferation of other 
control institutions balance the lower incidence of explicit shareholder influence. The 
following section extracts evidence from statutory shareholder rights, and the degree of 
directorial deference permitted. It ends with a hypothesis concerning the practical workings 
of shareholder monitoring. 
a) Shareholder Rights 
                                            
137
 Friedrich A. Hayek, “Individualism: True and False” (1946), in: Individualism and Economic Order 
(The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1948), at 8-9. Hayek tracks this strain of thought 
through Anglo-American philosophy, including John Locke, Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Josiah 
Tucker, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and Edmund Burke. 
138
 Supra, B.II. 
- 41 - 
Procedural rights in shareholder meetings 
I have shown elsewhere139 that mandatory rules with respect to procedural rights pertaining 
to communication and co-ordination among shareholders in advance of shareholder 
meetings differ between the jurisdictions. France and Germany provide for relatively strong 
and direct shareholder influence, while Canadian law, as well as American Securities 
Regulation in connection with the Delaware corporate law, represent the flipside of the 
coin.140 The French and German regimes are spawned from the ideal of giving minority 
shareholders the power to monitor both managers and large shareholders. Conversely, the 
Canadian and American systems seem to be rooted in the ideal of, and better suited to, 
providing a level playing field, for those participating in control contests.141 
In particular, by providing extensive information to the market about the consequences that 
might occur from voting in shareholder meetings, American rules on proxy solicitation 
enable markets to estimate the impact of either success or defeat of insurgents on the firm’s 
future. From the American stance, since through active opposition to a merger 
“shareholders will receive additional gain for their vote, even though they may not be 
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shareholder proposals of 120+ days before the proxy statement; 8. Non-voting shares cannot make 
shareholder proposals; 9. Some meeting decisions do not bind directors. A different opinion on this issue 
provides Cunningham, “Commonalities and Prescriptions”, supra note 12, at 1187 et seq. However, he does 
not consider some devices German corporate law provides to shareholders, esp. the right of counter-motion, 
and the 500.000  nominal share capital threshold for proposals. 
141
 French and German law provides insufficient information about the shareholder group that attempts to 
gain control, and surprise attempts are possible. Furthermore, German law requires super-majority for early 
dismissal of supervisory board members, which is in practice almost never achievable. In contrast, while 
American and Canadian law provide adequate information, long deadlines and high thresholds for proposals, 
aiming at replacing directors, require relatively strong support of the insurgents among shareholders. The 
relatively high fixed costs American law imposes might be an obstacle for change in controls in shareholder 
meetings of small companies. 
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conscious that this is occurring,”142 the active opposition to a merger is the archetype of 
proxy solicitation. At the same time, the costs for insurgent shareholders organizing an 
opposition are rising, shareholder co-ordination is less likely, and shareholder monitoring is 
crippled.143  
In contrast, German law encourages shareholder activity by providing for three institutions, 
designed to overcome shareholders’ rational apathy. First: every shareholder of a German 
company can require that the company publishes a shareholder’s opposing or dissenting 
statement on an agenda item after the Notice of the shareholder meeting, and up to two 
weeks before the meeting. This may include a Draft Resolution.144 Management must 
publish the opposing statement of up to 5000 characters at an easy to find, clearly marked 
place on the company’s website.145 In its particularity as an individual shareholder right, 
this right to oppose management is unique. Second: German corporate law encourages 
shareholders to organize themselves in associations of interest.146 These associations can 
sue the management on behalf of their members, a right which is exercised on a regular 
basis against – allegedly - negligent or criminal management.147 Third: In order to further 
facilitate shareholder co-ordination, the German legislature is planning to implement a 
specific section for shareholder co-ordination in the German Federal Electronic Bulletin.148 
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 Manne, “Some Theoretical Aspects”, supra note 4, at 1438. 
143
 See, for example, the considerations by Manne, id., at 1439 et seq.: “The most complex takeover 
technique is undoubtedly the proxy fight.”, and 1442: “In the absence of party loyalty, moral suasion or high 
“entertainment” value, small shareholders have little incentive to incur any costs to aid in the election if 
corporate management.” 
144
 Until 2002, the management needed to print the opposing statement and send it to all shareholders. S. 
126 (1) GSCA (old version).  
145
 § 126 (1) GSCA, see on details Noack, “The New Rules on Counter Motions“, BB 2003, 1393, 1395 
ff.; Zetzsche, “Virtual Shareholder Meeting”, BKR 2003, 736, at 738.  
146
 S. 135 (9) GSCA; on shareholder associations from the German perspective, see Noack, in: FS Lutter 
(2000), at 1480. The German shareholder associations, though, does not have the privileges of lower 
thresholds for proposals, and one-time registration, as the French Association of Interests.  
147
 Two established German “Shareholder Associations” function traditionally as watchdogs of minority 
shareholders in German shareholder meetings. The “Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz” 
(German Association for the Protection of Securities Holders), online:<www.dsw-info.de> and the 
“Schutzvereinigung der Kleinaktionäre” (Association for the Protection of Retail Shareholders).  
148
 See “Draft Rules on raising the integrity of corporations and to modernise the court procedures 
declaring shareholder meeting decisions void” (translated by the author) [UMAG] by the German Federal 
Secretary of Justice, which is likely to come into force per 1 Jan 2005, online: 
<www.bmj.bund.de/images/11742.pdf>, Art. 1 No. 6, introducing S. 127a of the GSCA.  
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Many minority rights currently require shareholders to meet a threshold before they can be 
exercised. Under the legislative proposal, a shareholder can send her issue and a contact 
address to the editor of the Federal Bulletin who will publish it in the special section. Other 
shareholders can access the special section by electronic means, and thereby associate with 
the opposition, free of costs.  
Information Rights 
Neither direct nor indirect control can be exercised without proper information. Advanced 
Corporate Governance systems thus facilitate the flow of information to the controlling 
institutions. The proposition developed in this paper suggests that Anglo-America’s prime 
concern is market information, while Continental Europe focuses on shareholder 
information. With respect to information, it is therefore reasonable to distinguish between 
market information, which securities law mandates, and information that is provided under 
state149 or federal150 corporate legislation (merely) to shareholders. 
Since the enactment of the 1933 and 1934 federal securities laws, American securities 
regulation has pursued a disclosure philosophy,151 which the Securities and Exchange 
Commission [SEC] actualised by enacting rules which demand mandatory corporate 
disclosure.152 The more material information there is available, the better the share prices. 
Thus, “[a]t its core, the primary policy of [American] federal securities laws … involves the 
remediation of information asymmetries.”153 Consequently, the American legal regime 
strives for the access of market participants to all material information on each company, 
requiring the registrant to report to security holders periodically in Annual and Quarterly 
Reports.154 According to the SEC, the Annual Report is “the most effective means of 
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 Esp. in the United States, but also in Canada. 
150
 France, Germany, United Kingdom, Switzerland, but also the Canadian CBCA. 
151
 Loss & Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (2001), at 31. 
152
 This would later constitute a precondition of the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis, 
purporting, that all publicly available information is considered in the stock prices at within the markets. On 
the efficient capital market hypothesis, see supra note 64. 
153
 Seligman, Transformation of Wall Street (2003), at 604. 
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 Pursuant to Section 13 (a) Nr. 2 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC enacted Rule 13a, which 
requires the issuer to file an Annual Report on Form 10-K (Rule 13a-1), and a Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q 
(Rule 13a-13), available online:<www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34ActRls/reg13A.html>.  
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communication between management and security holders.”155 The rules on proxy voting 
have gradually tightened and now require the issuer to include all information contained in 
its Annual Report in its proxy statement as well. Since 1987, the SEC has allowed issuers to 
include the information required in Form 10-K only in its proxy statements. In the absence 
of a violation of the antifraud provisions, companies can draft and format the Annual 
Report as they see fit.156 In addition, registrants have to disclose in Form 8-K such 
information as the SEC may by rule require “to keep [the previously filed information] 
reasonably current”. Form 8-K contains an exclusive catalogue of events, which are 
presumed to generate “material information.”157 If one of these events occurs, an issuer 
needs to file a current change report. Periodical and current change reports together 
establish the SEC’s “integrated disclosure system,” which should operate so that the public 
files contain, at any given time, information substantially equivalent to that published in a 
current prospectus.158 
Four aspects of American Securities Regulation support the proposition expounded herein, 
according to which the American system of corporate control is implicit, meaning that it 
impacts corporations through the forces of capital markets, rather than through direct 
shareholder activity: (1) the early creation of the SEC itself under President Roosevelt in 
1933 - 1934,159 (2) its Brandeis-style160 disclosure philosophy, which both facilitated 
market forces – in contrast to direct market regulation, as demanded by some high-profile 
contemporaries -,161 (3) the early development162 of a centralized filing system of all issuer-
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 Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 11,079,5 SEC Dock. 356, 357 (1974). 
156
 Loss & Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (2001), at 473-474.  
157
 See s . 13 (a) No. 1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 13a-11.  
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 See Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities’ Revisited” (1966) Harv. L. Rev. 79, 1340. 
159
 See Seligman, Transformation of Wall Street (2003), at 101 et seq. 
160
 See supra note 67, McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (1984), at 84, 151-152, and Seligman, 
Transformation of Wall Street (2003), at 53, 79. Brandeis’s philosophy was so influential on the concept of 
the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933/1934, since James M. Landis, the drafter of the 
acts and first chairman of the SEC, had worked for Brandeis as law clerk, and President Roosevelt personally 
admired Brandeis’ texts. 
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 On the one side, Wall Street resisted against any regulation. On the other side, more progressive 
political forces demanded interfering with market forces, Seligman, Transformation of Wall Street (2003), at 
51 et seq. 
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 First established in 1984, the SEC database Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, Retrieval System - 
EDGAR (since 1993 available online: <www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm>), were the first 
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related material information, which, practically speaking, imposes “on issuers … a 
genuinely continuous duty to update”163 of the information available, and (4) the unlimited 
access of the public, including present and potential shareholders, as well as other interested 
parties, to the data. 
In contrast, other than a basic prospectus obligation for share issues, none of these four 
elements existed in Germany until the early 1990s.164 A federal security trading agency was 
established in 1994. Supervision of managerial conduct was traditionally considered to be a 
private concern of shareholders. Laws imposing mandatory disclosure, such as the Annual 
Report, which has been federally regulated since the 19th century, had primarily been 
understood as tools to provide information to shareholders and to protect creditors.165 Until 
1994/1995, potential shareholders could not acquire topical166 company information 
without management’s consent. Thus, a (hostile) takeover market was already crippled at 
the level of adequate information.167 
Corporate law provides a laterally reversed image. S. 131 of the GSCA grants 
shareholders of German companies a far-reaching investigative information right that is to 
be exercised in shareholder meetings. Its scope is wide. If the company has not published 
the information required, management can only deny information when the publication of 
the information will cause damage to the corporation. Courts have rarely held that this is 
the case. The information right, however, will be unlimited if shareholders require 
                                                                                                                                     
centralized electronic filing system of all company related information worldwide, see Loss & Seligman, 
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (2001), at 136-138. 
163
 Donald C. Langevoort, “Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation,” (1985) 
Harv. L.R. 98, 747, 786. 
164
 Since the early 1990s German legislature enacted up-to-date capital market regulation, including 
various report obligations and a wide definition of the group of legally recognized receivers of company 
information. A centralized electronic company database exists under www.bafin.de, though some information 
is merely available at other public-run databases. For details on the centralized database, see Noack, Database 
for Corporate Information (2003); with respect to the development of information-related capital market laws 
see Zetzsche, Shareholder Information (2004), § 8, at 193 et seq., and infra, sub C.III.2.a). 
165
 For example, Baumbach/Hopt, Commentary on German Commercial Code, Einl vor § 238 Rn. 15. 
166
 Some information could be achieved through the Annual Reports, and the collection of basic company 
data in commercial registrars. The impact on actual events, however, was low, since these data were usually 
outdated, before the companies even sent them to the registrars. 
167
 Pirelli tried in 1990-1991 the first hostile takeover bid in Germany that, given the combined white 
knight efforts of almost all German banks and insurers, finally faltered. There was no hostile takeover bid on 
German ground until 2000, when Vodafone took over Mannesmann AG.  
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information that has been given to any other shareholder before,168 besides the controlling 
shareholder who is compensating the minority as defined in the control agreement under 
German Konzernrecht.169 If information is given to shareholders who also are supervisory 
board members, these shareholders must not use information that they achieve for other 
purposes than for exercising their function as supervisory board members.170 Whether 
management has lawfully denied information may be reviewed in a specific judicial 
procedure,171 and, in addition, may be a reason for declaring the decisions reached at 
shareholder meetings to be void. Though French corporate law does not contain codified 
rights allowing individual shareholders to spontaneously ask questions in shareholder 
meetings, French literature interprets such spontaneous rights to be an inherent part of 
shareholder meetings.172 In addition, French shareholders have inspection rights in respect 
of specific company information,173 which are enhanced during the period preceding the 
meeting.174 
Neither American nor British corporate laws provide for an individual shareholder right to 
speak, or to ask questions in shareholder meetings of public corporations.175 Shareholders 
may propose that the management shall report on certain issues. This proposal right, 
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 S. 131 (4) GSCA. 
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 German commentators discuss contentiously whether controlling sharehoders that have not entered into 
a formal control agreement are exempted from s. 131 (4) GSCA. See the citations in favor and against an 
exemption at Hüffer, AktG (2003), § 131 Rn.38; in Zetzsche, Shareholder Information (2004), § 17 II 3, at 
469 et seq. I hold that the Securities Purchase and Takeover Law of 2001 adds important arguments in favor 
of an exemption. 
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 Hüffer, AktG (2003), § 131 Rn. 38. 
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 S. 132 GSCA. 
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 According to Art. L. 225-108 French Code de Commerce [FrCC], French shareholders may hand in 
their questions to the corporation in writing until a specific time before the meeting. Associations of 
shareholders, and shareholders representing a quorum of shares may ask twice a year questions, which must 
be handed in in writing, Art. L 225-232 Code de Commerce. See Siems, Convergence (2004), at 142. 
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 Art. L225-115, L225-117 FrCC, Art. 142, 152 Decret to FrCC. 
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 Art. 135, 138 Decret to FrCC. 
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 In Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No 14638, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 12, aff’d, 700 A.2d 135 
(Del. 1997), at 25, the court held that there was no “specific legal duty to answer every question put to them 
by shareholder at an annual meeting,” though ”courtesy and prudence indicate that [the directors] should do 
[so] where possible.” ABA, Shareholders’ Meetings (2000), at 8, recommends to hold a question and answer 
session after the vote, notwithstanding that this recommendation is not intended “to limit … questions ord 
disccussion about the issues that require shareholder action.” For the U.K., see Davies, Principles (2003), at p. 
360: such a right merely exists in private companies. According to Siems, Convergence (2004), at 142, the 
reform proposal, which Davies cites in note 38, will not be enacted.  
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however, is subject to a vote of stockholders at the Annual Meeting, and, due to the proxy 
process176 and the “Wall-Street-Rule,”177 chances are slim that the stockholder will succeed. 
The chances are effectively zero when requiring information spontaneously in the meeting. 
On a customary basis and under the principles of fairness and good faith, corporations 
practice discussions including question and answer periods. The length of these sessions, 
the number and the content of questions being asked, as well as the complexity of the 
answers given by management are entirely voluntary. Sanctions do not exist. Management 
cannot be forced to answer. One might suggest that inspection rights178 provide for 
complementarities. Inspection rights, however, have different characteristics regarding 
coverage, initiative, and costs of exercising the right.179 With respect to coverage, books 
and records of the company usually contain merely objective facts. Notes from meetings 
are typically short and merely state the result of deliberations, for the simple reason that 
there are inspection rights, or that the protocols may be subject to subpoenas as evidence in 
shareholder actions. In contrast, information provided by the company in a shareholder 
meeting may also include subjective facts, such as opinions, emotions, and arguments in 
favor of or against yet undecided issues. Regarding the initiative, an inspection right is a 
one-sided process entailing a lengthy session of digging through folders and data. A 
spontaneous information right, in contrast, facilitates communication between the 
corporation and its shareholders, which may provide new insights to both sides. Finally, an 
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 This is particularly due to the broker non-votes resulting from the proxy procedure (see more in detail 
infra B.III.3.). 
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 Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure (1991), at 83, n.33: “Given the combination of collective 
action problem and easy exit through the stock market, the rational strategy for most dissatisfied shareholders 
is to sell rather than incur costs in attempting to bring about change through votes. .. The greater the 
availability of the sale or exit option, the less desirable is the voting or voice option.” 
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 S. 220 DelCL, and § 16.02, 03 MBCA (2002). For long, inspection rights were merely vested in 
shareholders representing a 5% Quorum. This has relatively recently changed. Individual shareholders of 
Delaware corporations may inspect the corporation’s books and records, as well as the corporations 
subsidiaries’ books and records over which the corporation has control, provided that the inspection such 
stockholder seeks is for a “proper purpose.” The chancery court supervises that the shareholder indeed 
achieves access to the books. Jurisprudence understands “proper purpose” to include the desire to evaluate the 
shareholders investement, and to deal with other shareholders, qua investors, but excludes the desire to obtain 
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(1986), at 100, and State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971). British 
shareholders’ inspection rights are limited to specific, primarily publicly available information, see ss. 288, 
318, 380 of the British Company Act of 1985.  
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 For details, see Zetzsche, Shareholder Information (2004), at § 13, pp. 300 et seq. 
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essential difference is who bears the costs. While shareholders bear the costs of inspection 
rights, the costs associated with spontaneous information rights can be attributed to the 
corporation. Given the large amount of data that company books may contain, the costs 
associated with inspection rights may be significant.180 Given that both types of information 
rights may be exercised on behalf of all shareholders as corporate control instruments, an 
inspection right encourages “free-rider phenomena” among other shareholders, while 
spontaneous information rights mitigate adverse incentives. 
Since it can be safely assumed that majority shareholders receive information through 
supervisory board meetings, the individual, investigative-like information right primarily 
symbolizes the Continental management’s direct accountability towards minority 
shareholders. In contrast, Anglo-American law increases the barriers for individual 
shareholder participation in corporate control. This is consistent with the Implicit System: if 
rules force companies to disclose all material information, markets control managers, and 
market prices reflect all available information, shareholders who are presumed to be merely 
financially interested have no reason to ask questions.  
Remedies 
Finally, shareholder remedies are reflective of the different control approaches. As has been 
demonstrated, shareholder suits can be aimed at financial compensation [compensation-
directed suit], or at a revision of the shareholder meeting’s decision [revision-directed 
suit].181 
The compensation-directed suit prevails in American corporate law practice. While the 
traditional form of the compensation-directed suit was the derivative suit, which was 
succeeded by fraud claims under federal securities law,182 the vast majority of 
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 This fact explains that many shareholder proposals in the U.S. aim at demanding the directors to report 
on some kind of issues, see the data collected by the author in Appendix E. 
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 Supra, B.II.2. 
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 Both were supposed to be “a weak, if not ineffective instrument of Corporate Governance,” see 
Romano, “The Shareholder Suit”, supra note 88, at 84; ditto Snjai Baghat & Roberta Romano, “Event Studies 
and the Law: Empirical Studies of Corporate Law” (2002) Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 4, 380, 407. This judgement 
initiated a downsizing of shareholder rights to sue, see citations at Branson, “The Very Uncertain Prospect”, 
supra note 13, 330.  
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representative litigation in Delaware courts today (after the Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995) consists of class actions launched against public companies by shareholders 
who challenge directorial action in an acquisition, the terms of which were influenced by a 
majority shareholder.183 Though s. 225 (b) of the Delaware General Corporate Law 
provides for a revision-directed suit in the case of a contested election of directors and 
courts may grant revision-based remedies by means of interim injunctions, shareholders 
rarely initiate these type of actions, and courts rarely set aside a decision of a shareholder 
meeting.184  
In contrast, the revision-directed suits prevail by a significant margin in Germany.185 This 
might be due to the strict German corporate law, which states that every shareholder who 
was represented in the meeting can challenge a shareholder meeting decision that is held to 
violate the law or the Articles of Association, or to benefit a specific shareholder.186 
Remarkably, if shareholders sue on the grounds that they were denied access to information 
by management, it does not legally matter that the majority of shareholders decided against 
providing the requested information. The judiciary’s discretion (yet)187 merely extends to 
answering the question of whether the company’s conduct was unlawful or not, but not the 
legal consequences of the suit. At the same time, the law does not (yet) enable the court to 
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 Thompson & Thomas, “Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions”, supra note 88, at 6-8, present data 
showing that these claims represent approximately 80% of breach of fiduciary duty claims. Most settlements 
happen to exist in cases where a majority shareholder squeezes out minority (public) shareholders. Weakness, 
however, seem to persist: Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, “File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware 
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Actions,” id., and “The Public and Private Faces”, supra note 57.  
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 Based on data of my survey, I estimate that 8 of the DAX30 corporations were subject to revision-
directed shareholder suits twice or more since the year 1998. One firm was subject to 12 suits in 7 meetings, 
with shareholders challenging decisions of all but 1 meeting. 
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 S. 243 (1) and (2) GSCA. 
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 For recent trends, see infra C.III.2. 
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grant preliminary injunctions. The statutory derivative shareholder suit, aimed at financial 
compensation for the company on the basis of managerial misconduct, (yet) presents rather 
high procedual hurdles.188 This is due to the statutory concept that the supervisory board, 
and not the shareholders, should take action against managers. In addition, the German 
Federal Supreme Court traditionally allowed shareholder suits for enforcing shareholder 
participation rights in shareholder meetings,189 but did not allow for compensation-directed 
claims. Securities fraud claims for being wrong given information were ineffective, as well, 
until the securities law reform in the year 2002 facilitated financial compensation in glaring 
fraud cases.190  
A look at other European Countries paints a mixed picture: While Swiss law is similar to 
German law,191 French Corporate law contains an exhaustive list of revision-directed 
shareholder suits.192 Instead, compensation-directed litigation is more strongly developed, 
though not to the same extent as in American law.193 Despite the fact that the derivative suit 
originated in English law, modern English law is much more cautious in providing 
derivative actions. The claim of unfair prejudice may result in a revision-directed remedy, 
though this is rarely the case,194 given that the judge may order financial compensation 
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 For details, see ss. 117 and 147 GSCA.  
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 German Federal Supreme Court, in BGHZ 83, 122, 126 - Holzmüller-; BGHZ 136, 133, 140 – 
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 Amended by the Fourth Financial Markets Promotion Law, see Zetzsche, Shareholder Information 
(2004), at 100 et seq. 
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 Witt, “Informationrrights,” AG 2000, 257, 263; Siems, Convergence (2004), at 246-247, and Hans-
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459-461 of the Companies Act 1985?” (2004) The Company Lawyer 24, 100. Davies, Principles (2003), at 
522 cites McGuiness v Bremner Plc, [1986] BCLC 382, in which the judge decided whether delay on the part 
of the directors in convening a meeting requisitioned by the petitioner was unfairly prejudicial. 
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under the same claim.195 Though Canadian law does not explicitly contain a sanction of 
revision-directed actions, the oppression remedy196 can be utilized for this purpose. 
The observation that American shareholders can substitute financial compensation for the 
power to directly influence corporate decision making, while German legislature 
traditionally required shareholders to enforce their interests through revision-directed suits 
is consistent with the distinction between an Explicit and an Implicit System of corporate 
control. The diminished existence of derivative actions in the United Kingdom, in respect 
of that of revision-directed suits in France weakens the argument, though not significantly. 
The fact that the English and the American system are rooted in the same philosophy does 
not mean that some elements cannot develop differently, which is likely be due to 
idiosyncracies of each country.197 This is also true with respect to France and Germany. 
Additionally, the fact that French law comprises several provisions dealing with revision-
directed suits reveals that the legislature has assigned some level of importance to revision-
directed suits. Eventually, the existence of extensive codification of – and, thus, clear laws 
on - revision-directed suits, though rarely exercised, might nevertheless have the effect of 
stiffening the directors’ backbone when opportunistic incentives lure them towards the path 
of illegality. Despite the allure of this explanation, it does not lend itself to empirical 
support.  
b) Directorial deference 
The evidence presented thus far lends support to the hypothesis that the degree of 
directorial deference afforded to directors is higher in Anglo-American statutes than it is in 
Continental European statutes, which is consistent with the Explicit / Implicit 
categorization. Further statutory evidence strengthens this impression, as follows.  
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 Ss. 459 (1) and (2), 461 (2) Companies Act of 1985 determines that the petitioner’s shares may be 
purchased by the controllers or the company. Davies, Principles (2003), at 525 holds that this remedy is 
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American corporate statutes start from a foundational statement that all corporate power 
ultimately resides in the board,198 while shareholders essentially have no power apart from 
voting, esp. in director elections,199 suing and selling.200 German corporate law traditionally 
referred to shareholder meetings as the “highest body of the corporation”201 - as Swiss 
corporate statutes still do202 - in which shareholders demand and receive information, 
communicate among each other, and make decisions.203 
Under Delaware law, if a majority that is required by law to support the decision supports 
the proposal, for example in a written comment, management can dispense with the 
meeting altogether.204 In addition, s. 211 Del. GCL determines that a failure to hold a 
meeting does not affect otherwise valid corporate acts.205 Thus, Delaware law understands 
shareholder meetings merely as voting devices. In contrast, a shareholder vote in German 
corporations by means other than a meeting can only substitute for a meeting if all 
shareholders, including holders of preference shares who are not entitled to vote, have 
agreed on substituting the vote for the meeting.206 Decisions lacking the legally required 
consent of the shareholders are considered to be void, or voidable. 
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shareholders’ consent for the abandonment of procedural provisions on shareholder meetings, see Hüffer, 
AktG (2003), § 121, at [23].  
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Finally, in American corporations, some submissions to shareholder meetings require 
directorial approval before shareholders can vote on the issue,207 and some shareholder 
meeting decisions do not bind directors.208 Besides the general limit that shareholder 
meetings may only decide upon matters of day-to-day management, if the board of 
management makes a proposal pertaining to day-to-day issues,209 both restrictions are 
unknown to German shareholders.210  
c) The Functionality of Minority Shareholder Monitoring 
For companies with dispersed ownership, commentators have associated a disciplining211 
and an advisory212 effect with proxy votes and shareholder meetings. But how does 
shareholder monitoring work in corporations with concentrated ownership where – in spite 
of stronger shareholder rights and lower directorial deference - majorities can easily curtail 
minority influence through their voting power? The efficiency of minority shareholder 
monitoring depends on two factors: first, a legal regime that enforces minority rights and, 
thus, reduces the adverse incentives that the aforementioned economic considerations213 
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 For example, pursuant to s. 2.02(3)(d) MBCA (2002), the board of directors of a corporation must 
approve a merger before it is submitted to shareholders for a vote. This means that ordinarily there is no way 
for an outsider to reach the shareholders directly as they can with tender bids or proxy fights, see Manne, 
“Some Theoretical Aspects”, supra note 4, at 1437. 
208
 See SEC Rule 14a-8, Question 1 (§240.14a-8), online www.sec.gov/about/forms/reg14a.pdf: A 
shareholder proposal is your recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of directors 
take action. 
209
 S. 119 (2) GSCA. Further, some commentators hold that the shareholder approval of management’s 
actions beside disapproval of the supervisory board pursuant to s. 111 IV 3 GSCA is a recommendation. 
210
 S. 83 (2) GSCA. Though specific items require proposals by the board of management or the 
supervisory board, the shareholder meeting may require the boards to propose this matters, s. 83 GSCA. 
211
 Easterbrook & Fischel, “Voting in Corporate Law” (1983), 26 J. Law & Economics 395; Randall S. 
Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, “The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation” (1999) 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 67, 1021; Pound, “Proxy Voting”, and “Proxy Contests”, both supra 
note 2. However, empirical studies achieved mixed results. An overview of empirical studies on the effect of 
shareholder activism provide Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, “A Survey of Shareholder Activism: 
Motivation and Empirical Evidence” (1998) Contemporary Finance Digest 2, 10, at V; more positive Deon 
Strickland, Kenneth W. Wiles & Marc Zenner,“ A requiem for the USA: Is small shareholder monitoring 
effective?” (1996) J. Fin. Econ. 40, 319. 
212
 Joseph A. Grundfest, “Advice and Consent: An Alternative Mechanism for Shareholder Participation in 
the Nomination and Election of Corporate Directors” (November 2003) Stanford Law and Economics Olin 
Working Paper No. 274 (from SSRN) [Grundfest, “Advice and Consent”]; Ernst G. Maug & Kristian 
Rydquist, “Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Evidence on the Advisory Role of Annual General Meetings” 
(January 2004) CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4192 (from SSRN).  
213
 Supra note 4, and B.III.2.a). 
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have revealed. This first element has been examined above. Second, shareholders must 
overcome the (nevertheless) remaining adverse incentives. The ethical, rather than legal, 
obligation of shareholders to take on responsibility for their property - property entails 
obligations -, may have strengthened shareholders’ propensity to monitor.  
I hypothesize, however, that this ethical tendency was furthered by the fact that France and 
Germany traditionally had poorly functioning capital markets, which catalysed the need for 
exercising explicit rights. The efficiency of capital markets correlates with the incentives to 
participate in shareholder monitoring. In semi-strong efficient capital markets, all publicly 
available information is taken into account within the stock prices.214 This is not true in 
inefficient capital markets: If shareholders cannot rely on the informational content of stock 
prices, they will need to gather and evaluate information before they can sell. Even then, in 
the state of asymmetric information, they might not find a buyer who trusts in the 
shareholder’s (private) evaluation, or the buyer might require a discount for the risk of non-
liquidity of the stock. Altogether, selling might be more expensive to the shareholder than 
monitoring the investment and making sure that it yields adequate returns.  
Some empirical evidence supports this proposition: for deep and liquid capital markets, 
economists have found that increased liquidity reduces the incentives for large shareholders 
to fulfil their monitoring role.215 Conversely, more illiquid, poorly-functioning equity-
capital markets increase the incentives for large shareholders to monitor. The poorer that 
capital markets function, the smaller the investor that is affected by deficiencies of 
liquidity. Since minority shareholder monitoring through shareholder meetings usually 
requires preparation and expenses merely once a year, and – in Explicit Systems - does not 
impose costs for inspecting the firm’s books and records, monitoring costs are sustainable. 
Active shareholder monitoring is therefore a logical phenomenon when one considers the 
historical state of the German and French world as being characterised by weak capital 
markets.  
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 Supra, B.II.1.  
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 Amar Bhide, “The hidden costs of stock market liquidity” (1993) J. Fin. Econ. 34, 31; Philippe Aghion, 
Patrick Bolton & Jean Tirole, “Exit options in corporate finance: liquidity versus incentives” (2004) European 
Finance Review 8, 1. 
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Having regarded the legal side and the minority shareholders’ incentive, the last unsolved, 
though particularly important, factor is whether and how shareholder monitoring, which is 
exercised only once a year in a shareholder meeting, may influence management and 
controlling shareholders. Three potential threats drive the efficiency of (minority) 
shareholder monitoring: negative publicity, (ad-hoc) shareholder co-ordination, and legal 
enforcement.  
Probably the most commonly used threat of minority shareholder monitoring is negative 
publicity, having a direct impact on the company’s share prices, disgruntling the 
controlling shareholder, and damaging the controlling shareholder’s and the manager’s 
personal reputation. If managers’ compensation depends on stock prices, it may also 
directly affect managers’ wealth. Wealth and reputational effects may come hand in hand, 
in particular, if the controlling shareholder is one of the executive managers.216 
As between wealth and reputational restraints, the potential reputational loss is likely to 
restrain the controlling shareholder most effectively: First, it is likely that negative publicity 
related to minority expropriation would permanently increase the firm’s cost of capital 
through an “expropriation discount” on the shares issued to minority shareholders. Second, 
controlling shareholders of large corporations can be assumed to be very wealthy. The size 
of wealth itself makes it likely that decreasing marginal returns to wealth have set in.217 
Values other than pecuniary values, such as social standing and reputation, are likely to 
become the core of the controlling shareholder’s utility function. This individual 
characteristic is augmented by a societal characteristic: in societies that are rooted in the 
belief that minority expropriation is particularly unethical, the reputational loss resulting 
from minority expropriation can be assumed to be much higher than in a society that 
furthers the ideal of individualism. Consequently, minority expropriation would have an 
extraordinary negative impact on the controlling shareholder’s non-pecuniary benefits of 
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 Controlling shareholders in Germany used to control the management through the supervisory board. 
The controlling shareholder is rarely an executive manager. 
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 Gilson, “Complicating”, supra note 52, at IV., ask the hypothetical question: “Is the role of leading 
industrialists in a country … worth more than additional wealth at a point where decreasing marginal returns 
to wealth must surely have set in?” 
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control, such as social standing and the political weight of the controlling shareholder’s 
opinion, and might also impact relationships with pecuniary impact.218  
In light of these considerations, the chairmen of the boards, who in practice do the talking, 
need to have - at least at first glance - convincing answers to pressing issues. Otherwise, 
despite a theoretically low impact on the voting results, negative emotions will be 
transferred by the press to the public. The press would not be present if shareholder 
questions would not reveal interesting, though rarely “material”, facts. Thus, publicity and 
information rights are closely interrelated. 
Another possible effect of unconvincing answers and arrogance towards shareholders is a 
spontaneous resistance by, and co-ordination among, shareholders against the 
management’s proposal. Even more burdensome to management are displeased 
shareholders’ proposals for additional shareholder meetings,219 or the initiation of special 
reviews by minorities220 (which may augment the protective devices under Konzernrecht). 
It is possible that, in shareholder meetings with many shareholders attending in person, 
there will be sufficient support for meeting the threshold-requirements. Shareholders’ 
exercise of these procedural rights would consume management’s time, and – under 
German corporate law - are costly to the corporation (while shareholders bear merely a 
small fraction of the overall costs).221 Since the costs imposed on the corporation will annoy 
the controlling shareholder, managers will strive to avoid giving shareholders a reason to 
exercising these procedural rights in the first place. Furthermore, these procedural rights 
fulfil an important function in augmenting other cost- and reputation-related incentives. If 
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 In fact, pertaining to the large and established German corporations, minority expropriation is rarely 
reported. Instead, the famous controlling shareholder families – for example, the Quandts (BMW, Altana), 
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 S. 122 GSCA provides for calling rights in specific circumstances. For details, see Zetzsche, 
“Shareholder Procedural Rights”, supra note 139, at C.I. 
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the gain of asset diversion outweighs the direct costs of minority opposition and the loss of 
reputational costs, these restraints alone may become ineffective. Given this situation, the 
aforementioned legal devices put management and the majority shareholder under the 
permanent threat that additional minority shareholder scrutiny, esp. through the individual 
information right and the minority’s power to initiate a special review, results in sufficient 
evidence for criminal and civil liability of the controlling shareholder and managers.  
Thus, a combination of the negative publicity threat and the nuisance value of dealing with 
the exercise of minority rights prompts management to prepare properly for shareholder 
meetings as a means of avoiding the occurrence of these consequences in the first place. 
Legal enforcement of information rights constitutes the fulcrum of both the publicity- and 
the nuisance value-threat: since the procedure itself is costly and risky to managers and 
controlling shareholders, a legal obligation to provide information and to enter into a 
discussion – and severe enforcement of such obligation – helps to overcome adverse 
incentives. In the absence of law, management and controlling shareholders may be less 
inclined to answer shareholders’ questions. At least, legal enforcement of information rights 
makes lying and withholding of information more costly since 1) it increases the risk that 
the lie will be revealed, and 2) it imposes sanctions.222 Without information and discussion, 
the press would not report about the meeting - since the voting results in countries with 
concentrated ownership are far from being spectacular -, and less shareholders would be 
aware of, and come to, meetings, thereby reducing the threat of spontaneous co-ordination. 
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 Though he did not deal with a right to ask questions, we are facing here a variant of Akerlof’s lemons-
problem. George A. Akerlof, “The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, 
(1970) 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 488, has held that in perfectly efficient markets and under a regime 
that renders lying costly, one would assume that investors would discount goods (here: shares) of firms that 
do not provide sufficient and timely information pertaining to the quality of their product (here the company). 
Thus, share prices would be depressed. Since managers know how investors think, one would assume that 
they disclose information voluntarily. Transferring the model to the real world faces difficulties: First, history 
and empirical data have shown – (even) for traditionally strong capital markets – that managers tend to 
withhold bad news, despite the discount that theoretically follows. Because of this behavior, mandatory 
disclosure rules have been enacted in the first place (Seligman, Transformation of Wall Street (2003), at 39; 
for a different view, see, e.g. Marcel Kahan, “The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance”, 
(2000-2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1869, and the literature by Kahan & Klausner cited in the bibliography). 
Second, regarding to the flow of information, the historic state of German capital markets was likely one in 
which capital markets were inefficient. Thus, they did not fulfil (or were close to) the preconditions of 
Akerlof’s model. The assumption of poorly-functioning capital markets is consistent with the traditional very 
low numbers of initial public offerings (see infra, sub B.III.3.), of public corporations and of shareholders (see 
Table 8 and 9 infra sub C.III.2.b) in German capital markets. For recent changes, see infra, sub C.  
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Finally, the severe sanction of suits challenging a meeting’s decision223 often prevents 
directors from withholding information altogether.  
Admittedly, one might regard the risk to a manager of being exposed to negative publicity, 
or majority owners’ furor insignificant. However, two aspects improve the minority 
shareholders’ position. First: the controlling shareholder is likely to examine “regular” asset 
diversions, hence, the minority shareholders can free-ride on the controlling shareholder’s 
actions. Thus, based on the control report by the auditors, minority shareholders can focus 
their attention on transactions between the corporation and the controlling shareholder. This 
is a relatively narrow scope and would not often be beyond the capacity of minority 
shareholders.224 Second: since reputation is the primary concern of managers225 - and 
reputation is what they can easily lose as a consequence of poorly organized shareholder 
meetings - managerial stakes are relatively high. Managerial propensity to thoroughly 
review corporate policy and present a viable long-term strategy is facilitated by the fact that 
shareholders bear the costs of any conduct engaged in by managers to avoid risking their 
reputations. Pointing at the severe sanctions helps to overcome the resistance of controlling 
shareholders against wasting corporate resources. Thus, managers have few incentives to 
forego these expenses. Consequently, shareholder meetings exert permanent pressure on 
managers to keep the possibility in mind that shareholders can and will use their strong 
information rights in shareholder meetings to question the details of managerial conduct.226  
3. Empirical Evidence 
If there were – for whatever reason – a greater level of explicit shareholder influence in 
France and Germany, and a greater level of implicit shareholder influence in Anglo-
America, one would assume that current corporate practice should provide some empirical 
evidence. In particular, this regards two key assumptions of the proposition.  
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 For example, a decision whose validity is required for selling a significant part of the firm’s assets. 
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 If minority shareholders nevertheless reveal regarding “regular” asset diversion, they can assume that 
the controlling shareholder will undertake appropriate measures in the aftermath of the meeting. 
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 Fama, “Agency Problems”, supra note 55, at 293 et seq. 
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 The Implicit System achieves the same effect through analyst conferences, and conference calls with 
institutional investors. However, this information is, at its core, voluntarily, and not enforceable. 
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First: if capital market control constitutes the core component of Anglo-American 
shareholder influence, there is likely some proof that capital markets are more strongly 
developed in the United States than in Continental Europe. This first point has been 
sufficiently examined in former studies to which I refer.227  
Theoretically, though, one might assume that the Explicit System could lead to a sizable 
capital market that relies on Explicit Control, rather than Implicit control. However, a 
system that does not rely on capital markets for control and financing purposes is unlikely 
to develop the institutions that are required for a highly sophisticated capital market, either. 
This particularly pertains to institutions that guarantee equal access to information - in 
between the shareholder meetings! - (securities law), institutions that evaluate information 
on a day-to-day basis (analysts), and institutions that strive to exploit the liquidity of capital 
markets by developing and bringing new firms to the market (venture capitalists). All of 
these institutions require direct or indirect funding by the corporations and their 
shareholders. If the shareholders do not regularly use these institutions, it is unlikely that 
they will generously pay for their existence. Hence, institutions which drive efficient capital 
markets are less likely to develop in countries which have traditionally relied on the 
Explicit, rather than the Implicit System of corporate control.  
The empirical evidence is consistent with this observation: The thesis of poorly-functioning 
French and German capital markets is consistent with historically very low numbers of 
initial public offerings: Between 1986 and 1996, 200 German and 281 French firms were 
newly listed at official capital markets, as compared to 1,955 in the United Kingdom 
(which has approximately as many inhabitants as France, and as Germany had before 
1990), 7,538 in the United States – which has four times the inhabitants of Germany, but 38 
times its IPO numbers -, and 253 in Switzerland (with less than 10 million people!). The 
figures for the five year period of 1997-2002 signal improvement: 398 German and 452 
French (only 1997-2000) registrations, as compared to 1,342 British, 3,268 American, and 
89 new Swiss listings.228 
                                            
227
 E.g., Coffee, “The Rise”, supra note 10, at 15, whose data slightly differ from the data presented here. 
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 Source: DAI, Factbook, supra note 28. 
- 60 - 
Table 1: Market Capitalization as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product229 
Further, Table 1 replenishes existing data on Market Capitalization as a percentage of the 
Gross Domestic Product. The data support the general view that French and German capital 
markets were weak, but increased their strength to a greater extent than European countries 
with a stronger capital market tradition, as for example, the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland. The data, however, also provide an insight into the decline in capital market 
strength after the “tech bubble” of the years 1998 to 2000. The extent of the decline is 
greater in Germany230 than in countries with a capital market tradition.231 The greater 
decline might be understood as a proxy for a deficiency in investor maturity. Inexperienced 
investors may be more inclined to sell on the basis of noisy signals when the market turns, 
as compared to their experienced Anglo-American counter-parts.  
Second: since, according to the foregoing, shareholder meetings constitute the center of the 
Explicit System, one would assume that there exists some empirical evidence that French 
and German shareholders are more active through shareholder meetings than are Anglo-
American investors.  
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 Data taken from DAI, Factbook (2003).  
230
 Decline of 50,22% from peak in 2000 to 2003. 
231
 Switzerland: decline of 42,49%; United Kingdom: peak in 1999: 195,5% of GDP, decline of 43,01%; 
United States: peak in 1999: 181,1% of GDP (according to Coffee, “The Rise”, supra note 10, at 18), decline 
of 37,82%.  
  1989 +/- 1994 +/- 1997 +/- 2000 +/- 2003 1989/2003  +/- 
France 37.80% -10.05% 34.00% 41.47% 48.10% 130.35% 110.80% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Germany 30.90% -21.36% 24.30% 60.49% 39.00% 74.10% 67.90% -33.43% 45.20% 14.30% 46.28% 
Switzerland 251.20% -56.61% 109.00% 106.24% 224.80% 46.80% 330.00% -29.82% 231.60% -19.60% -7.80% 
U.K. 98.50% 14.01% 112.30% 34.82% 151.40% 20.01% 181.70% -24.77% 136.70% 38.20% 38.78% 
U.S. 55.10% 31.40% 72.40% 79.56% 130.00% 19.92% 155.90% -15.72% 131.40% 76.30% 138.48% 
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To my knowledge, data on this second point have not been systematically collected and 
evaluated. This paper thus presents new data on shareholder activity in shareholder 
meetings, based on a survey including the thirty largest German public corporations, which 
are listed in the DAX30.232 This data has been compared to data taken from the EDGAR-
files of a random sample of thirty-two of the largest American public corporations with 
dispersed ownership, which are listed in the N.Y.S.E. U.S. Top 100 index.233 Tech-stocks 
listed on the NASDAQ and on the German Tec-DAX were excluded for two reasons: (1) 
concentrated ownership is more likely to occur in young tech firms, due to their relatively 
recent history as public corporations and, hence, there will be less dilution of shares held by 
entrepreneurs. These shares would disproportionately influence the outcome of the 
statistics; (2) traditional, old firms are the firms that need active shareholders the most, 
since corporate finance theory predicts a concentration of managerial slack in these 
firms,234 which particularly necessitates either implicitly or explicitly exercised shareholder 
control. The data presented in this section is extracted from Appendixes B and C, regarding 
attendance rates, as measured by votes, and Appendix D, showing the personal attendance 
at shareholder meetings in German companies.  
a) Attendance Rates? 
Table 2: American sample: average attendance, measured in votes 
In the years 1994 – 2004, the average attendance, as measured in votes, of the American 
sample varies between approximately 83% and 86%. Given that the period of time that the 
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 The data presented is rooted in various sources. In addition to those mentioned in the first note the 
author is heavily indebted to all corporations listed in the DAX30 for answering on his questionary.  
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 According to the New York Stock Exchange, this index tracks “the top 100 NYSE-listed U.S. stocks.” 
New York Stock Exchange, online:<www.nyse.com/marketinfo/p1020656068262.html.> . 
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 Michael C. Jensen, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers” (1986) Am. 
Economic Review 76, 323, at 326 [Jensen, “Agency Costs”]; See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, “The 
Structure of Ownership: Causes and Consequences” (1985) J. Pol. Econ. 93, 1155, at 1158 et seq. [Demsetz & 
Lehn, “The Structure of Onwership“]; Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and Theory of the Firm 
(1983) J.L. & Econ. 26, 375. 
% (votes) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1994-2004 
Average 83.26% 85.05% 85.99% 85.96% 84.88% 84.33% 84.26% 84.26% 85.01% 84.88% 86.34% 84.93% 
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data covers includes a boom and two bust periods, which can be assumed to influence 
shareholder activism, this is a relatively narrow corridor. Further inquiry illuminates the 
fact that in the years following the tech-bubble (in which American shareholders were to 
suffer due to a range of corporate scandals), average attendance hardly varied from 
previous years. In light of these scandals, one would anticipate a shareholder response of 
either higher attendance (stemming from a desire to exercise more control over managers) 
or of diminished attendance rates (due to shareholder frustration). The data, however, show 
the only unlikely result, which is stability.  
An inquiry into the institutional and regulatory environment in which proxy voting 
occurred reveals that, while originally designed as a means of ensuring that companies 
could meet quorum requirements, American stock exchange rules permit brokers to vote 
uninstructed shares held in street names for routine, rather than classified, proposals.235 The 
impact of these uninstructed shares for the year 1998 is estimated to account for 
approximately 15% of the overall turnout at the meeting.236  
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 NYSE Rule 451,452, Amex Rule 576, 577, and NASD proposal for Rule 2260, pending with the SEC 
(see <www.nasdr.com/filings/rf99_63.asp>). Pursuant to NYSE Rule 452, “[a] member organization which 
has transmitted proxy soliciting material to the beneficial owner of stock … and solicited voting instructions 
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 451, and which has not received instructions from the beneficial 
owner … by the date specified in the statement accompanying such material, may give or authorize the giving 
of a proxy to vote such stock, provided the person in the member organization giving or authorizing the 
giving of the proxy has no knowledge of any contest as to the action to be taken at the meeting and provided 
such action is adequately disclosed to stockholders and does not include authorization for a merger, 
consolidation or any other matter which may affect substantially the rights or privileges of such stock.” Rule 
402.08 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual defines which proposals may affect substantially these rights 
(online: <www.nyse.com/listed/p1020656067970.html?displayPage=%2Flisted%2F1020656067970.html>).  
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 Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan,“ The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on 
Shareholder Voting” (2002) Financial Management 31, 29, at 30. 
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Table 3: Turnout at special meetings of American Sample 
Corporation Year Turnout in votes Average Turnout 1994-2004 +/- 
Bank of America 2004 68.13% 85.00% -16.87% 
Hewlett & Packard 2001 84.69% 84.30% 0.39% 
JP Morgan Chase 2004 84.09% 86.78% -2.69% 
Pepsi & Co 2001 66.37% 83.47% -17.10% 
Procter & Gamble 1998 88.57% 89.92% -1.35% 
SBC Communications 1996 73.56% 82.18% -8.62% 
Time Warner 2000 83.29% 87.59% -4.30% 
Tyco 1999 62.65% 84.10% -21.45% 
Wachovia Corp. 1998 74.90% 84.16% -9.26% 
Walt Disney 1996 77.08% 85.19% -8.11% 
Average Difference       -8.95% 
Table 3, showing the turnout at the special meetings (with classified proposals only) of the 
American sample, suggests that broker votes impacted the overall turnout in the sample in 
the range of approximately 9%. This estimate, however, might be a bit too low since special 
meetings might extraordinarily encourage shareholder attendance, due to the importance of 
the issue at stake. Further, special meetings with strong attendance rates were held at the 
same day as the Annual Meeting. Hence, these data are likely to be too low. In 2004, the 
reported non-broker votes in the American sample accounted for 15.10%.237 These data, on 
the other hand, might be a bit too high, since some shareholders will wilfully rely on the 
non-broker voting mechanism if unimportant issues are at stake. The truth is likely to be 
somewhere in between. In light of these data, one can reasonably assume that American 
active shareholders account for a turnout of approximately 70-75% of the votes. 
Table 4: Average attendance of German DAX 30 firms, 1998 - 2004. 
% (votes) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1998-2004 
Average 
58.26% 57.20% 53.39% 52.29% 50.80% 48.88% 47.21% 48.97% 
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Measured by the percentage of overall votes, the data of the German sample show a 
continuous decline between 1998 and 2004, from 58.26% to 47.07% of the votes. Four 
factors influence the statistics: (1) the increase of foreign (non-German) investors in 
German corporations, (2) a reduction in concentrated ownership, (3) a change in the 
structure of German proxy voting rules, and, (4) finally, a different disclosure policy 
regarding share buybacks.  
First: Germany animated its capital markets in the 1990s.238 In the aftermath, international 
investors have increasingly invested in large German corporations. International investors 
are primarily institutional investors who do not participate in German shareholder meetings. 
This is due to the fact that foreign financial intermediaries, which administer the deposits of 
foreign investors, do not forward the company information regarding meetings, and the 
registration procedure requires co-ordinated behavior of several financial intermediaries, 
which is costly and may require more time than is available before the meeting. Further, 
institutional investors fear that their shares will be blocked for the purpose of exercising 
votes239 - a fear that is not justified with respect to German company law.240 Given these 
problems and the absence of extraordinary circumstances for the purpose of these statistics, 
one can assume that foreign shareholders are non-voting shareholders. Empirical data 
support this assumption.241 
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 For details, see C.II. and III. 
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 Editorial, “Institutional Investors and Cross Border Voting“ (2003) Corporate Governance: an 
International Review 11, 89. 
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 See Noack & Zetzsche, “The Identification of Shareholders of Companies Issuing Bearer Shares”, WM 
2004, 1, and Noack & Zetzsche, “Identification of Shareholders”, AG 2002, 651, at 663; Expert Group on 
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 Of the ten companies with the lowest three-year attendance rate average seven are owned by more than 
40% by foreign investors, while three of these companies refrained from publishing a shareholder structure 
that distinguishes between countries (though Volkswagen-data are likely to be inconsistent with the foreign 
shareholder theory, since the Volkswagen law discourages proxy voting). The company with the lowest three-
year average, adidas-salomon with 27,65%, is 66% foreign-owned, with 34% American investors. Between 
2001 and 2003, the international shareholdings of Deutsche Bank are waving between 53% (2001) to 46% 
(2002) and 53% (2003). The attendance rate waves as well. 
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Table 5: impact of foreign investment. 
Corporation Foreign Shs Turnout 2004 “German Only”  
Infineon Technologies  n.a. 17.59% n.a. 
adidas-Salomon  66% 28.25% 83.09% 
Deutsche Börse  59% 31.55% 76.95% 
Deutsche Bank 53% 31.98% 68.04% 
Bayer  42% 32.50% 56.03% 
Siemens 56.30% 32.67% 74.76% 
Schering  52% 33% 68.75% 
Continental  n.a. 34.44% n.a. 
BASF  52.40% 34.99% 73.51% 
E.ON  43% 35% 61.40% 
Allianz 33.90% 37.15% 56.20% 
Volkswagen n.a. 37.21% n.a. 
Deutsche Lufthansa  23.90% 41.09% 53.99% 
DaimlerChrysler  45% 43.69% 79.44% 
Munich Re  36.70% 44.89% 70.92% 
Average (without n.a.)     68.59% 
Table 5 demonstrates that, in a hypothetical “German only turnout”, the average attendance 
is relatively close to the adjusted American figures. One might suggest that the same 
adjustment to international investments is required with respect to American turnout rates. 
However, the size of the American capital market is disproportionately larger than the 
German market, while the proportion of foreign investors is lower in American capital 
markets, as compared to Germany.242 Further, several European firms are second-listed at 
American stock exchanges, while American firms rarely strive for a second listing at 
                                            
242
 In 1995, foreign investors held 8,7% of German stocks, as compared to 4,2% of American stocks. 
(Further data: France: 11,2%, United Kingdom: 13,7%; the large stake of foreign shareholdings in U.K. is 
probably due to the similarity to the American system, which lures American institutional investors to invest 
in British capital markets). The data are taken from DAI, Factbook (2003). These data reflect the level of 
foreign investment before the adoption of advanced securities regulation in Germany. The data presented in 
Appendix F suggest a much higher foreign shareholding in the DAX30 (app. 35%) in 2004. 
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European stock exchanges. At the same time, institutional investment through pension and 
mutual funds, which undertake the majority of cross-border investments, is traditionally 
more strongly developed in Anglo-America than in France and Germany.243 Thus, one can 
assume that Anglo-American investors (still) invest more money in French and German 
firms than vice versa, hence foreign investors do not have as much of an impact on 
American turnouts. Finally, many international investors act through their American 
subsidiaries. With respect to these subsidiaries, American proxy rules (esp. the broker non-
voting rules for shares hold in broker-accounts, rather than directly) may apply, ensuring 
that these shares are represented in the meeting. Though the above considerations suggest 
that foreign investment in American firms does not significantly impact the turnouts, it 
nevertheless constitutes a potential source of error, which – given the published data – 
could not be extinguished.244 
Table 6: impact of concentrated ownership245 
Corporation Conc. Os. 3-year average 
Henkel 57.75% 81.11% 
Deutsche Post World Net  62.60% 76.48% 
Metro 55.58% 65.84% 
BMW  46.60% 65.37% 
Altana 50.10% 64.74% 
Fresenius Medical Care 50.76% 64.19% 
Deutsche Telekom 42.77% 59.82% 
ThyssenKrupp 23.50% 59.30% 
SAP 35.50% 57.65% 
RWE 27.68% 55.05% 
                                            
243
 The data of DAI, Factbook (2003), show that in 1995 domestic investment and pension funds and 
insurance companies in Germany held 20%, while in the United States these institutions held 44,3 % of the 
shares in domestic public corporations (France: 3,9%; United Kingdom: 50,1%).  
244
 Unfortunately, the NYSE TOP 100 firms do not publish regional shareholder structures. 
245
 Source: Database available at www.bafin.de, and tested against recent corporate announcements. 
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Table 6 demonstrates the impact of concentrated ownership on attendance at German 
shareholder meetings. Of the ten companies with the highest attendance rates, eight have a 
controlling shareholder or a controlling group of shareholders (holding more than 30% of 
the votes). Of the remaining two companies, the founders’ families of ThyssenKrupp AG 
together hold approximately 23.5% of the votes. A large number of municipalities, Allianz 
AG, and Munich Re AG together hold 27.68% in RWE AG.  
Third: Until the year 2001, banks organized the proxy voting process in German 
companies, while management was prohibited from collecting and exercising proxies. 
Organizing proxy voting is burdensome, costly, and – particularly in the case of small 
banks and credit co-operatives, which have no influence on management, – does not pay 
out directly nor indirectly. Thus, banks have become increasingly more likely to refrain 
from offering proxy voting to their clients. Despite the use of new technologies, 
management-organized proxy voting has not demonstrated the same efficacy in increasing 
turnout rates, which is largely due to a prohibition on using proxies to vest discretion with 
the management246 and/or to give long-term proxies to management.  
Fourth: the last factor influencing the statistics is rooted in a different practice regarding the 
publication of overall numbers of outstanding shares in the United States and Germany. 
American firms publish the number of outstanding common stock in the quarterly report 
regarding the shareholder meeting. Shareholder meeting notices of German firms merely 
publish the nominal share capital. Different legal regimes governing share buybacks may 
account for these differences. While American firms buy and sell their stock on a regular 
basis, German companies are subject to strict limitations when buying back their shares.247 
These share buybacks may impact German turnout figures up to 10%.248  
                                            
246
 Noack, in FS Lutter (2000), at 1480; Pikò/Preissler, in Zetzsche (ed.), The Virtual Shareholder Meeting 
(2002), Rn. 348 with further citations. 
247
 S. 71 GSCA lists an exhaustive catalogue. 
248
 E.g., by 28 June 2004, Deutsche Bank had repurchased 10% of outstanding shares, see Press Release,, 
online: <www.deutsche-bank.de/presse/index.html?contentOverload=http://www.deutsche-
bank.de/presse/releases_1502.shtml>]. The adjusted attendance rate is approximately 36%, rather than 
31,98%, as Appendix C suggests, the “German only turnout” is 76,60%, rather than 68,04%. Based on the data 
of outstanding shares published for end of April 2004 at www.stoxx.com, the average turnout at the DAX30 
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The margin of error provided by these four factors suggests that turnout measured in votes 
may be an inaccurate proxy for shareholder activism.  
b) Personal Attendance at Shareholder Meetings 
The personal attendance of shareholders at shareholder meetings may be a better proxy for 
shareholder activism. From an economic point of view, one would suggest that 
shareholders rarely attend shareholder meetings in person, since they have very little to gain 
by attending personally, while they bear the direct (journey, hotel) and indirect (time, loss 
of salary) costs of attendance.  
American evidence supports this hypothesis. The few data that are available249 suggest that 
the average attendance at shareholder meetings of large American companies is in the 
vicinity of 200 to 300 persons per meeting.250 Only a few corporations have significantly 
more shareholders in their meetings. For example, Procter & Gamble has a three year 
average (2002-2004) of more than 1500 shareholders per meeting. In contrast, German 
shareholder meetings are huge public events. In the German sample, the lowest three-year 
average (2002-2004) was 519 shareholders (adidas-salomon AG), and the highest was 
Siemens AG (10,867 shareholders per meeting), resulting in an overall three-year average 
of 4,039 shareholders per meeting.251 Between 0.24% (Deutsche Telekom AG) and 6.83% 
(Henkel AG) of all shareholders of the corporation visited the shareholder meetings 
personally.  
                                                                                                                                     
firms for 2004 were 47,7% rather than 47,21%. These data, however, were in some respects inconsistent with 
information published by the companies. 
249
 Since the EDGAR files did not contain data on personal attendance and very few companies even 
collect data on personal attendance, empirical data covering the sample for attendance measured in votes 
cannot be given here. Thus, American data is rather sketchy. 
250
 A representative of the Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (DSW) reported merely 200-
300 shareholders present at the shareholder meeting deciding upon the amalgamation of Daimler-Benz and 
Chrylser in 1998. This is consistent with figures the author received from some firms of the American sample. 
The American firms wished not to be mentioned by name. 
251
 The data regarding BASF AG and TUI AG are estimates based on data kindly provided by gsc 
research, see www.gsc-research.de. Estimates regarding earlier years are based on company information. The 
probably largest shareholder meeting ever was the meeting of DaimlerChrysler AG in 1999 with 16.500 
shareholders. After that meeting, DaimlerChrysler moved its meeting location from Stuttgart, its traditional 
place, to Berlin, which resulted in lower personal attendances. 
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These figures suggest that shareholder meetings are of substantial importance to German 
corporations and shareholders, while the American numbers support the proposition that 
shareholder meetings are not a particularly important aspect of the American firms.252 
Further, the fact that German firms keep track of personal attendance, while American 
firms do not, might be itself understood as evidence for the relevance of personal 
attendance in Germany, while, in the United States, only votes matter. Both aspects are 
consistent with the Implicit / Explicit distinction presented herein. 
c) Control Considerations 
The high turnout at shareholder meetings might be explainable by two factors that are not 
obviously related to a culture of shareholder activism. First, German companies might be 
more generous with respect to indirect rewards provided for their shareholders’ personal 
attendance than are American firms.253 The same effect might yield from the fact that, 
under German tax law, costs for attending shareholder meetings are tax deductible from 
capital gains. Both aspects may positively influence the likelihood of attendance for 
shareholders whose time is of relatively little value, such as pensioners. This explanation, 
however, leads to the question of what explains the generosity of the firms or the state that 
results in luring shareholders to the Annual Meeting? Firms and the state would not be 
generous unless they regarded a high personal attendance at shareholder meetings a good 
thing. In light of this observation, it is possible that the German corporate world and the 
state understand a high personal attendance as a proxy for good Corporate Governance, 
which is – again – consistent with the Explicit System. 
 
                                            
252
 Bernhard Pellens and Joachim Gassens recently held that (merely) 52% of German retail investors 
would sell their voting rights for a premium of 20% of the share prices, see www.investorrelations.dpwn.de, 
at “IR News”. Given that merely 0,23% - 2,15% participate personally (and an unknown number of retail 
investors by proxy), this number is remarkably low. 
253
 While a few years ago these indirect payments might have been more important, today, German 
corporations generally refrain from exhibiting a generous attitude towards their shareholders. For example, 
Henkel AG decided in 2001 to refrain from handing out shareholder gifts (pakets of Persil, which is the most 
prominent detergent in the German market). The next year, the turnout was 2.900, rather than 3.900 (as in 
2001). 
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Table 7: Shareholder / Corporation Ratio254  
Country Shareholders % (population) Public Corporations Ratio 
Canada 5,746,000 37.00%  3635 1,580 
France 5,600,000 12.70% 750 7,467 
Germany 4,600,000 7.10% 829 6,696 
Switzerland 1,666,000 31.90% 286 5,825 
United Kingdom 12,500,000 23.00% 2322 5,383 
United States 78,800,000 25.40% 5261 14,978 
Second, even though the small shareholder’s most efficient behavior in market systems is 
said to be to free-ride on other shareholders’ monitoring expenses and rely on capital 
market pricing,255 not all shareholders behave in a perfectly economical rational manner. 
Further, when it comes to economic matters portfolio theory strongly promotes the 
advantages of diversification.256 Then, time and wealth restraints might increase incentives 
to refrain from attending all of the shareholder meetings of corporations in which a 
shareholder holds shares. Thus, one could hypothesize that, rather than resulting in an 
overall higher level of shareholder activity, a lower overall number of public corporations 
as compared to the overall number of shareholders is a possible explanation for a higher 
number of shareholders personally attending the meetings. Table 7 presents data pertaining 
to the shareholder / corporation ratio in selected countries. It shows that the ratio of 
shareholders per company is much greater in the United States than in Germany. Given a 
comparable level of activism, one would suggest that more shareholders attend the 
meetings in the United States than in Germany. However, the United States is a much larger 
country than Germany and, thus, other factors like the location of the meeting might 
significantly influence the decision to travel to a meeting. Hence, a proxy that is unrelated 
                                            
254
 Data taken from DAI, Factbook (2003). The number of Shareholders of Switzerland is of 2002, and 
that of U.K. and U.S. of 1999. The number of French public corporations is estimated on basis of data kindly 
provided by Euronext NV (www.euronext.com ). The number of Canadian public corporation is the number 
of issuers listed on TSX and TSX venture exchange per 30 June 2004 (see www.tsx.com ). 
255
 Supra, note 4. 
256
 Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, Corporate Finance (1999), at 10.3, pp. 235 et seq,  
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to the influence of the number of shareholders, or the size of the country could strengthen 
the persuasiveness of the above evidence.  
A review of the means by which corporations report about shareholder meetings provides 
this evidence. Firms in the American sample rarely report about annual general meetings on 
the company’s website. Shareholders will find the mandatory information regarding 
shareholder meetings on the company’s website257 under the headline “SEC filing”. Under 
the headline “events & presentation,” approximately 50% of the American firms publish the 
presentation of the board at the shareholder meeting,258 in between financial presentations 
to capital market audiences like analysts, institutional investor circles, or general statements 
made by the CEO in public. Only a few American firms provide some kind of additional 
information on shareholder meetings under the headline “shareholder meeting”.259 Since 
American corporations are not responsive to requests for information regarding shareholder 
meetings,260 access to meeting-related information is limited to the items voted upon and 
the meeting results. Additional information, for example on procedural issues or 
discussions in the meeting, is generally unavailable.  
Though German corporate law already requires extensive reporting about the meeting in 
publicly accessible databases,261 the German Corporate Codex262 suggests that the 
corporation engage in additional reporting about shareholder meetings. All German DAX30 
firms have a specific part of their investor relations website devoted to shareholder 
meetings, and all but 4 companies offered (per July 2004 – hence, long after the proxy 
season -) some kind of additional information, such as retrospective views on the content of 
the last meeting, web-casts, press releases, or abstracts of the discussion in the meeting.  
                                            
257
 Proxy statement, Annual Reports, Quarterly Report (From 10-q) with voting results. 
258
 Either as webcast, or (more often) as text. 
259
 For example, Abbott Laboratories and Altria (press releases). PepsiCo. offers a webcast of the full 
meeting, incl. Q&A session. 
260
 From 32 American corporations that the author questioned about their shareholder meetings, merely 7 
firms reacted, but merely two firms answered to the authors questions. In contrast, 28 of 30 German 
corporations answered the author’s questions. The reluctance of American corporations to answer is partly 
due to many questions of academic nature, and partly due to strict and burdensome securities regulation. 
261
 For an overview see Noack, Database for Corporate Information (2003). 
262
 Online: <www.corporate-governance-code.de/ger/kodex/2.html >. 
- 72 - 
Given the size of the firms included in this sample, costs can hardly be a reason for the 
passivity of American firms when it comes to providing information regarding shareholder 
meetings. In the absence of any other plausible explanation, these data suggest that 
shareholder meetings are a low priority for most American firms, and a high priority for 
most German firms. The approximate length of shareholder meetings augments this 
impression: The webcast of the PepsiCo. shareholder meeting of the year 2004 is 61 
minutes long,263 while the length of large German shareholder meetings can be estimated to 
comprise between 5 and 11 hours.264 
This leads to the question of what role shareholder meetings play in the two corporate 
cultures. American literature tends to understand shareholder meetings merely as an 
institution that legitimizes the board’s ultimate power over the corporation.265 Corporate 
control issues are rarely considered, as websites of the American sample demonstrate. 
While board issues are reported under the sub-domain “Corporate Governance”, none of the 
firms include information about shareholder meetings under this headline. In contrast, the 
German Corporate Governance Codex starts with provisions on shareholder meetings in 
Chapter 2, before considering board-related issues, and German firms’ reports on Corporate 
Governance,266 or Annual Reports, usually allude to shareholder meetings when reporting 
about Corporate Governance. One can thus reasonably assume that shareholder meetings in 
Germany are an important facet of corporate control, while they fulfil other needs in Anglo-
America. In light of above analysis of shareholder monitoring through meetings,267 it is 
unclear, though, which needs they fulfil in particular, given the inefficiency of a meeting 
that has been reduced to voting procedures.268 
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 Online: < phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=78265&p=irol-audiopresentations >. 
264
 This estimate is based on the author’s own experience as former organizer of shareholder meetings. 
Special Meetings can be even longer. However, some entrepreneurial shareholders’ undertaking to utilize 
shareholder meetings for “strike suits”, as well as some ideologist shareholders, abuse the meeting through 
extensive questioning. The problems resulting from this abuse are considered infra, C.III.2.a). 
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 Clark, Corporate Law (1986), at 389. 
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 See, for example, SAP AG (online: <www.sap.com/company/governance/>), but also Allianz, Bayer, 
Commerzbank, DaimlerChrysler, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Lufthansa. 
267
 Supra, B.III.2.c). 
268
 Besides providing an alternative to a takeover bid for a change in control, see Zetzsche, “Shareholder 
Procedural Rights”, supra note 139, at D.I.3. 
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IV. Intermediate Result 
This section posited that the main difference between shareholder rights in Continental 
Europe and Anglo-America pertains to the usage of explicit and implicit ways of exercising 
shareholder influence in public corporations. The paper provided historical, statutory, and 
empirical evidence in support of this proposition: corporate law development in France and 
Germany was driven by a strong state’s desire to hamper the impact of market forces, to the 
benefit of weaker parts of society. This predominant public goal was rooted in Catholic and 
Lutheran ethics, which were consistent with the Germanic value of responsibility for one’s 
“followers.” Shareholders in Continental Europe thus were to embrace their “social 
responsibility” rather than concentrating on maximizing profit through a pre-occupation 
with selling, as was generally acceptable in Anglo-America. These public goals were most 
likely to be achieved by a system that maximized direct shareholder influence on the 
management, while at the same time the system denied shareholders an exit at an adequate 
price. Thus, shareholder meetings became a central concern in the legal frameworks of 
Germany. Statutory evidence showed a greater direct shareholder influence through 
procedural rights preceding the meeting, information rights, and shareholder suits, as well 
as lower directorial deference. These shareholder rights established the predicate for 
shareholder monitoring based on the three pillars of publicity, nuisance value, and severe 
sanctions for disregarding minority shareholder interests. Empirical figures demonstrated 
that a relatively higher proportion of shareholders attend shareholder meetings in German 
corporations, as compared to American firms, that German firms used to report extensively 
about shareholder meetings, and that shareholder meetings in Germany are considered to be 
part of Corporate Governance, while American firms refer to shareholder meetings merely 
for (dubiously) legitimising the board’s ultimate power over the corporation. In light of this 
evidence, the analysis of current Corporate Governance developments in Anglo-America, 
France, and Germany is well grounded in a prime categorization of Explicit and Implicit 
Systems of corporate control. 
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C. The “Convergence Cycles” 
The remainder of this paper provides speculations regarding the future development of 
Anglo-American and Continental European Corporate Governance systems on the basis of 
the categorization of Explicit and Implicit Systems of corporate control. This section, in 
particular, analyses the extent to which the corporate law regarding internal control 
systems of corporations will converge.269  
I. Formal Convergence on Intermediate Ground 
On the basis of above categorization, a convergence of Anglo-American, French and 
German systems of corporate control toward a system that is neither exclusively Explicit, 
nor Implicit is the most likely occurrence. Such a system would have both strong market 
institutions for external control, as well as strong institutions for internal control of 
management and directors. The weaknesses of both systems270 would be mitigated by the 
existence of the other form of control instrument. It is unlikely that this ideal system will be 
the American market-model,271 nor will it be an ethically based model of direct shareholder 
influence, as is prevalent in Continental Europe. Rather, convergence forces are more likely 
to push both archetypes toward an intermediate ground, finally resulting in formal 
convergence. 
I suggest that the force that drives convergence toward an intermediate ground will be a 
phenomenon that I term “Convergence Cycles.” The prime assumption underlying 
Convergence Cycles is that none of the current Corporate Governance systems is perfect. 
On the lookout for better solutions, both Anglo-American and Continental European 
legislatures are looking at the other’s system and attempting to isolate its positive and 
negative aspects. Where the weaknesses in one’s own system are obvious, corporate reform 
will draw on foreign experiences. Rather than immediately adopting provisions or 
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 Since this thesis primarily addresses shareholder rights, there will not be a detailed analysis of other 
Corporate Governance issues, such as the board of directors or “external Corporate Governance”. See 
Branson, “The Very Uncertain Prospect”, supra note 13, at 359-361, criticizing that corporate scholars would 
miss the important issues of the world. 
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 Supra, B.II.2., and – more in detail – C.II. infra. 
271
 Supra, note 12. 
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institutions of the alternative system, the legislatures will strive for “local optima,” hence 
there will be the adoption of certain variants that are predicated upon the foreign regulatory 
concept, but adjusted to take into account national interests. Then the (now) less successful 
(older) system will review whether an adoption of the more successful (newer) variant 
makes sense, and the process will recur, with different aspects of the system. It may turn 
out, in fact, that the national variant is inefficient or unsustainable. In this case, an adoption 
of the more successful foreign variant is possible, but so is a regression. In struggling to 
find the best corporate law for national interests, convergence forces will finally push the 
development in a direction that enables more convergence, rather than less.272 In between, 
various steps of imitation and refusal will occur.  
In light of these Convergence Cycles, I hypothesize that the “end of history”273 will not 
come in the form of a big bang, but in many small regulatory steps, narrowing down the 
space in which regulatory devices will be adjusted. Though it might take a while, the 
Convergence Cycles may finally lead to formal convergence. 
II. Potential Counter-Arguments 
The likely outcome of convergence has been subject to a rich discussion.274 Reviewed 
separately, many conceptually argued positions appear consistent and logical, while, at the 
same time, they contradict other equally convincing views. The almost unlimited number of 
factors that potentially influence future convergence accounts for a situation in which the 
one side of the story can be as strongly conceptually argued as the opposing view. When 
results regarding the future become somewhat arbitrary, another aspect of convergence 
theory becomes more important, which is the inherent task of deciphering present strains of 
developments on the basis of statutory and empirical evidence. In light of this observation, 
the author limits the conceptual argument in favor of a development in Convergence Cycles 
to a minimum that shows the theory’s position within the present state of academic debate, 
and focuses on the evidential part as the core of the argument.  
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 Convergence forces will de facto be supported by provisions of hybrid character, in particular those 
regarding information, since these provisions facilitate both the Explicit and the Implicit System. 
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 Hansman & Kraakman, “The End”, supra note 7. 
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 Supra, notes 11-14. 
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The theory of Convergence Cycles, finally resulting in a convergence toward a new system 
that combines explicit and implicit elements of corporate control, is “surrounded” by three 
academic “adversaries:” the divergenists (below sub 1.), the functional convergenists 
(below sub 2.), and the Americanocentric convergenists (below sub 3.).  
1. Divergenists 
It is anticipated that divergenists would submit that divergence forces will hinder the 
convergence forces to push the development in a direction that enables more convergence, 
by pushing in the opposite direction. If the small development toward convergence falters, 
the overall development in Convergence Cycles will as well. 
a) Divergence Forces 
Divergence forces have been intensively examined.275 In essence, divergenists have brought 
forward cultural, political, and economical (efficiency-) arguments. With respect to 
culture, divergenists emphasize the relative uniqueness and insularity of Anglo-America, 
which is said to be founded upon the ideal of free speech and the egoistic pursuit of 
happiness. The result is a society which clings to the notions of unbridled individualism and 
capitalism, and has a propensity towards conflicts. The rest of the world is said to pursue 
concepts of capitalism that are embedded in traditional social and family values, thereby 
maintaining ideals of tolerance, responsibility for society as a whole, and harmony. Cultural 
differences would therefore account for backlashes against American values and legal 
regimes.276 Political arguments include rent-seeking by national incumbents who defend 
their turfs, a lack of transparency and political accountability in international convergence 
initiatives, and the apprehension that convergence relocates competitive factors to the 
benefit of foreign competitors. All three factors would add to political resistance against 
convergence, resulting in persistence of the old regime.277 Finally, efficiency 
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 E.g. Bebchuck & Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence”, supra note 13, at 168; Branson, “The Very 
Uncertain Prospect”, supra note 13, at 325, and 343 et seq. 
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 E.g. Lucian Arye Bebchuck, “A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control” (1999) 
Harvard L. School Olin-Center Discussion Paper No. 260 (from SSRN); Bebchuck & Roe, “A Theory of Path 
Dependence”, supra note 13, at 142 et seq.; Branson, “The Very Uncertain Prospect”, supra note 13, at 338.  
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considerations refer to complementarities, structures that, though different in design, fulfil 
equivalent functions in corporate control,278 “local optima” whose reform (even if it results 
in efficiency gains) is more costly than keeping the existent structure and accepting the 
(relatively small) losses,279 and the irrelevancy argument, which holds that legislatures 
would consider other issues much more pressing than the improvement of Corporate 
Governance.280 Divergenists assume that all of these factors render a path dependent 
development of corporate law the most likely alternative.281  
b) Counter-Arguments 
Since convergence forces have been almost exhaustively expounded upon,282 they do not 
require repetition at length. In short, they include an increasing the exchange of knowledge 
within the corporate world,283 pressure from outsiders284 and insiders285 to adopt more 
efficient Corporate Governance structures, and political developments, such as 
globalization and regional harmonization.286 In light of arguments for and against 
convergence, the discussion between the divergenists and the convergenists has reached a 
stalemate. 
The idea of Convergence Cycles, however, could reanimate the discussion, since it differs 
from other statements predicting formal convergence by arguing convergence towards a 
middle ground. All of the aforementioned divergence arguments are less convincing if one 
considers convergence towards an intermediate ground, rather than towards the American 
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“Pathways”, supra note 12, and “An International Relations Perspective”, supra note 7. 
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model. Cultural sentiments between the United States and Europe will not provide barriers, 
if corporate law converges toward an intermediate ground. Continental Europeans fear 
American hegemony, but not the United States itself. European states will not resist 
American ideas per se, unless they are imposed on them by either economic or military 
force. Better solutions for serious problems – the core of the Convergence Cycles – will 
find fertile European grounds.287 Domestic scandals will reveal the loopholes in each 
system’s efficiency. On the other hand, the American system has proven to be highly 
adaptable due to a practical, rather than an ideological, approach to policy by American 
regulators. Political barriers do exists. However, European and American economies are 
already deeply intertwined, and it is logical to suggest that nationalistic tendencies in one 
economy will provoke countermoves in the other that will eventually balance external rents 
of the economies on an even ground. To the same extent, the costs of change can be 
assumed to be lower if both sides share the costs of change. Under these circumstances, it is 
likely that internal resistance will be lowered, and chances are greater that the collective 
action problems that path dependency creates might be overcome. Proportionally, the 
remainder of internal rent-seekers will become weaker, and will finally be overcome by 
pressure exerted by firms that rely on exports into other economies.288 Finally, since 
Continental European and Anglo-American states already have the basic institutions 
necessary for further convergence, which are capital markets with active regulators, firms, 
managers, shareholders, and shareholder meetings,289 the costs of change can be presumed 
to be relatively low. Thus, efficiency considerations are less likely to result in “local 
optima” situations that stall further development. Instead, due to lower information and 
transaction costs that formal convergence presents, the states’ experiments in an effort to 
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find the best combination of implicit and explicit elements is more likely to finally result in 
formal convergence. 
2. Functional Convergenists 
It is anticipated that functional convergenists290 would criticize the convergence cycle 
model on the grounds that Convergence Cycles might stop turning when a functional 
equivalent has been found within an existing Corporate Governance system. They would 
allege that such a functional equivalent will be as efficient as a potential future system and 
will represent a lower cost alternative. The existence of a functional equivalent will thus 
stifle the continuation of Convergence Cycles.  
a) The Idea of Functional Adaptability 
Functional convergenists assume that “functional convergence operates behind a façade of 
[traditional] local institutions.”291  
[The development of Corporate Governance systems] was driven, domino-like, by the 
linking of complementary institutions. … [The] institutional form is still constrained by 
the initial starting point. … When external economic changes counsel altering one 
institutional attribute, the change may cause the productivity of the entire system to 
decline dramatically because other attributes were selected to make good use of the now 
altered attribute. [Thus, traditional institutions may establish a] barrier to change if altered 
economic conditions reduce the resulting system’s efficiency. 292 
Gilson also compared national institutions to “plate tectonics, in which the demands of 
current circumstances grind against the influence of initial conditions.”293 Thus, functional 
convergence is presumed to be the first, and formal convergence is presumed to be the last 
state of institutional harmonization.294  
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b) Why Formal Convergence Will Nevertheless Occur 
Functional convergenists assume that convergence forces rarely cause formal convergence 
if a Corporate Governance system has sufficient flexibility to find a solution within its path 
dependent limits.295 I suggest, however, that the present state of Corporate Governance 
development in Anglo-America and Europe does not fulfil this condition, as follows: The 
tech bubble of 1998 through 2000, and its aftermath, have (once again)296 shown the 
vulnerability of the Implicit System for all the world to see. These weaknesses include the 
possibility of market frenzies, and the inherent risk of imposing massive losses in declining 
markets on powerless investors.297 During the bubble, most market institutions proved 
incapable, foul, or both. The amount of information available exceeded the capacity of 
market institutions to evaluate and process information.298 Firms, investment bankers and 
analysts collaborated to the detriment of investors.299 Finally,  
under perfect capital markets, fully informed traders with unlimited access to capital 
immediately pounce on mispriced securities. If arbitrageurs were available to trade 
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against the noise traders, then their action would suffice to return prices to efficient 
levels.300 
Studies, however, have shown that arbitrageurs, which market theory expected to establish 
a counterweight against noise traders, such as Hedge Funds, either refrain from activity in 
highly volatile settings301 or drive both sudden rises and declines to their own benefit.302 In 
the aftermath of the bubble, when one corporate scandal after the other was revealed and 
stock prices crashed en masse, investors faced immense losses, while scarce financial 
compensation flew primarily to entrepreneurial lawyers.303 Finally, the picture painted of 
greed, egoism, unfairness, and disgrace within the capital markets was completed when 
SEC investigations revealed that mutual funds and their brokers interacted to the detriment 
of other (primarily retail) investors through illicit short-term share trading,304 
foreshadowing the end of a system that is based primarily on market control.  
The Explicit system, however, did not fare much better. Internationalization and transition 
from bank-driven to manager-driven proxy systems deprived shareholder meetings of 
representative turnouts, as measured in votes.305 Devices of explicit influence were abused 
by blackmailers and ideological activists, the result being that many shareholders would 
actually leave shareholder meetings before the vote, or they would vote in favor of 
management in order to vote against blackmailers.306 The sharp sword of revision-directed 
suits that were grounded in allegations that the corporation withheld information and 
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bypassed formalities, cut deep into the flesh of corporations that were pursuing objectively 
reasonable restructuring plans. The Explicit System imposed almost no obligation on 
crooks to refund the benefits of market manipulation through semi-true and super-euphoric 
statements. Though there is no evidence that large and established corporations were 
involved in the aforementioned activities,307 investor faith went down to zero. The 
(traditionally weak) Initial Public Offering market ceased to exist, which prevented 
primarily young firms from gaining external financing, and led to a decline in share 
issuances by large firms.308  
Given these developments, the need for ongoing reform and modernization is obvious. Both 
systems experienced crises at the same time, though with different results. In the United 
States, some of the largest and most well-established firms were involved in scandals.309 
These are the kinds of firms in which corporate finance predicts that market control is most 
useful, since financial slack increases managerial incentives to steal and shirk, while 
dispersed share ownership reduces shareholder incentives to directly monitor the 
management.310 In contrast, young tech companies in which entrepreneurial managers often 
held a majority of the voting shares, were often the subject of scandals in Germany. One 
would assume that minority shareholder monitoring is most intense (and, thus, most 
efficient) in these firms, since managerial and majority shareholders interests are aligned. 
However, it was not, for three reasons: (1) most dispersed shareholders were inexperienced 
in holding shares, and thus, they were inefficient monitors; (2) legal loopholes facilitated 
the deficiency of minority shareholder monitoring;311 (3) this problem was inflamed by the 
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fact that many majority owners who were also managers were – although honest - 
inexperienced and inefficient managers. Thus, minority shareholders could not rely on 
majority monitoring. 
Both systems developed inefficiencies precisely where current Corporate Governance 
theory predicted they would be most effective. These inefficiencies imposed immense costs 
on investors, firms and the overall economy.312 Though one might also take a different 
view, I hypothesize that these costs have reached a magnitude that justifies institutional 
reforms that go beyond the limits provided by an Implicit or Explicit system of corporate 
control, and thus, that formal, rather than functional convergence will occur. 
3. Americanocentric Convergenists 
It is anticipated that Americanocentric convergenists would assert that efficiency 
considerations and the influence of the more successful investors will drive convergence 
toward the American standard-model, rather than toward an intermediate ground. 
a) The Proposition 
Americanocentric convergenists rely primarily on efficiency and political arguments: the 
main competitive advantage of the American model consists in the access it provides to 
equity markets at lower costs due to the (apparently) stronger rights it attributes to minority 
shareholders.313 Thus, the value of dispersed shareholdings is presumed to be less diluted 
than in weak legal regimes, resulting in stronger capital markets overall. Allured by a 
possibly higher valuation of their shares,314 dispersed (and also some controlling) 
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shareholders would press firms to move towards American-style market regimes. Thus, 
more and more firms would seek to exploit the superiority of the American system.315 
Issuers who refrain from seeking this advantage would eventually falter in the efficiency 
competition with other firms. Inefficiently organized and non-pecuniary oriented firms and 
their controlling shareholders would become less successful, less important, and less 
influential.316 On the other hand, the shareholders of efficiently organized firms would 
become more and more wealthy and influential, until they would finally be able to 
influence the national polity to adopt an American style regime for the national securities 
markets as a means of reducing the information and transaction costs for their investments, 
eventually resulting in formal convergence. 
b) A Different View 
The 1990s were indeed the decade of the Americanocentric convergenists: backed by the 
longest sustained bull-market in Unites States history from 1981 through 1999317 and the 
breakdown of the USSR, many legislatures looked toward the United States when 
reforming their systems. However, legislatures around the world might interpret the 
weaknesses of the Implicit System that the early 2000s highlighted318 as the first signs of a 
“downfall of the West,” that has “seriously undermined the confidence in … the 
fundamentals of market-based capitalism.”319 Further considerations support the view that 
American corporate law is not as superior to other Corporate Governance systems as its 
protagonists have posited.  
 (1) The Americanocentric theory is rooted in the belief that American-style Corporate 
Governance is superior because of its stronger protection of minority rights. Part B. of 
this paper, however, has shown that American Corporate Governance theory has neglected 
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an important aspect of other corporate systems, namely, the use of explicit control 
mechanisms as a substitute for implicit control devices. The Americanocentric literature has 
failed to provide a satisfactory justification for the neglect of such mechanisms. 
(2) Despite the fact that there might not be stronger protection of minority rights, Anglo-
American Corporate Governance models could nevertheless result in higher share prices at 
the capital markets in the short run, for the simple reason that powerful American investors, 
just as American academia, are not familiar with the Explicit System. Thus, looking merely 
for characteristics of the Implicit System, they would discount shares of countries in which 
implicit elements are not as strongly developed as in the United States. Higher evaluations 
would be rooted in ignorance of, rather than superiority of, corporate law.  
If this is, in fact, true, it will be doubtful whether American money can lure foreign issuers 
in the long run, given that European Capital Markets will gain strength in the 2000s.320 In 
2004, Europe has become the earth’s largest economy.321 The bulk of investments of more 
than 450 million Europeans is likely to flow through European capital markets. Further, 
European harmonization is far from providing “dismal failure,”322 as recent events 
demonstrate: The Directive on the European Company has been enacted, providing a 
solution for the co-determination debate that has stalled European Corporate Governance 
reform for almost two decades.323 European regulators have almost finished the works on 
the ambitious Financial Services Action Plan [FSAP]324 that aims to establish a uniform 
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European accounting, securities regulation and corporate law framework for public 
corporations by 2007. This framework empowers the European Commission and a network 
of cooperating national securities agencies (with the assistance of expert associations) as 
the central enforcement agencies.325 The competition of three stock exchanges326 drives 
the efficient development of trading structures. The rise of Asian economies, lead by 
China’s rapid development, may further threaten American economic hegemony. If 
American superiority of corporate law is merely a myth, then the truth will be soon 
revealed – by market forces. 
(3) Finally, since 11 September 2001, for the first time since the American-Canadian war, 
the United States faces a foreign threat on its own grounds. Though the impact of terrorism 
on American politics is still uncertain, one possible outcome is that the United States is 
looking for closer ties to its cultural allies. These ties could provide for partial solutions for 
increasingly pressing economic, social and environmental issues.327 I speculate that one 
aspect of closer cooperation could be more flexibility regarding Corporate Governance on 
the American side of the negotiation table to the benefit of both economies. Teamwork of 
American and European regulators will be more likely, once European corporate law is 
harmonized, and Europeans are speaking with one voice.  
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III. The Evidence 
While all aforementioned theories, including mine, are speculations that can each be 
convincingly argued, and whose substance will be tested only by the wheel of time, 
statutory and empirical evidence strengthens the persuasiveness of my prediction, relative 
to the others. 
1. Anglo-America: The Re-Invention of Shareholder Rights 
Anglo-American corporate law development of recent years could bear the headline “(re-
)invention of Explicit shareholder rights.”  
a) Trajectory towards the Explicit System 
The takeover friendly judicature in the Unocal, Revlon and Paramount cases328 initiated an 
intra-American takeover boom. In light of this boom, more than 30 American states 
adopted anti-takeover laws. Takeover activity diminished significantly in the years 
following the introduction of such laws,329 thereby reducing the impact of market forces as 
well. To the same extent that the takeover market lost momentum, mechanisms of the 
Explicit System were developed. The Council of Institutional Investors started co-
ordinating activities of investment funds to control directors in 1985. Following its 
recommendations,330 institutional investors concentrated more and more on “voting”, rather 
than on just buying and selling. Meanwhile, large pension and mutual funds, such as 
CalPERS and Vanguard, but also the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, adopted 
policies that encouraged investors to take an active role in shareholder meetings.331 
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A first reaction to increasing institutional investor activism was the reform of the federal 
proxy rules in 1992. Prior to their revision, the federal proxy rules effectively dampened 
collective shareholder action.332 In 1992, federal securities regulation softened the rules 
pertaining to communication among shareholders sufficiently to permit an open exchange 
of views among shareholders.333 In 1999, some burdensome information requirements for 
proxy votes in takeover situations were abandoned.334 In the aftermath, a wave of 
shareholder activism flooded corporate Anglo-America, which lead to some 
enthusiastically celebrated “victories” of shareholder activists over corporate managers.335  
b) Statutory Evidence 
Statutory evidence regarding the new rules on board composition, the SEC proposal on the 
election of directors, and the holding of the SEC that shareholders may decide upon a 
firm’s dividend policy, evidence the rise of the Explicit System.336 
First: while jurisdiction over Corporate Governance rules, other than proxy regulation, was 
traditionally vested with the states, in 2003, the SEC and the Stock Exchanges began 
regulating board functions. While the SEC rules require enhanced transparency regarding 
the operation of the boards of directors of the companies,337 stock exchanges required 
American corporations to elect a majority of independent directors with specific 
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functions.338 A mandatory distinction between the position as Chief Executive Officer and 
the Chairman of the board is likely to be the next step in disentangling the position of 
executives and supervising directors.339 Thus, American regulators adopted the advantages 
of the German two-tier board system with worker co-determination on supervisory 
boards340 without taking its downside, which is the involvement of another greedy 
stakeholder group at the top of the corporate ladder. The adoption of one part, but not all of, 
the German system may trigger a turning around of the cycle. The next step might 
constitute a de facto abolition of the worker co-determination through the competition for 
firms incorporating in Europe.341  
Second: under current federal proxy rules, a shareholder proposal must not be included in 
the management’s circular if the proposal relates to a director election.342 Due to the 
extensive use of proxy forms in the United States, dissidents, dissatisfied with management, 
must generally343 undertake a proxy contest, along with its related expenses, to put 
nominees before the security holders for a vote.344 This is an uneven contest since the 
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corporation bears the cost of the candidacies of nominees who the board proposes.345 This 
has caused a lively discussion in the United States about shareholder access to the ballot,346 
which has resulted in a moderate proposal to change the current SEC proxy rules.347 
Pursuant to the SEC draft proposal, shareholders will be empowered to include candidates 
in the management’s proxy statement and the form of proxy, subject to four conditions.348 
In the context of this paper, SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson’s reasoning for the 
requirement to add shareholder candidates to the management slate is noteworthy: 
In over-simplified terms, our current proxy rules give dissatisfied shareholders just two 
options: start a proxy fight for control or sell their stock. We are seeking to find middle 
                                                                                                                                     
the statement shall be treated as a vote against the resolution. Pursuant to s. 665 of the BGB (German Civil 
Code), proxy holders, incl. those solicited by the board, must vote in the best interest of the beneficiary. 
345
 In exceptional cases, incumbent directors must pay for extraordinary expenses, though the case law is 
unclear, see Hall v. Trans-Luc Daylight Screen Picture Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 A. 226 (1934); Rosenfield 
v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).  
346
 SEC Division of Corporation Finance, “Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the 
Nomination and Election of Directors” (15 July 2003), online: <www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyrpt.htm>, at 
2 – 5; “The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot” (2003) Bus. Lawy. 59, 43; Bebchuk (ed.), Symposium 
on Corporate Elections (2003); Grundfest, “Advice and Consent”, supra note 212; Martin Lipton & Steven A. 
Rosenblum “Election Contests In the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come” (2003) Bus. 
Lawy. 59, 67; Robert C. Pozen “Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate 
Directors” (2003) Bus. Lawy. 59, 95; Task Force on Shareholder Proposals of the Committee on Federal 
Regulation of Securities (Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association) “Report on Proposed 
Changes in Proxy Rules and Regulations Regarding Procedures for the Election of Corporate Directors” 
(2003) Bus. Lawy. 59, 109; Janet McFarland, “SEC’s small step for shareholders”, Globe and Mail Report on 
Business (8 October 2003), at B2. 
347
 Proposed Rule: Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48626 (14 October 2003), online: 
< www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm >, stating a new §240.14a-11 “Security holder nominations”; 
see for the current status of the proposal online: <www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations.htm>. On the 
comparative aspects, see David C. Donald, “Nomination of Directors under U.S. and German Law” (2004) 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main, Institute for Law and Finance Working Paper Series 
No. 21, online: <www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/dcdonald033104.pdf>, and Zetzsche, “Shareholder 
Procedural Rights”, supra note 139, at C.II.4.. 
348
 1) as formal requirements, the candidates must be supported by a minimum ownership of 5% of the 
voting rights with a two-year holding requirement as of the date the proposal, and lengthy information about 
the candidates, see Proposed Rule 14a-11(b) and (c). The requirements are in essence similar to that required 
for a proxy statement under Item 7 of Schedule A of Regulation 14A. (2) The requisitionists can only 
nominate a minority (1-3) of director candidates [short slate], see Proposed Rule 14a-11(d); (3) The candidate 
must be independent from the nominating shareholder, see Proposed Rule 14a-11(c), sub 4., and (d); (4) A 
triggering event must demonstrate the need for additional shareholder power. Triggering events are: (i) a 
shareholder proposal (submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8) to subject the company to shareholder access regime 
wins a majority of the votes cast; (ii) at least one of the board’s nominees for director receives “withhold” 
votes from at least 35% of the votes cast, see Proposed Rule 14a-11(a), sub (2). 
- 91 - 
ground, particularly at a time when Corporate Governance, while improving, is still not 
where it should be.349 
There is some likelihood that the SEC draft will be further softened before adoption.350 Its 
trajectory is nevertheless consistent with another new SEC rule, which requires a 
description of the company's policy “with regard to board members' attendance at annual 
meetings and a statement of the number of board members who attended the prior year's 
annual meeting.”351 The attendance of all or most of the directors, which is likely to follow 
from this proposal, is apt to further direct accountability and responsiveness of directors to 
shareholders in annual meetings. The SEC’s strategic plan for the years 2004-2009 suggests 
that the SEC will further encourage the development towards more substantial shareholder 
meetings.352 
Third: while European company laws vest the right to decide upon how to use profits of a 
corporation in shareholders,353 American directors have traditionally held the power to 
declare dividends.354 In 2002, however, shareholders of Cisco Sys., Inc. launched a 
shareholder proposal to vote on the declaration of a quarterly dividend.355 Shareholders of 
Potlach Corp. proposed in 2003 that the board prepare a report explaining the corporation’s 
past and current dividend policy.356 In both cases the SEC staff denied the board permission 
to omit the proposal from the management’s circular.357 Whether this trend toward reducing 
directorial deference will persist, might be clarified in the Hollinger-case, in which the 
                                            
349
 SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson, “Remarks to the Council of Institutional Investors” 
Washington, D.C., March 25, 2004, online: www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch032504whd.htm. 
350
 See Deborah Solomon, “compromise may rescue SEC rule on directors,” The Wall Street Journal of 11 
August 2004, as reprinted in The Globe and Mail, at B6, stating that the SEC works on a new draft that 
includes mandatory negotiations between shareholders and management before shareholders can put 
candidates on the management slate. 
351
 New SEC Rule 33-8340, introducing new Paragraph (h)(3) of Item 7 of Exchange Act Schedule 14A, 
which demands: “Describe the registrant's policy, if any, with regard to board members' attendance at annual 
meetings and state the number of board members who attended the prior year's annual meeting.”] 
352
 SEC, Strategic Plan for 2004-2009 (2004), at 38, (online: www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan0409.pdf). 
353
 See ss. 119 (1) Nr. 2, 174 (1) GSCA; Art. L. 232-11, 232-12 French Code de Commerce; Art. 102 of 
Table A to British Companies Act of 1985.  
354
 S. 6.40 MBCA and s. 170 DGCL. Critical Cunningham, “Commonalities and Prescriptions”, supra 
note 12, at 1181, with a proposal de lege ferenda (but inaccurate with respect to Germany). 
355
 See Sisco Sys., Inc., 2002 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶78,330 (avail. 19 Sept 2002).  
356
 Potlatch Corp., 2002-2003 Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶78,450 (avail. 18 Feb 2003). 
357
 Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i) of Regulation 14A under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
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Delaware Chancery Court is to make explicit the conditions under which shareholders are 
entitled to vote on sales of corporate assets.358 
c) Empirical Evidence 
Statutory changes will be futile if the cultural differences between the Anglo-America and 
Continental Europe serve to stifle the development of shareholder activity or passivity, 
respectively. Empirical evidence indicates, however, that this is not, in fact, the case. 
Press releases by the Investor Responsibility Research Center – a social shareholder activist 
-, suggest that the number of shareholder proposals in the United States has been steadily 
increasing.359 Since data covering a longer period of time are not publicly available, the 
author analysed the sample of American firms of the NYSE TOP 100 index, which were 
used for determining the average turnout at American shareholder meetings,360 with respect 
to the number of shareholder proposals that were voted on at annual meetings.  
Table 8: Number of proposals in American Sample 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Overall 36 55 44 45 49 59 76 71 71 112 122 
Set of data 28 29 30 31 31 31 31 31 31 32 29 
Average 1.29 1.90 1.47 1.45 1.58 1.90 2.45 2.29 2.29 3.50 4.21 
                                            
358
 Online: <www.irrc.org/company/news_fulltext.htm#Court >. 
359
 2001: Of overall 138 social policy proposals, 27 proposals garnered support from 10 percent or more of 
shareholders. 15 of these addressed global labor standards or fair employment. (Online: 
<www.irrc.com/company/06292001_RecordVotes.html>); 2002: Resolutions on global labor standards: 21 
resolutions filed in 1996 (average support 6%) to 49 each in 2001 (average support 8%) and 2002 (average 
support app. 10%) (<www.irrc.com/company/10092002_sweatshops.html>); 2003: 26 global warming 
resolutions have been filed, up from 21 in 2002. 322 (2002: 106!) resolutions related to CEO compensation 
have been submitted; 56 (2002: 51) resolutions related to classified boards 
(<www.irrc.com/conference/thanks.html>). 2004: 28 global warming proposals have been filed at 22 
companies (including three filings at two Canadian companies). 11 came to votes, several others withdrawn 
when the targeted companies agreed to conduct the requested reviews; 28 companies--nearly twice as many as 
last year--asking them to report generally on their sustainability policies, 11 so far have come to votes; 56 
resolutions on classified boards, with – so far – 66,2% average support (in 2003: 48 with average level of 
support of 63%). 49 proposals dealing with expensing stock options (in 2003: 69, on average 47.4 % support.) 
16 companies adopted proposals for expensing options in 2003 and consequently had the proposal withdrawn 
from the ballot. (<www.irrc.com/company/stock_options.html>). 
360
 Supra, B.III.3. 
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Appendix E, of which Table 8 is an excerpt, demonstrates that the average number of 
shareholder proposals per meeting has risen from 1.29 per year in 1994 up to 4.07 in 2004.  
While these figures do suggest that some shareholders were more active in proposing 
resolutions, they do not provide evidence that shareholders in general have become more 
active. As a measure of general shareholder activity, the number of accepted proposals 
might be a better proxy for activism. Furthermore, a distinction between proposals made by 
social activists, and those pursuing better Corporate Governance can reveal insights into the 
maturity of investors. The data shown in detail in Appendix E evidence that American 
shareholders have, indeed, become more active: While no shareholder proposals were 
successful in the years 1994 through 1998, the years following show an increasing number 
of successful proposals.361 Out of 332 social activist and 400 corporate governance 
proposals that shareholders submitted, merely 2 out of 29 proposals that were accepted by 
shareholders were social activist proposals. This ratio indicates that American shareholders 
distinguish between the different kinds of proposals presented to them. Though both the 
scope and volume of the sample data is relatively constricted, it nevertheless suggests that 
shareholder activity through explicit devices has increased in the United States. 
2. Germany: The Rise of the Market Model 
Commentators have realized that Germany has become increasingly willing to accept of the 
market model.362 Exogenous363 and endogenous364 forces pushed the German system to 
                                            
361
 1999: 1; 2000: 3; 2001: 2; 2002: 4; 2003: 11; 2004: 8 (with 27 of 32 firms reported, as of 22 August 
2004). 
362
 Cioffi, “Restructuring “Germany Inc.””, supra note 30; Coffee, “The Rise”, supra note 10, at 12 et 
seq.; Cunningham, “Commonalities and Prescriptions”, supra note 12, at 1147 et seq.; Gordon, “An 
International Relations Perspective”, supra note 7; Eric Nowak, "Investor Protection and Capital Market 
Regulation in Germany", in: Jan Pieter Krahnen, Reinhard H. Schmidt (eds.), The German Financial System, 
(Oxford University Press, 2004) [Nowak, "Investor Protection and Capital Market Regulation”]; Siems, 
Convergence (2004), at 287 et seq. 
363
 Globalisation diminished protective barriers, and increased competitive forces. The globalised market, 
however, is more similar to the (chaotic historical) conditions in Anglo-America, than the state-dominated 
jurisdictions of Continental Europe. Thus, the states and firms in Continental Europe needed to adapt their 
traditional social and legal systems to the new conditions in order to stay competitive. These costs of change 
might account for the current competitive disadvantages of Continental European economies.  
364
 The development may be explained as follows. Once the economy spluttered, the cookie that was to 
share between the parties of the social contract became smaller, rather than larger, as in the years before, 
which resulted in conflicts between the parties of the “social contract”: (1) employees concentrated on 
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open up to implicit elements. The fact that the German state could take advantage of 
stronger capital markets365 might have added to the legislature’s propensity to bear the costs 
of change, though European developments triggered the launch towards the Implicit System 
at a much earlier time.366  
a) Statutory Evidence 
Since 1989, the German legislature has installed a disclosure based system of securities 
regulation,367 the rules of which are enforced by a specific enforcement agency.368 
Takeover regulation followed in 2001.369 The adoption of the European FSAP370 will 
further increase the momentum of German equity markets. One step taken to implement the 
FSAP is the proposal of an “Investor Protection Improvement Law” which is likely to come 
into force in 2005. It enhances the management’s duty to publish a prospectus and increases 
the liability for making misleading statements. It also forces security analysts to disclose 
conflicts of interest, and it improves devices designed to prevent insider trading and market 
manipulation.371 Where American rules are arguably more efficient, both the FSAP and 
                                                                                                                                     
maximizing their own, rather than the firm’s, return; (2) the state raised taxes and increased state debt, thereby 
implicitly raising the firms’ costs of external finance; (3) managers thought to increase their salaries; (4) the 
developments (1) through (3) have tipped a system that was originally beneficial to shareholders to their 
disadvantage. Consequently, shareholders looked for ways to re-adjust their returns by investing more in 
(foreign) firms without being obliged to monitor. These conflicts have stalled necessary reforms.  
365
 Gordon, “An International Relations Perspective”, supra note 7, and “Pathways”, supra note 12. 
366
 The development started with the harmonization of European Accounting Law through the 2nd and 3rd 
Directive on Company Law in the 1970s, see Zetzsche, Shareholder Information (2004), at 204 et seq. 
367
 See Nowak, "Investor Protection and Capital Market Regulation”, supra note 362. The legislative steps 
include the four Laws on Strengthening Capital Markets [FMFG]: Gesetz zur Stärkung des Finanzplatzes 
Deutschland (1. FMFG) of 11 July 1989, Federal Bulletin I (1989), 1412; Zweites 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz (2. FMFG) of 26 July 1994, Federal Bulletin I (1994), 1749; Drittes 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz (3. FMFG) of 29 March 1998, Federal Bulletin I (1998), 529; Viertes 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz (4. FMFG) of 21 June 2002, Federal Bulletin I (2002), 2010.  
368
 In 1994, the “Federal Agency for the Supervision of Securities Market” [BAWe] was established. In 
order to enable strong enforcement, following the example of the SEC, the BAWe was united with two other 
federal agency in the Bundesaufsichtsamt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (“Federal Agency for the 
Supervision of Financial Services”) [BAFin] in 2002.  
369
 With the Wertpapier- and Übernahmegesetz - WpÜG [“Law on Security Offers and Takeovers”] in 
2001, which was put into force 2002. 
370
 See above, C.II.3.b). 
371
 See Bundesregierung, “Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung des Anlegerschutz 
(Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz - AnSVG)“ (translated: Federal Government, Proposal of a “Investor 
Protection Improvement Law”) of 21 April 2004, online: 
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German securities laws strive for convergence with these more efficient aspects of the 
American system. However, where the regulation provides European solutions (rather than 
carbon copies of the American solutions), hence “local optima,” it initiates the next turn of 
the Convergence Cycle. 
At the same time, regulators also strived for improvement of the Explicit System, esp. with 
respect to individual information rights, and the doctrinaire distinction between control and 
the financial value of equity, which constitutes the legal basis for the rigidity of revision-
directed shareholder suits. Both devices have been abused in the past for blackmailing372 
and social activism. In accordance with recent judicature from the German constitutional 
court,373 two decisions of the German Federal Supreme Court enhanced shareholders’ 
ability to get financial compensation, where the statutes suggested that non-financial 
sanctions would be sufficient. The decision in MEZ enhanced the power of courts to soften 
the impact of a revision-directed suit, which is a de facto blocking of a merger, until the end 
of court proceedings that might come by way of judgment or settlement.374 Drawing on an 
analogy to another statutory form of merger, the court applied provisions regarding a 
corporate mediation proceeding that is aimed at financial compensation, rather than those 
regarding revision-directed suits. Before this judgment, the scope of this statutory 
mediation proceeding had been strictly limited. In Macrotron, the court held that 
shareholders need to be financially compensated for the loss in liquidity caused by a 
voluntary retreat of the firm from the securities market (“delisting”) that was initiated by a 




 Baums, “Legal Opinion F. for the 63rd Conference of German Jurist Forum”. 
373
 In the judgments of the German Constitutional Court in BVerfGE 14, 263, 282 – Feldmühle -; SEN – 
ZIP 1999, 533; - DAT/Altana -, ZIP 1999, 1436, 1439 f.; ZIP 2000, 1670, 1671 f. – Moto Meter -, the court 
established a three step test for interference with shareholder property rights. An interference to be lawful 
requires (1) a justification, relying on the specific situation of the underlying business and those of related 
parties, (2) a financial compensation of the full economic value of the shares, and (3) effective judicial 
review. 
374
 BGHZ 146, 179 (1.Ls.) bzw. 186 – MEZ -; ditto BGH, ZIP 2001, 412 – Aqua-Butzke-Werke -. 
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controlling shareholder. At the same time, it cut down the scope of the revision-directed 
suit by preferring financial compensation to a revision of the meeting’s decision.375  
The German legislature follows the same trajectory as do the courts. Upholding the Explicit 
System in principle,376 and in particular the individual information right and the revision-
directed suit, the legislature is going to further disarm these devices in order to prevent 
abuses. One such action is an acknowledgement that information published on a company’s 
website is the equivalent of answers given by the boards in shareholder meetings. Another 
action is the establishment of a preliminary procedure in certain revision-directed suits. In 
this preliminary procedure courts will decide whether the transaction that is being 
challenged will be blocked until the end of judicial proceedings, or whether financial 
compensation may substitute for the revision-directed suit if the suing shareholder 
eventually prevails. Effectively, the scope of the revision-directed suit will be reduced to 
the benefit of financial compensation for infringements of corporate law. At the same time, 
the German legislature is planning to lower the thresholds for shareholder derivative suits 
against directors – originally requiring the shareholder(s) to hold 10% of the shares or 
shares with a face value of 1 million  for at least three months before the filing - to a face 
value of 100,000 , with a new preliminary court proceeding providing an additional 
gatekeeper for shareholder actions.377 
Both the court decisions and the new draft is consistent with the trajectory of the EU-
Takeover Directive that also facilitates the “commercialisation” of shares.378 
                                            
375
 BGHZ 153, 57 = ZIP 2003, 387, 390 = NZG 2003, 280, 282; see Zetzsche, “Voluntary Delisting“ 
(2000) NZG 2000, 1046 et seq. 
376
 See the improvements relating to shareholder proposals preceding the meeting, supra B.III.2. 
377
 See ss. 131, 243, 247a, 147a GSCA, as amended by UMAG, supra note 148. 
378
 Art. 5 of European Directive 2004/25/EG requires national governments to implement a sell-out right 
for minority shareholders for cases in which an acquirer acquired a very large stake of the shares through a 
tender offer.  
- 97 - 
b) Empirical Evidence 
Empirical evidence for the trajectory towards the Implicit System consists of (1) the 
increasing number of shareholders, (2) the decline of bank influence, and (3) the increase in 
takeover activity since 2001.  
Table 9: development of investment ownership in Germany379 





Shareholders 3,192 23.25% 3,934 -0.36% 3,920 58.44% 6,211 -26.36% 4,574 1,854 43.30% 
Shareholders & 
Fund Unit Owners 
n.a.   n.a.   5,601 111.18% 11,828 -10.74% 10,558 4,957 88.50% 
(1) Table 9 demonstrates that the number of German shareholders has risen significantly 
since the implementation of securities regulation in 1989, despite some setbacks in the 
aftermath of the bubble. Per July 2004, 16.4% of the German population invests in shares 
or funds, a rise from 8.9% in 1997. 
(2) Commentators have posited that bank influence in Germany is declining.380 Data 
provided by DAI, which cover the period when the German federal government gave up 
income taxation of profits from sales of corporations, or parts thereof, in 2001, support 
these results. While German market capitalization dropped from 2,631 billion  in 1999 to 
                                            
379
 Data taken from DAI, Factbook (2003). 
380
 Mark Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners (1994), at 210 et seq.; Coffee, “The Rise”, supra note 10; 
Gordon, “An International Relations Perspective”, supra note 7; Hoepner & Krempel, “The Politics”, supra 
note 29. Three changes drive the decline of bank influence: (1) the more burdensome procedure in collecting 
proxies, (2) higher competitive pressure, forcing banks concentrate on their core business, which implicates 
selling large shareholdings in German corporations, (3) more complex rules on board memberships. Since 
securities regulation hinders “insiders” to trade in securities, and current Corporate Governance legislation 
demands a stronger involvement of the supervisory board in business decisions, bank representatives in 
supervisory boards were more and more prevented from either participating in the supervisory board’s work, 
or from using any knowledge about the firm for business purposes, since market participants would assume 
the use of insider information. Thus, banks faced more obstacles than benefits from their participation in 
Corporate Control.  
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1,477 billion  - or 43.8% -, bank shareholdings dropped from 350 billion  in 1999 to 
159,1 billion  in 2002, or 54.5%. Banks reduced their investment, measured in proportion 
to overall investment in shares, in 2001, by 8.26%, and in 2002, by 25.32%. At the same 
time, the proportion of non-financial enterprises, insurance companies, investment funds 
and international investors increased.381 
(3) Until the year 2001, Germany did not have any takeover law, while tax law required 
full income taxation of profits in the case of sales of corporations, or parts thereof.  





The German legislature eliminated both obstacles to takeovers in 2001. As of July 2004, 65 
takeover have been were launched. While, at first glance, Anglo-American spectators might 
consider this figure insignificant, it needs to be interpreted in light of an overall small 
number of 687 public corporations that are listed in regulated markets in Germany.383 Thus, 
in 2.5 years that were marked by capital market depression,384 9.46% of all corporations 
within the scope of German takeover law have been the target of takeover bids.  
                                            
381
 Data taken from DAI, Factbook (2003). 
382
 Derived from the database of the German Agency for the Supervision of Financial Services [BAFin], 
online <www.bafin.de >. 
383
 Source: DAI, Factbook (2003). The data in Table 7, supra at B.III.3.c), showing the existence of 829 
German public corporations, includes corporations listed at the unregulated “Freiverkehr”, which is not within 
the scope of German takeover law, pursuant to s. 1 of WpüG (German Law on Security Offers and 
Takeovers). 
384
 See the data provided in Table 9. 
Notice of Control Takeover Other Bids Total 
2002 17 27 2 46 
2003 19 29 0 46 
2004 (per 31 July) 10 9 0 19 
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c) Path Dependency Overcome 
The statutory and empirical evidence suggests that, in Germany, significant convergence 
forces have opened up the Explicit System for the introduction of elements of the Implicit 
System. Since 1989, German politics has invested significantly in creating the legal and 
institutional preconditions for a strong securities market. Regarding elements of the Implicit 
System, it is reasonable to assume that Germany has already paid most of the costs of 
convergence, which primarily comprise setting up an institutional and legal framework for 
market control. Naturally, change requires time. As the data on declining shareholdings 
after the peak in 2000 suggest, German investors and institutions have not yet permanently 
absorbed the idea of market control. Thus, besides its theoretical advantages over the 
Implicit System in certain situations, the Explicit system also remains important in the day-
to-day control of managers. 
3. The Cycles are Turning … 
While the above merely suggests that Germany is adopting particular elements of an 
Implicit System, and the United States is adopting particular elements of an Explicit 
System, some developments underpin the functionality of Convergence Cycles themselves, 
as well. These include the new American propensity to adopt the International Financial 
Reporting Standards [IFRS], the time-lines of current change reports, and the 
harmonization of market and shareholder needs with respect to German individual 
information rights.  
(1) In 2002, the European states within the European Union agreed on adopting the IFRS 
for all public corporations by 2005.385 Recently, American regulators announed their 
willingness to consider the adoption of the IFRS, as well.386 Though the IFRS are rooted in 
British – hence implicit – philosophy, adopting the IFRS nevertheless constitutes 
convergence on a middle ground. American and European accounting specialists are 
                                            
385
 Technically, the European Commission adopts provisions suggested by the IASB. For details, see 
Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002 [published 11 September 2002 in official bulletin, L243]  
386
 According to Janet McFarland, “U.S. accounting rule maker open to change”, in The Globe and Mail, 
22 October 2003, B4, FASB Chairman Herz announced that the United States would adopt global standards 
within seven years. 
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equally represented on its standard setting body, the International Accounting Standards 
Board [IASB]. Though British experts are among those who represent Europe, thereby 
giving representatives of Implicit System a de facto majority, Continental European states 
may block IFRS proposals at the level of the European Commission and its affiliated expert 
commissions, which effectively forces the IASB to consider Continental European 
standards as well.387 It is thus reasonable to assume that Anglo-America and Continental 
Europe will enact rules that are somewhere on the middle ground.  
(2) European member states need to ensure that issuers inform the public “as soon as 
possible” of inside information by filing current change reports.388 In contrast, American 
law set relatively lax timelines and provided a relatively narrow exhaustive catalogue in 
Form 8-K. As originally adopted, companies could file the Form 8-K as late as 10 days 
after the end of the month in which an event requiring disclosure occurred. This meant that 
a company did not have to report a Form 8-K event occurring on the first day of a month 
until 40 days later. These provisions furthered an issuer’s apathy with respect to an early 
filing of material information, where the efficient market hypothesis would require it the 
most.389 In 2004, the SEC dramatically shortened the filing deadline for Form 8-K to two 
business days after an event triggering the form's disclosure requirements, and added 
various new items to the Form 8-K.390 In this case, American securities regulation 
                                            
387
 One example for the influence of Continental features is the regulation of the Management Discussion 
& Analysis [MD&A] (Financial Review by Management). According to s. 289 (2) of the HGB (German 
Commercial Code), this report contains forward looking statements, and disclosure of qualitative, rather than 
quantitative data. Being afraid of liability for misleading statements, Anglo-American firms had refrained 
from both. This was particularly unfortunate, since markets used to regard data on future developments as 
more important than data pertaining to the past. In 1979, the SEC adopted its safe harbour rule, which enabled 
American firms to publish forward looking statements with little risk, if they provided a disclaimer. 
Nevertheless, a comprehensive qualitative analysis of the quantitative data provided by management and 
reviewed by an auditor, has not become commonly accepted until recently. Another example constitutes the 
present discussion in the EU about the adoption of IAS 39 regarding derivatives.  
388
 See Article 6 (1) of European Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 
January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) [published 12 April 2003 in official 
bulletin, L96/16], According to s. 15 WpHG (German Securities Trading Law), this might mean hours, rather 
than days. According to the FSAP, issuers might postpone the current change report on their own risk of 
liability, if they guarantee that the information will not be disclosed to, or used by, any market participant. 
389
 Loss & Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (2001), at 475. 
390
 Regulation 13a-11, as amended by Rule 33-8400, Release No.: 34-49424 on “Additional Form 8-K 
Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date” of March 16th 2004, Effective Date: August 23, 
2004, online: <www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8400.htm>. These amendments are responsive to the "real time 
issuer disclosure" mandate in Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
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converged toward (more advanced) European law, which itself had been previously 
modelled after the Implicit System. 
(3) As shown above, a crucial element of the Explicit System is the individual information 
right. At the same time, according to the majority opinion, the Implicit System requires 
equal access of all market participants to disclosure of material information.391 These may 
conflict if shareholders ask for material, though yet undisclosed, information in shareholder 
meetings. Now having both advanced Explicit and Implicit Systems, German law faces the 
problem of how to harmonize both functional requirements. Giving up one of these would 
reduce the efficiency that the system provides, and this paper has shown that both systems 
may augment each other’s effectiveness.392 Thus, most commentators hold that the board 
might refrain from providing an answer in the shareholder meeting until a current change 
report is filed. The report, however, must be filed before the shareholders vote in the 
meeting.393 This compromise guides the way for future convergence toward a middle 
ground of Implicit and Explicit Systems. 
IV. Intermediate Result 
This section argued that the Explicit and the Implicit Systems of corporate control converge 
toward an intermediate ground due to the government’s propensity to learn from the other 
system, and to permanently improve its own system. This pattern of corporate law 
development was termed Convergence Cycles. Statutory and empirical evidence has 
demonstrated the American tendency toward integrating Explicit Elements into the system, 
while regulators attempt to perfect the Implicit System. In Germany, recent years have 
shown a rise in the use of Implicit System mechanisms, while the Explicit System has been 
permanently ameliorated. Further evidence supported the assumption that the Convergence 
Cycles remain remarkably vital in the present.  
                                            
391
 See the discussion initiated by Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966), as reflected 
by Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure (1991), at 253, 259 et seq. 
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In light of these observations, though path dependence has defined the starting points of 
Corporate Governance development, the future probably lies in the convergence of 
corporate law. The theory of Convergence Cycles, which I presented herein, suggests that 
the development will result in formal, rather than functional convergence. 
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D. Convergence of Ownership: An Equilibrium Hypothesis 
Assuming that corporate laws will eventually converge, will dispersed or concentrated 
ownership structures persist? Convergence literature on ownership development has only 
partially accepted the established corporate finance literature pertaining to ownership 
structure. This resulted in an overly simplified “black and white” discussion, more or less 
pre-occupied with the question of whether concentrated or dispersed ownership is generally 
preferable. Equivalent to the former sections’ inherent call for a concentration of the 
convergence debate back to the corporate law roots, this section strives to encourage 
comparative Corporate Governance scholars to more carefully consider what corporate 
finance has to tell us about ownership structures. It suggests that the combined forces of 
comparative and corporate finance research would probably result in much more 
complicated assumptions about ownership structure convergence than the current positions 
in literature reflect. It is the author’s intention to push the discussion’s focus from the 
overly simplistic question of “which ownership structure is better?” to the more difficult 
question of “which ownership structure is most efficient for which type of firm in a world 
of convergent corporate law?” 
The depths and rich facets of corporate finance theory inherently limit the scope of such an 
undertaking. Thus, I merely demonstrate the fertility of a corporate finance based 
convergence theory through one example based on Michael Jensen’s theory of free cash 
flow. The Boston Consulting Group’s [BCG] Matrix of business life cycles of a firm 
reflects this model in an easy-to-understand way. The application of the free cash flow 
theory to the question of what the best ownership structure is, suggests a dynamic, rather 
than static view: Ownership structures will neither systematically converge toward diffused, 
nor toward concentrated ownership. Instead, under efficient corporate law regimes, the 
ownership structure of a firm is likely to evolve with the business life cycle of the firm, 
starting with concentrated ownership, moving to dispersed ownership in the growth period, 
and moving back to concentrated ownership in the Cash Cow and the Dog periods. Neither 
the dispersed ownership structure that is said to prevail in the United States, nor the 
concentrated ownership of Germany will be permanent. Rather, the structures will move 
towards a cycle-dependent equilibrium.  
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Part I. introduces the discussion of which ownership structure is preferable, Part II. 
progressively develops the aforementioned proposition, Part III. considers why corporate 
law correlates with the ownership structures, and Part IV. examines the equilibrium 
ownership structure for Cash Cows, in particular. Finally, Part V. provides (partially 
empirical) support for the argument contained herein.  
I. Shareholder Monitoring and the Convergence Debate 
Convergence theorists have considered the impact of shareholder structures on monitoring 
efficiency.  
It is generally acknowledged that shareholders add value to the corporation as either 
monitors or advisors. The former function, in particular, may prevent managers from 
expropriating shareholder assets through shirking or stealing.394 Shirking diminishes the 
value of shareholder assets through all kinds of agency costs resulting from 
mismanagement, laziness or passivity that is caused by the drive to maximize managerial 
utility to the detriment of the firm and its stakeholders. Advanced corporate laws impose a 
duty of care which should prevent shirking.395 However, the duty of care allows directors to 
retain a wide latitude when it comes to decision-making.396 Courts have been reluctant to 
replace directorial discretion regarding ex ante business decisions with their own ex post 
wisdom. Instead, they have judged the directors’ conduct under a quasi-procedural standard 
known as the “business judgement rule.”397 Under this standard, courts take into account 
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 With respect to the following section, see Edward M. Iacobucci, “A Wise Decision? An Analysis of 
the Relationship between Corporate Ownership Structure and Directors´ and Officers´ Duties” (2002) 36 
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Wrigley, 247 N.E. 2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A, 
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whether the directors explored all relevant facts, whether they had considered expert 
opinions before a decision was made, and whether the decision itself was reasonable, fair 
and made in good faith.398 The wide discretion of directors allowed under the “business 
judgement rule” results in a legal vacuum, which needs to be filled by exogenous restraints, 
such as investor monitoring. Stealing includes all forms of illegal asset diversion from the 
corporation to someone else, for example to the managers themselves, their friends and 
families, and controlling shareholders. Advanced corporate laws address the problem of 
stealing in three ways.399 First, they require approval of every potentially beneficial 
transaction by (an independent committee of) the board of directors or the supervisory 
board as a prerequisite for its validity. Second, they require disclosure of the nature of the 
transaction. Third, they impose liability on managers (and controlling shareholders) through 
the concept of fiduciary duties. Without monitors who trigger its legal consequences, the 
fiduciary duty concept is, however, - despite its sharp and clear design - merely theoretical. 
With respect to restraining managers, large blockholders are considered to be more efficient 
as compared to other forms of shareholders.400 
In light of this functionality, comparative governance theorists have extensively debated 
about which form of shareholding (concentrated vs. dispersed) provides more benefits to 
holders of small shares. Commentators tend to hang on to one of two static positions on the 
development of ownership structures. Either they hold that concentrated ownership will 
                                                                                                                                     
2d 34 (Del. 1994), at 45; adopted for Canada for example in CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC Western 
International Communications Ltd. (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 755 (Gen. Div.). 
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persist, due its superior monitoring efficiency of managers,401 or they allege that 
competitive capital, takeover, product, and managerial labor markets would be as effective 
in restraining managers, as would large blockholders. However, concentrated ownership 
would result in illiquid blocks, which rational (large) investors would avoid, as well as a 
depressed value of small shares, due to the danger of expropriation by the blockholder. 
Thus, in developed markets, dispersed ownership would eventually prevail.402  
II. The Business Life Cycle Equilibrium 
Shareholders’ monitoring capacity is merely one of the possible restraints on managers that 
influence ownership structures. Others include firm size,403 the volatility of a firm’s cash 
flow depending on the industry of the firm,404 exposure of the firm to the public,405 state 
regulation, either directly,406 or indirectly through regulation of financial intermediaries,407 
states’ protective policy, resulting in a lack of competition,408 and the stage in the firm’s 
business life cycle.409 Given the rich array of possible influences on ownership structures, a 
convergence discussion that focuses on merely one aspect can be assumed to provide overly 
simple answers to complicated questions. This assumption is consistent with the present 
state of the discussion, which primarily focuses on the question of whether dispersed or 
concentrated ownership provides more efficient monitoring. 
Instead, this section proposes a multidimensional view on convergence of ownership 
structures, resulting in a dynamic theory of ownership convergence. As (only) one example 
of the likely impact of a multidimensional corporate finance view on ownership 
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convergence, this paper emphasises the fact that, besides exogenous factors, such as 
shareholder and creditor monitoring and market pressure, managers are also restrained by 
endogenous, hence business dependent, factors. Depending on the level of endogenous 
restraints that are operating effectively within the firm, there may or may not be a need for 
stronger exogenous restraints. In some cases, in fact, there will be little need for exogenous 
restraints if endogenous factors completely substitute for exogenous pressures that prevent 
directors from stealing and shirking. Since cash is crucial for the company’s survival in the 
short term and, thus, may provide for strong restraints on managers, an analysis of the 
likely level of endogenous restraints provided by the cash-flow of the firm might be 
particularly insightful.410 Thus, this section models the impact of cash restraints on the 
ownership structure of the firm, based on the simplified model of a firm’s life cycle that a 
matrix developed by the Boston Consulting Group provides.  
1. The BCG Matrix411 
According to the BCG matrix, a business can be categorized as falling within one of four 
stages in the business life cycle: (1) Problem Children / Question Marks, (2) Stars, (3) Cash 
Cows, or (4) Dogs.  
(1) Problem Children are firms with a low share of a high growth market. They consume 
excessive resources and generate little return. Problem Children absorb cash in an attempt 
to increase their market share. If they are successful, they become Stars. If they are 
unsuccessful, they become Dogs.  
(2) Stars are firms that provide products to high growth markets while they have a relatively 
high share of that market. Stars tend to generate high amounts of income. Growth might, 
however, consume significant parts of the income generated. When the market growth 
slows down, a Star will become a Cash Cow. When the Star falters in catching up with 
technological change, it will become a Dog.  
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(3) Cash Cows deliver products to slow growth markets, where they have high market 
shares. Cash Cows generate more income than is invested in them. When technological 
change provides a substitution for the products provided by the Cash Cow and, thus, the 
Cash Cow’s market share declines, it might become a Dog.  
(4) Dogs hold a low share of a low growth market. They do not generate cash, but tend to 
absorb it. Dogs constitute prime candidates for restructuring or insolvency. 
2. Different Level of Endogenous Restraints 
The level of endogenous restraints that align managerial interests with those of 
shareholders differs from stage to stage.  
(1) The Problem Child / Question Mark has no income and no growth. Cash is scarce and 
needs to be acquired from external financiers at a high cost (for example, from venture 
capitalists, creditors, friends & families, etc.). On the other hand, chances are that 
managerial effort will contribute to the firm’s growth, resulting in higher managerial 
benefits, through an increase in salary, a higher value of the management’s share in the 
firm, and a boost to the reputation of the managers. Since endogenous restraints push the 
manager’s back to the wall and, at the same time, provide positive incentives to managers, 
exogenous restraints should not be required to prevent managers from shirking. The 
monitoring role of shareholders is negligible. Shareholders might, however, participate in 
the firm in advisory, rather than supervisory, functions.412 
(2) Stars use large amounts of cash and are leaders in their business, so they should 
generate large amounts of cash. If the market share remains high, the reward will be the 
progression to a Cash Cow. In order to attain this goal, managers must work hard. In 
addition, despite their large market share, Stars are under permanent cash restraints because 
of their immense growth, while external financing is hard to achieve: The investment in 
Stars is – despite the large market share – risky, since the market growth can easily change 
the position of the Star into that of a dog, if the incumbent’s market share is outweighed by 
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that of a new entrant. Thus, creditors are unlikely to provide cash to the firm, and external 
financing through share issues would dilute the entrepreneurial stake, which the 
entrepreneur tries to avoid. Thus, during the Star period, growth provides significant 
endogenous restraints on the firm.  
(3) The Cash Cow produces more cash than its slow growth consumes. Its management has 
an easy job and the high returns create the inherent risk that managers will engage in 
inefficient investments for their utility’s sake. For example, managers might reinvest 
substantial cash amounts in their businesses which are mature and not growing anymore, or 
might engage in “empire building,” which subsequently results in higher management 
salaries than the profitability of the firm would justify.413 In Cash Cow businesses, 
endogenous restraints are low. 
(4) In Dog businesses, cash is (or has become) scarce, and the managerial position is in 
danger. With their backs to the wall, managerial shirking is unlikely. However, employees 
and managers might resist pressures to restructure or declare insolvency, due to the risk of 
losing their jobs, by “fighting an impossible battle” and, even worse, by engaging in 
hopeless or excessively risky414 attempts to “turn the business around.” Thus, specific 
endogenous pressures are insufficient to keep managerial and shareholder interests aligned. 
3. Equilibrium of Ownership Structure  
In light of this analysis, one can determine a “perfect ownership structure” for each stage in 
the business life cycle. As the level of endogenous restraints declines, the need for effective 
exogenous restraints increases in order to prevent managers from shirking. Assuming (1) 
that inefficiently organized firms will falter either in the product or the equity markets,415 
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and (2) that large shareholders are good monitors of managers,416 leads the way to an 
equilibrium theory of ownership structures, as follows.  
(1) Managers of Problem Children are bound by strong endogenous restraints. Insofar, 
there is no need for shareholder monitoring through concentrated ownership. However, 
blockholders may contribute to firm value through the provision of advice (which might be 
even more costly than monitoring). Furthermore, diffusion is likely to falter since the firm 
is inexperienced and unknown, which makes an investment highly speculative. Risk-
adjusted share prices would be low, and the costs of investor relations are high in 
proportion to the income of the firm. Thus, concentrated ownership would be the “perfect 
ownership structure” of the firm. 
(2) Growth provides strong endogenous restraints on Stars. In this stage, liquidity restraints 
may substitute for the impact that concentrated ownership could have on managerial 
incentives. The barriers to equity financing that exist at the Problem Children stage is likely 
to cease to exist to the same extent as the cash needs and the size of the firm increase. In 
theory, step-by-step, the entrepreneurs’ (or their heirs’) influence diminishes through 
dilution. According to the free cash-flow theory followed herein, as long as the Star 
consumes cash faster than it accumulates income, diffused ownership is likely to be the 
“perfect ownership structure,” due to an efficient level of endogenous restraints that 
balances management’s incentives to steal and shirk. 
(3) In Cash Cows, endogenous restraints do not exist: The product market might provide 
for sufficient restrains at the product level. However, the firm’s size and its established 
products might even impede competitors’ entry into the market. Furthermore, the capital 
market will not provide for restraints, since Cash Cows can rely on internal financing rather 
than tapping the capital markets. Further, share buybacks can keep share prices high, and 
render takeovers unlikely. Consequently, the free cash-flow theory suggests that 
concentrated ownership is most needed in the Cash Cow stage: the larger management’s 
leeway, the more that stronger shareholder influence is required in order to protect the firm 
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from managerial stealing and shirking.417 The precise level of concentration required 
depends on some other Corporate Governance aspects and, thus, will be explored more 
fully below.418 
(4) As shown above, in Dog firms, strong exogenous influence is required to pressure the 
firm into restructuring or insolvency.419 Shareholders will likely press for restructuring, 
while secured creditors will press for insolvency and reorganization if the shareholders’ 
pressure is unsuccessful. Consequently, exogenous pressure through concentrated 
ownership is required to save the rest of shareholders’ money (if there is any); otherwise, 
reorganization might result in re-concentration of ownership by equity issuances as part of a 
reorganization plan.  
4. Caveats 
The above view requires two cautionary notes. First, the practical problem created by the 
above proposition is to determine which firm is in which stage of its life cycle. Established 
firms tend to have a mix of products some of which are Cash Cows, and others which could 
be either Problem Children or Dogs. While the applicability of the above proposition is thus 
somewhat restrained, it should apply to firms that focus on a specific line of products.420 
Second, other endogenous restraints which corporate finance considers to be important, for 
example the intensity of research & development that the business of the firm requires, or 
the workers’ fluctuation, may be interrelated to the restraining effect that a scarcity of cash 
provides. Therefore, it needs to be emphasized – again - that the application of the BCG 
matrix should merely provide one example of the possible outcome of more closely 
connecting the convergence debate with corporate finance theory. 
                                            
417
 Jensen, “Agency Costs”, supra note 234, at 327 et seq. 
418
 Infra D.IV. 
419
 Supra, D.II.2.; see also Roe, Strong managers, Weak Owners (1994), at 253. 
420
 Portfolio theory suggests that unsystematic risk disappears in well diversified portfolios, and that 
shareholders can diversify at lower costs than firms. Further, investors can more easily diversify their 
portfolio with stocks of firms with a clear risk structure, see Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, Corporate Finance 
(1999), at 10.6, pp. 250 et seq. In light of portfolio theory, many firms strive for specialisation in order to 
lower their costs of capital. However, some firms (e.g. General Electric) resist this pressure and “diversify 
within themselves.” 
- 112 - 
III. The Correlation of Ownership Structure and Corporate Law 
The above has not yet explained why this equilibrium depends on efficient corporate law, 
hence, why efficient corporate law correlates with the equilibrium theory of ownership 
structures. The answer to this question provides arguments against both those offered by 
proponents of concentrated ownership and those of diffuse ownership persistence. 
Since only strong corporate law can protect small shareholders from expropriation by 
managers, some commentators have posited that the development of strong corporate law 
would result in strong capital markets with dispersed shareholdings.421 The conclusion is, 
however, not cogent. As shown above, strong corporate law provides for devices that 
enable active shareholders to prevent managers from stealing, while the wide discretion of 
directors allowed under the “business judgement rule” results in a legal vacuum that 
exogenous restraints may fill.422 Thus, having a blockholder who prevents managerial 
stealing and shirking may be a superior ownership structure to dispersed ownership, if 
corporate law and active423 minority shareholders prevent blockholders from diverting more 
assets than their monitoring function adds to the value of minority shareholders’ shares 
through both lower monitoring costs with respect to managers, and higher returns due to 
less managerial shirking.  
Without strong corporate law, shareholders will neither be interested in investing in a firm 
with dispersed shareholdings, nor in becoming minority shareholders. Minority 
shareholders in firms with concentrated ownership will fear expropriation by the majority, 
and those in firms with diffused ownership will fear expropriation by managers. Thus, 
strong corporate law is a prerequisite for the existence of small shareholding in any firm.424 
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Consequently, strong corporate law does not necessarily result in strong capital markets 
with dispersed shareholdings. 
IV. Equilibrium for Cash Cows 
In light of above considerations, one may determine an equilibrium ownership structure for 
Cash Cows. This will be demonstrated by a simplistic model that merely regards the triad 
of restraints that strong corporate law, shareholder monitoring, and the firm’s cash flow 
provide. 
Though explicit minority shareholder influence (which corporate laws may facilitate, for 
example through Konzernrecht) can protect minorities from expropriation by the majority, 
concentrated ownership may nevertheless be an inefficient structure. This is for the simple 
reason that concentrated owners may not be required to efficiently monitor the firm due to 
sufficient endogenous pressures. If this is the case, the potential damage of expropriation by 
a blockholder outweighs the potential benefit associated with decreased managerial 
shirking. Further, commentators have held that controlling shareholder monitoring systems 
are less flexible and thus may not be able to  
adapt quickly to large and abrupt changes in the economic environment. [Thus, t]he 
stability associated with an efficient controlling shareholder system [may] become a 
barrier to necessary adaption; in this circumstance, a widely-held shareholder system, 
with control open to the market, likely will be more efficient.425  
Both considerations support the proposition that dispersed ownership might be an optimal 
structure for high growth firms in the Star-stage.426  
Different might be true, however, with respect to Cash Cows. Given that blockholders are 
better monitors than dispersed shareholders, better monitoring may increase the value of all 
shares, due to higher returns of the firm (assumption 1).427 On the other hand, while 
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corporate law can confine the ability of blockholders to expropriate the assets of the 
minority, corporate law is not perfect in doing so, nor are there always active minority 
shareholders who monitor the majority. Thus, even though corporate law is strong, the 
presence of large blocks of shares constitutes a risk that depresses share prices. One can 
assume that the risk increases in proportion to the size of the block, until it reaches the 
control level. Beyond the level of control, the risk should stay constantly very high 
(assumption 2). While assumptions 1 and 2 push share prices in different directions, it is 
likely428 that there is a point of equilibrium at which blockholders are effective monitors 
who provide little threat to the value of the remaining shares, thereby creating an overall 
positive effect for minority and majority shareholders alike.  
Economists’ data show a significant correlation between directorial share ownership429 and 
market evaluation, as measured by Tobin’s Q. This correlation is understood to reflect the 
market evaluation of the incentive structure for directors on the one hand, and the tendency 
and capability of the directors to shirk and steal on the other hand.430 The data show a point 
at which the percentage of directorial ownership optimises the value that the director adds 
to the firm. This point has been found to exist at approximately 5% of a firm’s stock. Larger 
concentrations (>5%) affect share prices negatively.431 Very large blocks (>65%) also 
positively correlate with added value. These very large concentrations, however, can be 
presumed to result in high discounts due to the risk of minority expropriation, and will 
therefore be excluded for the purposes of further analysis. Smaller blocks (<5%) do not 
affect share prices as positively as 5% blocks. These data suggest that the equilibrium at 
which blockholders are the most efficient monitors, while at the same time the value of the 
minority shareholders’ stake suffers only to a minor degree, lies in the vicinity of 5%. 
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These data are quite dated. Since Randall Morck and others have studied the impact of 
directorial shareholdings on share prices, corporate law has increased its firm grip on 
majority shareholders. Thus, some control considerations based on current corporate law 
provisions might help to define the equilibrium ownership more accurately. On the one 
hand, large shareholdings correlate with stronger influence on management. For example, 
5% or 10% of the shares may constitute a threshold for the exercise of important minority 
rights.432 Furthermore, management can hardly deny a shareholder who holds shares in the 
range of 10% or more a seat on the board of directors without risking retaliation through a 
proxy fight or a takeover bid. This threat will account for permanent access to management 
and influence on the financing and investment structure of the firm. Thus, blocks in the 
range of 5% - 10% or more provide for influence that could be used for effective 
monitoring. 
However, the utility curve of large shareholdings does not rise permanently. Size can 
become costly, both factually and legally. Size negatively correlates with liquidity of the 
stocks,433 and with portfolio diversification, hence risk-spreading. Burdensome disclosure 
duties apply to large shareholdings.434 Large shareholders might be considered to be 
controlling shareholders under the American doctrines of piercing the corporate veil435, and 
of lender liability and equitable subordination,436 or the German material equity doctrine,437 
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and Konzernrecht.438 Furthermore, large shareholdings might trigger specific fiduciary 
duties to minority shareholders, the duty to establish special meetings of the board, the duty 
of a mandatory tender offer439 or the applicability of provisions of the appraisal remedy.440 
Eventually, tax authorities might re-characterize the firm’s financing and dividend 
distribution behavior, with negative tax consequences following for the controlling 
shareholder.  
Thus, control comes at high costs, while – given effective corporate law and active minority 
shareholder monitoring – the benefits of control are not guaranteed. In these circumstances, 
large, but not necessarily controlling, shareholding might be efficient. Since judicature 
created many of the large shareholder’s possible obligations, the threshold that triggers 
these duties is not always defined with a high degree of precision or certainty. It may, 
however, be suggested that a block of more than 15% comes with significant financial 
risks. A large shareholder will also consider the aforementioned liquidity and 
diversification restraints. Further, having a lower overall share might encourage other 
shareholders to share in the burden of monitoring, while a negligible share raises the overall 
costs, due to the additional costs associated with coordinating many shareholders. Thus, I 
hypothesize that the equilibrium of positive influence on management through monitoring, 
and the negative impacts of large shareholdings is in the vicinity of 5-10%.  
                                                                                                                                     
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank, [1992] 97 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 419 (SCC). See also 
Robert Charles Clark, “The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors” (1977) Harv. L.R. 90, 505. 
437
 This is the German equivalent to the American doctrine of equitable subordination. The German 
Federal Supreme Court has held that the threshold for the re-qualification of credit into “material equity” is 
generally 25% of a stock corporation, see BGHZ 90, 381 – WestLB/BuM-. 
438
 In the absence of additional factors, control is triggered at 30%. 
439
 With respect to last three devices under Delaware Corporate Law, see Gilson & Gordon, “Controlling 
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440
 Supra, B.II.2. 
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V. A Tendency 
The equilibrium hypothesis only regards a tiny aspect of the rich corporate finance 
literature. It nevertheless provides an interesting example for the fertility of the combination 
of traditional corporate finance with the convergence debate. A closer examination of the 
model presented here would need to examine whether and why the aforementioned 
dynamic model will substitute for the static position. In particular, it would require a 
detailed argument against the position of functional convergenists that difference Corporate 
Governance systems may solve the same monitoring problem through different 
institutions.441 This detailed argument is beyond the scope of this section that merely 
intended to encourage further consideration of corporate finance literature in the 
convergence debate. Despite the lack of completeness, and although corporate law 
convergence is not yet complete, some data nevertheless support the accuracy of the 
dynamic model of a cycle-dependent ownership equilibrium theory.  
1. Concentration and Diffusion 
On the one hand, Mark Roe has presented empirical data that suggest ongoing 
concentration of ownership in the United States.442 On the other hand, John Coffee has 
presented data that suggest a decline of concentrated ownership in Germany.443 Data that 
the author retrieved from his survey augment the overall picture.444 These figures are 
consistent with data provided on declining attendance rates in shareholder meetings 
provided in Appendix C.445 
                                            
441
 Gilson, “Economic Efficiency”, supra note 14, at 332, and “Globalizing”, supra note 14. 
442
 Roe, “Corporate Law’s Limits”, supra note 9, at 250, note 24, cites a study, which put forth that the 
average directors’ ownership has risen from 13% of the voting stock in 1935 to 21% in 1995. 
443
 Coffee, “The Rise”, supra note 10, at p. 15 et seq. shows the decline in block-holdings in Continental 
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444
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voting shares into voting stock in 2002), Munich Re (Allianz in 2002-2003), RWE (municipalities, since 
2002), ThyssenKrupp (foundation of Thyssen, 2003). 
445
 Supra, B.III.3.a). 
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In addition, Appendix F provides an overview with respect to foreign ownership 
development in some German DAX 30 firms. In only 4 of 20 firms in the German sample 
foreign do shareholdings decrease. Since international investors are primarily institutional 
investors, internationalisation can be interpreted as a proxy for both ongoing dispersion (as 
compared to former concentrated ownership) and ongoing concentration (as compared to 
diffused ownership) in German firms. 
2. Legal and Contractual Concentration 
The former figures merely cover the development of concentrated ownership in the form of 
a legal person that holds the shares. This, however, does not cover the full array of the 
topic. Since the equilibrium for Cash Cows was developed from the necessity of efficiently 
controlling managers, while averting the likelihood of minority expropriation, any kind of 
coordinated (threat of) exercising of a large number of shareholder rights may have the 
desired monitoring effect: On the one hand, concentration of ownership power can mean 
legally concentrated ownership, i.e. that shares are held by one legal entity [legal 
concentration]. This does not, however, necessarily imply that the beneficiary is just one 
natural person or family, as the examples of holding or investment companies demonstrate. 
On the other hand, concentrated ownership can also mean contractually concentrated 
ownership [contractual concentration]. This means that many (per se less efficient) small 
monitors enter into an agreement resulting in increased pressures on managers. The most 
intense form is the employment of an external monitor by the shareholders. Less intense 
forms might include factual cooperation coordinated through a central agency to which 
contractual relationships exist.  
This other form of ownership concentration prevails in the United States. While for a long 
time the bank’s trust business was the sole form of contractual concentration,446 in the last 
15 -20 years a form of contractual concentration that is independent of any connection to 
banks has developed in the United States,447 which is probably due to the fact that 
                                            
446
 See citations supra note 31. 
447
 The Council of Institutional Investors was founded in 1985. For the history of shareholder activism, see 
Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, “A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence” 
(1998) Contemporary Finance Digest 2, 10 
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burdensome securities laws blocked the path of legal concentration.448 The United States 
has further developed the path of contractual concentration through an intermediary. This 
intermediary can be a proxy voting service like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) or 
Georgeson Shareholders that recommends voting to a large number of its clients, or an 
institutionalized activist group that coordinates its members’ actions, such as the Council of 
Institutional Investors (CII), or the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). 
Though not as stable – and hence not as efficient in monitoring managers –as compared to 
legal concentration, these associations are a fluent form of concentrated ownership power. 
Under this definition, there is ongoing concentration of ownership power in the United 
States.  
In Germany (facilitated through traditionally less burdensome rules), legal concentration is 
(still) prevailing, in the form of holding and insurance companies. Most of the dispersed 
shareholders were represented by their banks, which is itself a form of contractual 
concentration of ownership power. Shareholders’ association of interests filled the niche for 
those shareholders who did not want to assign the bank in representing their interests. Until 
recently, voting services were not viable businesses in Germany, given that banks and 
shareholder association charged no additional fees449 for the aforementioned services to 
either the corporation or the shareholders. One can assume that the need for bank-
independent forms of contractual concentration will increase to the same extent, as legal 
concentration decreases, and banks retreat from offering proxy services at no costs. 
Though both above theory and its empirical testing excluded many other factors that might 
have influenced ownership structure development, it is nevertheless noticeable that – in 
light of a contractual ownership perspective - ownership structures in the United States and 
Germany apparently converge on a middle ground between dispersed and concentrated 
ownership. This result, that is consistent with the path that the (very limited) equilibrium 
hypothesis above predicted, is apt to encourage further studies, which interrelate corporate 
finance and comparative Corporate Governance theory. 
                                            
448
 See Mark Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners (1994), at 51 et seq. 
449
 Besides regular depository or membership fees. 
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E. Conclusion 
Many answers to questions of comparative Corporate Governance theory depend on 
whether one has an optimistic or pessimistic attitude towards the world. Thus, to the same 
extent that the precise prediction of the future is deemed to be valuable in that it enables 
one to make better choices in the present, the academic achievement of convergence theory 
consists of the insights that a comparative study provides into the similarities and 
differences, and into the functionality of, present Corporate Governance systems.  
With respect to these characteristics of comparative Corporate Governance analyses, this 
study is no exception: in providing a new categorization for systems of shareholder rights 
that utilizes the concepts of Implicit and Explicit Systems of corporate control, it has 
emphasized one efficient functional aspect of the present American and German systems 
that other studies have neglected to point out. This aspect pertains to the different meaning 
ascribed to the shareholder rights by each system, which is signalled through different 
provisions regarding the shareholder meeting’s preparation, execution, and the sanctions 
following from a showing of disrespect for the law. This difference was explained to the 
reader as being predicated upon the different ethical ideals that eventually resulted in either 
a friendly or hostile attitude towards market forces.  
The predictive part included one hypothesis regarding corporate law, and one hypothesis 
regarding ownership. Regarding corporate law, recent years have shown the practical 
attitude of the legislatures that are on the lookout for efficient solutions to the problem of 
how to control managers and majority shareholders. Thus, a development in Convergence 
Cycles, hence the legislatures’ tendency to mimic good solutions, and to learn from each 
other’s failures, is likely and might finally result in the formal convergence of corporate 
law. Regarding ownership, it has been demanded that comparative Corporate Governance 
more closely interrelates with established corporate finance theory, which complicates the 
questions that academia must answer, but increases the probability of achieving accurate 
results. As an example for the fertility of such coordination, the application of the free cash 
flow theory to comparative Corporate Governance resulted in a dynamic, rather than static 
position on the convergence debate pertaining to ownership structures: Dispersed and 
concentrated ownership are likely to become proxies for different stages of the firm in the 
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business life cycle. Concentrated ownership is likely to prevail at the beginning, and at the 
end, while the period of strong and profitable growth is marked by a diffusion of 
ownership. During the Cash Cow period, the theory suggests that ownership re-
concentrates, either in the hands of one or more legal entities holding large blocks of shares, 
or through the indirect or direct contractual co-ordination of a large number of smaller 
institutional investors. 
Eventually, the wheel of time will show who is wrong and who is right with respect to the 
two hypotheses regarding future developments. Besides predicting the future, academia’s 
function is, however, to look out for solutions to problems of the present. The idea of 
convergence towards a point between Skylla and Charybdis, hence on a middle ground 
between a system relying primarily on market forces, and a system primarily relying on 
direct shareholder influence, might best fulfil this other purpose of academic study. Authors 
tend to exaggerate the meaning of their own work. The author nevertheless hopes that the 
insight he has provided will help to spur legislative activity on both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean - which, at the same time, would initiate the next turn of the Convergence Cycles. In 
light of this prediction, it might not be coincidental that many cultures associate the 
geometric form of circle with perfection. 
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